Archive for March, 2007

May v. State

Friday, March 30th, 2007

MILTON MAY, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

Case No. 2D06-733

COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, SECOND DISTRICT

 
 March 30, 2007, Opinion Filed

NOTICE:    [*1]  NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
PRIOR HISTORY:   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County; Dennis P. Maloney, Judge.

DISPOSITION:   Affirmed.

COUNSEL:   James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Bruce P. Taylor, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Danilo Cruz-Carino, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

JUDGES:   LaROSE, Judge. CASANUEVA and SALCINES, JJ., Concur.

OPINION BY:   LaROSE

 OPINION:   LaROSE, Judge.

Milton May appeals his convictions and sentences for possession of marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia. He argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress contraband found during a traffic stop of a truck in which he was a passenger. Because Mr. May was legally detained and abandoned the contraband, we affirm.

Deputy Cronin stopped a truck driven by Raymond Maines because it had no tag light. He asked Mr. Maines for his license and registration; he asked Mr. May for identification. Mr. Maines admitted that his license was suspended, thus providing probable cause for his arrest. See Rennard v. State, 675 So. 2d 1006, 1008 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996);  [*2]  State v. Pugh, 635 So. 2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Mr. May gave Deputy Cronin an identification card. Deputy Cronin returned to his cruiser to run a name check. Deputy Kincaid arrived as backup. He walked around the truck to ensure there was nothing on the ground. Deputy Cronin returned to the truck to arrest Mr. Maines and ordered him out of the vehicle. Mr. May tried to exit at the same time, but Deputy Cronin ordered him to stay inside.

As Deputy Cronin talked to Mr. Maines, Deputy Kincaid stood by the right passenger door. Mr. May attempted to reach into his jacket pocket. Mr. May opened the door and tried to exit several times, but Deputy Kincaid directed him to stay in the truck. At one point, Deputy Kincaid saw a small blue pouch, an orange pill bottle, and a pack of cigarettes fall to the ground from the passenger side. He noticed that Mr. May’s jacket pocket was turned inside out.

After arresting Mr. Maines, Deputy Cronin placed him in the cruiser. Even though the deputies had the right to search the truck incident to the arrest, see State v. Frierson, 926 So. 2d 1139, 1145 (Fla. 2006), Mr. Maines consented to a search of his truck.  [*3]  All the while, Mr. May remained seated in the truck. Deputy Cronin left Mr. Maines secured in the cruiser and returned to the truck to talk to Mr. May.

Deputy Kincaid told Deputy Cronin that Mr. May had dropped the pouch, pill bottle, and cigarette pack from the truck. Deputy Kincaid examined these items and found a syringe, baggies of methamphetamine, marijuana, and a spoon with methamphetamine residue. Mr. May admitted to owning the cigarette pack. When Deputy Cronin searched the truck bed, he found a duffle bag containing a scale dusted with methamphetamine residue. The bag also contained a letter addressed to Mr. May. n1 Mr. May was arrested for drug-related offenses.

- – - – - – - – - – - – - – Footnotes – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -

n1 The items discovered in the truck bed were not the subject of Mr. May’s motion to suppress.
 

- – - – - – - – - – - – End Footnotes- – - – - – - – - – - – - -

Mr. May moved to suppress the contraband found on the ground, arguing that Deputy Kincaid seized it through an illegal detention and search. The State argued that Mr. May was legally detained and had abandoned the contraband. See Williams v. State, 640 So. 2d 1206, 1208 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).  [*4]  The trial court agreed with the State and denied Mr. May’s motion.

If a defendant abandons property as a result of an illegal detention, the trial court should suppress the evidence. Welch v. State, 689 So. 2d 1240, 1241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Cox v. State, 586 So. 2d 1321, 1322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Here, however, the deputies lawfully detained Mr. May. See State v. Holland, 680 So. 2d 1041, 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), aff’d, 696 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1997) (holding that detention is legal where valid objective reason supports it). Because Mr. Maines’ driver’s license was suspended, Deputy Cronin had reasonable cause to arrest him; thus, he also had authority to search the truck incident to the arrest. See Frierson, 926 So. 2d at 1144 . All occupants may be detained during a valid search of a vehicle. See State v. Cromatie, 668 So. 2d 1075, 1077 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); State v. Breed, 917 So. 2d 206, 209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). The contraband found on the ground was admissible against Mr. May because he abandoned it during his legal detention. See Williams, 640 So. 2d at 1208  [*5]  . Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress.

Affirmed.
 
CASANUEVA and SALCINES, JJ., Concur.

State v. Branham

Friday, March 30th, 2007

STATE OF FLORIDA, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL BRANHAM, Respondent.

Case No. 2D06-3676

COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, SECOND DISTRICT

 
 March 30, 2007, Opinion Filed

NOTICE:    [*1]  NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
PRIOR HISTORY:   Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Hardee County; Susan W. Roberts, Judge.
COUNSEL:   Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Danilo Cruz-Carino, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Petitioner.
 
Lawrence D. Shearer of McDonald & Shearer, P.A., Lakeland, for Respondent.

JUDGES:   CANADY, Judge. CASANUEVA, J., Concurs. SILBERMAN, J., Concurs specially with opinion.

OPINION BY:   CANADY

 OPINION:   CANADY, Judge.

The State seeks certiorari review of the trial court’s order determining that certain testimony is subject to the lawyer-client privilege. Because we conclude that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous and that the requirements for certiorari relief have been met, we grant the State’s petition.

I. Background

This certiorari proceeding arises from the prosecution of Michael Branham (the defendant) for the murder of his wife, Janette L. Branham (the victim). In the criminal proceeding, the defendant filed a “Notice of Exercise of Attorney-Client Privilege” with respect to certain communications between W. James Kelly, a practicing lawyer, and the defendant.

Prior to the defendant’s  [*2]  indictment, Kelly was subpoenaed by the State to give a sworn statement. After raising the issue of lawyer-client privilege, Kelly was instructed by a circuit judge to answer the State’s questions. Kelly then gave a sworn statement in which he testified that during the week preceding the victim’s death, the defendant told Kelly that he intended to kill the victim. After the defendant’s indictment, Kelly was listed by the State as a “person having information” with respect to the case.

In response to the defendant’s notice concerning Kelly, the State filed a motion seeking a determination that the communications between the defendant and Kelly were not subject to the protection of the lawyer-client privilege. After considering the circumstances surrounding the communication by the defendant to Kelly, the trial court entered an order determining that “the Defendant’s Exercise of Lawyer-Client Privilege is allowed.” The State now seeks to have this order of the trial court quashed.

At the hearing on the State’s motion, Kelly testified that several months before the death of the victim, the Branhams began having marital problems and discussed filing for divorce. Because Kelly was a friend  [*3]  to both of the Branhams, Kelly made it clear to them that he would not represent either of them in the divorce proceedings. However, Kelly agreed to act as a “go-between” for the Branhams in their efforts to resolve their differences.

Sometime during the week prior to the victim’s death, Kelly went to the defendant’s house on a social visit. Kelly testified that he and the defendant were discussing the Branhams’ marital problems and that “some of [the discussion] was just shooting the breeze, some of it was just talk.” During the conversation, the defendant inquired if Kelly was his attorney and Kelly responded “Sure.” Immediately thereafter, the defendant stated that he was going to kill his wife. According to Kelly, the defendant’s threat occurred “right in the middle of the conversation.” The defendant subsequently repeated the threat several more times during their conversation. Kelly’s response to the defendant each time he made the threat was “You’re crazy. I don’t even want to hear it” and “Don’t talk like that.” When Kelly was asked whether he gave the defendant advice or counsel, Kelly testified:

I don’t think he was asking me. I don’t know what his intentions were.  [*4]  I just know what I replied to him was certainly not in the context of a criminal lawyer. As far as I know, the issue of what he was telling me, I didn’t think that had anything to do with anything going on. I mean, it just came whistling out of the clear blue.
Kelly also testified that the defendant never requested Kelly’s assistance to plan, commit, or get away with a crime.

When asked if he was “talking to [the defendant] as his attorney with regard[] to the divorce,” Kelly said “No.” When asked if he was “talking to [the defendant] strictly as a friend,” Kelly said “Yes.” Kelly further testified that he warned the victim concerning the threats made by the defendant. There was no testimony before the trial court indicating that in the conversation between the defendant and Kelly, the defendant either sought or received any legal advice concerning any matter.

The trial court’s ruling that the lawyer-client privilege was applicable was based on the crucial determination that when Kelly “responded to [the defendant] indicating that he was his lawyer, he became such and [the defendant] had a right to rely on that affirmation.” In its certiorari petition, the State  [*5]  argues-as it did before the trial court-that the defendant neither sought nor received legal advice and that the lawyer-client privilege was therefore inapplicable.

II. Certiorari Jurisdiction

We have common law certiorari jurisdiction here because the trial court’s decision at issue would “‘substantially impair[] the ability of the [S]tate to prosecute its case’” and thereby cause irreparable prejudice to the State. State v. Pettis, 520 So. 2d 250, 253 (Fla. 1988) (quoting State v. Steinbrecher, 409 So. 2d 510, 511 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)). “[C]ertiorari review is appropriate” with respect to a “pretrial order excluding one of [the State's] witnesses from testifying at trial . . . because the [S]tate has no right to a direct appeal in the event the defendant is acquitted.” State v. Gerry, 855 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Certiorari relief will be granted only in “those situations where ‘there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.’ ” Pettis, 520 So. 2d at 254 (quoting Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93, 96 (Fla. 1983)).  [*6] 

III. The Basis for the Lawyer-Client Privilege

Section 90.502(2), Florida Statutes (2005), provides that “[a] client has a privilege . . . to prevent any other person from disclosing . . . the contents of confidential communications when such other person learned of the communications because they were made in the rendition of legal services to the client.” (Emphasis added.) Under section 90.502(1)(b), client is defined as “any person . . . who consults a lawyer with the purpose of obtaining legal services or who is rendered legal services by a lawyer.” (Emphasis added.)

The statute makes clear that the lawyer-client privilege only applies to communications if they “were made in the rendition of legal services to the client.” § 90.502(2). A person cannot be considered a client and therefore cannot obtain the protection of the lawyer-client privilege unless the person either “consult[ed] a lawyer with the purpose of obtaining legal services” or was “rendered legal services by a lawyer.” § 90.502(1)(b).

“The purpose of the [lawyer-client] privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403, 96 S. Ct. 1569, 48 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1976).  [*7]  The privilege “protects only those disclosures necessary to obtain informed legal advice.” Id. “[I]f a communication with a lawyer is not made with him in his professional capacity as a lawyer, no privilege attaches.” Skorman v. Hovnanian of Fla., Inc., 382 So. 2d 1376, 1378 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Thus, the lawyer-client privilege “does not extend to every statement made to a lawyer.” Modern Woodmen of Am. v. Watkins, 132 F.2d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 1942). A statement made “to [a] lawyer merely as a personal friend” is not subject to the privilege. Id.

IV. The Defendant Neither Sought Nor

Received Legal Services

Here, the evidence before the trial court unequivocally established that in the conversation with Kelly at the defendant’s home, the defendant never asked for any legal advice and Kelly never gave any legal advice. The defendant did not “consult” Kelly “with the purpose of obtaining legal services,” and Kelly did not “render[] legal services” to the defendant. § 90.502(1)(b). The defendant’s statements to Kelly that the defendant intended to kill his wife were not “made in [connection with] the rendition of legal services  [*8]  to” the defendant. § 90.502(2). In ruling that the statements made by the defendant to Kelly were subject to the lawyer-client privilege, the trial court failed to apply the clear-and clearly applicable-provisions of sections 90.502(1)(b) and 90.502(2).

There is no legal basis for the trial court’s conclusion that because Kelly told the defendant that Kelly was the defendant’s attorney, the defendant was entitled to rely on the lawyer-client privilege. The lawyer-client privilege is not established by incantation. Nor does the privilege come into existence simply because a party believes that it exists.

Kelly was the defendant’s attorney in a then-pending negligence case, and Kelly had previously represented the defendant in other civil matters. But the existence of the lawyer-client relationship between Kelly and the defendant with respect to the negligence case and the other matters did not establish a lawyer-client relationship with respect to the matters discussed in the course of the conversation at issue here. That conversation was totally unrelated to any lawyer-client relationship between Kelly and the defendant. See United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1463 (7th Cir. 1997)  [*9]  (“Regardless of [the attorney's] prior lawyer-client relationship with [the defendant], [the defendant] simply failed to meet his burden of establishing that his present involvement with [the attorney] was with [him] in his capacity as a legal advisor.”).

V. Conclusion

The State’s petition is granted, the writ is issued, and the order on review is quashed.

Petition granted.
 
CASANUEVA, J., Concurs.
 
SILBERMAN, J., Concurs specially with opinion.

CONCUR BY:   SILBERMAN

 CONCUR:   SILBERMAN, Judge, Specially concurring.

I concur in the majority opinion. I also note that section 90.502(4), Florida Statutes (2005), states as follows: “There is no lawyer-client privilege under this section when: (a) The services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew was a crime or fraud.” Thus, if Branham had consulted with Kelly to enable or to aid Branham in killing his wife, no privilege would apply.

The only evidence before the trial court in relation to the privilege issue was Kelly’s sworn statement and his hearing testimony. Branham did not testify or present other evidence that he was  [*10]  seeking legal advice from Kelly when he volunteered that he was going to kill his wife. Based on the evidence and the circumstances presented, I agree that the trial court erred in determining that the lawyer-client privilege applied.

In Re: Standard Jury Instructions

Thursday, March 29th, 2007

IN RE: STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES–NO. 2005-1.

No. SC05-803

SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

 March 29, 2007, Decided

NOTICE:    [*1]  NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.

COUNSEL:   The Honorable Terry David Terrell, Chair, Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, First Judicial Circuit, Pensacola, Florida, the Honorable Dedee S. Costello, Past Chair, Fourteenth Judicial Circuit, Panama City, Florida, Les Garringer, Staff Liaison, Office of the State Courts Administrator, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner.
 
Bart Schneider, Lake Mary, Florida and the Honorable David A. Glant, Eighth Judicial Circuit, Gainesville, Florida, Responding with comments.

JUDGES:   LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ. concur.

OPINION:   Original Proceeding — Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases
 
PER CURIAM.

The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (Committee) filed a report on May 6, 2005, proposing amendments to Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases 8.6–Stalking; 8.7(a)–Aggravated Stalking; 8.7(b)–Aggravated Stalking–Injunction Entered; 8.8–Aggravated Stalking–Victim Under 16 Years of Age; 10.15–Felons Possessing Weapons; 13.2–Possession of Burglary Tools; and 14.1–Theft.  [*2]  The Committee also proposed new instructions 11.14–Dangerous Sexual Felony Offender, and 13.21–Impairing or Impeding Telephone or Power to a Dwelling to Facilitate or Further a Burglary.

The Court published the proposals for comment in the July 1, 2005, edition of The Florida Bar News. Two comments were received. Following submission by the Committee of an amended proposal to instruction 8.7(a), the Court published that proposal for comment in the October 15, 2005, edition of The Florida Bar News. One comment was received. On October 30, 2006, the Committee filed an amended report revising its proposals with regard to instructions 8.7(b), 10.15, and 13.21, and withdrawing its proposal with regard to instruction 14.1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

We decline to authorize instruction 11.14–Dangerous Sexual Felony Offender, for publication and use pending further study and a report by the Committee. Instruction 11.14 would create a new jury instruction for the classification of “Dangerous Sexual Felony Offender.” The proposal derives from the rewording of section 794.0115, Florida Statutes, in chapter 2003-115, Laws  [*3]  of Florida, to include a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years of imprisonment for those classified as dangerous sexual felony offenders under the “Dangerous Sexual Offender Act.” Under the statutory scheme, a defendant may be adjudicated a dangerous sexual felony offender if he or she is convicted of committing certain enumerated offenses, see § 794.0115(2), Fla. Stat. (2006), as well as having done so under five alternative circumstances. We are concerned with the proposal in respect to the alternative circumstance under section 794.0115(2)(e), that the defendant “[h]as previously been convicted of a violation of [various statutes].” Unlike section 794.0115(4), Florida Statutes, the proposed instruction does not include qualifying language for “previously been convicted.” Section 794.0115(4) provides that “[t]he offense described in subsection (2) which is being charged must have been committed after the date of commission of the last prior conviction for an offense that is a prior conviction described in paragraph (2)(e).” Therefore, we refer this proposed instruction back to the Committee to address this  [*4]  issue.

Having considered the Committee’s amended report and the comments filed, we hereby authorize the publication and use of the other proposed instructions, as set forth in the appendix to this opinion, with a minor modification. n1 In doing so, we express no opinion on the correctness of those instructions and remind all interested parties that this authorization forecloses neither requesting additional or alternative instructions nor contesting the legal correctness of the instructions. We further caution all interested parties that any notes and comments associated with the instructions reflect only the opinion of the Committee and are not necessarily indicative of the views of this Court as to their correctness or applicability. New language is indicated by underlining, and deleted language is struck through. The instructions as set forth in the appendix shall be effective when this opinion becomes final.

- – - – - – - – - – - – - – Footnotes – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -

n1 With regard to the proposed version of instruction 8.6–Stalking, the Court corrected the statutory citation for “stalking” in the chart for the lesser included offenses.
 

- – - – - – - – - – - – End Footnotes- – - – - – - – - – - – - –  [*5] 

It is so ordered.
 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ. concur.

APPENDIX

8.6 STALKING

§ 784.048(2), Fla. Stat.

To prove the crime of Stalking, the State must prove the following element beyond a reasonable doubt:

[EDITOR'S NOTE: THE TEXT WITHIN THESE SYMBOLS [O> O< ] IS OVERSTRUCK IN THE SOURCE.]

(Defendant) willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly [followed] [O>orO< ] [harassed] [or] [cyberstalked] (victim).

Definitions.

“Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.

“Cyberstalk” means to engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words, images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.
 

 [*6] 

Comment

This instruction was approved in 1995 [657 So. 2d 1152] and amended in 2007 to include cyberstalking.

8.7(a) AGGRAVATED STALKING

§ 784.048(3), Fla. Stat.

To prove the crime of Aggravated Stalking, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. (Defendant) willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly [followed] [O>orO< ] [harassed] [or] [cyberstalked] (victim).
 
2. (Defendant) made a credible threat with the intent to place (victim) in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury to [himself] [herself] [(name of the subject of threat)].

Give if applicable.

(Name of subject of threat) was (victim)’s [child] [sibling][spouse] [parent] [dependent].

Definitions.

“Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.

“Cyberstalk” means to engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words,  [*7]  images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.

“Credible threat” means a threat made with the intent to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety. The threat must be against the life of, or a threat to cause bodily injury to, a person.

Lesser Included Offenses
 

STALKING — 784.048(2)
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO.
None      
  Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1
AGGRAVATED STALKING — 784.048(3)
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO.
Stalking   784.048(2) 8.6
  Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1
  Assault 784.011 8.1
  Improper exhibition of 790.10 10.5
  dangerous weapon    

Comment

This instruction was approved in 1995 [657 So. 2d 1152] and amended in 2007 to incorporate cyberstalking.

8.7(b) AGGRAVATED STALKING

(Injunction Entered)

§ 784.048(4), Fla. Stat.

To prove the crime of Aggravated Stalking, the State must prove the following [O>twoO< ] three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. (Defendant)knowingly,  [*8]  willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly [followed] or [harassed] [or] [cyberstalked] (victim).
 
[O>Give 2a, 2b, or 2c as applicable
 
2. (Defendant) did so in violation of

a. an injunction for protection against repeat violence.
 
b. an injunction for protection against domestic violence.
 
c. any [other] court imposed prohibition of conduct toward (the victim) or (victim’s) property.

O< ]
 
Give 2a or 2b as applicable.
 
2. At the time of the [following] [harassing] [cyberstalking],

a. an injunction for protection against [repeat] [sexual] [dating] [domestic] violence had been entered against (defendant) for the benefit of (victim).
 
b. a court had imposed a prohibition of conduct on (defendant) toward (victim)or (victim’s property).

3. (Defendant)knew that the [injunction] [court-imposed prohibition of conduct] had been entered against [him] [her].
Definitions.

“Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific  [*9]  person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.

“Cyberstalk” means to engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words, images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.

[O>"Credible threat" means a threat made with the intent to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety. The threat must be against the life of, or a threat to cause bodily injury to, a person.O< ]

Lesser Included Offenses
 

Comment

This instruction was adopted in 1995 [657 So. 2d 1152]  [*10]  and amended in 2007.

8.8 AGGRAVATED STALKING

(Victim under 16 years of age)

§ 784.048(5), Fla. Stat.

To prove the crime of aggravated stalking, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. (Defendant) willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly [followed] or [harassed] [or] [cyberstalked] (victim); and,
 
2. At the time of (defendant’s) actions, (victim) was under 16 years of age.

Definitions.

” Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.

“Cyberstalk” means to engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words, images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.

Lesser Included Offenses
 

AGGRAVATED STALKING (Injunction Entered) — 784.048(4)
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO.
Stalking   784.048(2) 8.6
  Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1
  Violation of injunction for 741.31(4) 8.16
  protection against domestic    
  violence    
  Violation of injunction for 784.047  
  protection against repeat,    
  sexual, or dating violence    
AGGRAVATED STALKING (Victim under 16 years of age)
– 784.048[O>(3)
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. CO.
Stalking   784.048(2) 8.6
  [O>None 777.04(1) 5.1
  Violation of injunction 741.31(4) 8.18
  for protection against    
  domestic violence    

 [*11] 

Comment

This instruction is based on the text of section § 784.048(5), Florida Statutes [O>Fla. Stat.O< ] (1997), and generally patterned after the standard instructions on stalking and aggravated stalking.

This instruction was adopted in 2000 [765 So. 2d 692] and amended in 2007 to incorporate cyberstalking.

10.15 [O>FELONS POSSESSING WEAPONSO< ] FELONS CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPON OR POSSESSING FIREARM/AMMUNITION/ELECTRIC WEAPON OR DEVICE

§ 790.23, Fla. Stat.

To prove the crime of (crime charged), the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. (Defendant)had been convicted of [(prior offense)] a felony.
 
Give 2a or 2b as applicable.
 
2. After the conviction, (defendant) knowingly
 
[O>Give 2a or 2b as applicable.O< ]

a. [owned] [had in [his] [her] care, custody, possession, or control]
 
[a firearm]
 
[an electric weapon or device]
 
[ammunition].
 
b. [carried a [O>(weapon alleged), which was concealed  [*12]  from the ordinary sight of another person]O< ] concealed weapon.]

[O>Defense

If you find that the defendant's civil rights had been restored at the time of the offense, you shall find the defendant non guilty.O< ]

Definitions.

“Convicted” means that a judgment has been entered in a criminal proceeding by a [O>competentO< ] court pronouncing the accused guilty.

[O>A ["firearm"][electric weapon or device"]["concealed weapon"] is legally defined as (adapt from § 790.001, Fla. Stat., as required by the allegations).O< ]

Give as appropriate.

[A "firearm"] ["Ammunition"] [An "electric weapon or device"] [A "concealed weapon"] is legally defined as (insert the definition in § 790.001, Fla. Stat.).

Give if appropriate.

A "deadly weapon" is legally defined as one likely to produce death or great bodily injury.

Give if 2a alleged.

"Care" and "custody" mean immediate charge and control exercised by a person over the named object. The terms care, custody, and control may be used interchangeably.

Possession.  [*13] 

To "possess" means to have personal charge of or exercise the right of ownership, management, or control over [O>the thing possessedO< ] an object.

Possession may be actual or constructive. [O>If a thing is in the hand of or on the person, or in a bag or container in the hand of or on the person, or is so close as to be within ready reach and is under the control of the person, it is in the actual possession of that person.O< ]

Actual possession means

a. the object is in the hand of or on the person, or
 
b. the object is in a container in the hand of or on the person, or
 
c. the object is so close as to be within ready reach and is under the control of the person.
Give if applicable.

Mere proximity to an object is not sufficient to establish control over the object when the object is not in a place over which the person has control.

[O>If a thing is in a place over which the person has control or in which the person has hidden or concealed it, it is in the constructive possession of that person.O< ]

Constructive possession means the object is  [*14]  in a place over which (defendant) has control, or in which (defendant) has concealed it.

If an object is in a place over which (defendant)does not have control, the State establishes constructive possession if it proves that (defendant) (1) has knowledge that the object was within (defendant’s)presence, and (2) has control over the object.

Possession may be joint, that is, two or more persons may jointly have [O>possession ofO< ] possess an object [O>articleO< ], exercising control over it. In that case, each of those persons is considered to be in possession of that object [O>articleO< ].

If a person has exclusive possession of an object [O>a thingO< ], knowledge of its presence may be inferred or assumed.

If a person does not have exclusive possession of an object [O>a thingO< ], knowledge of its presence may not be inferred or assumed.

Lesser Included Offenses
 

 [*15] 

Comment

This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1989 [543 So. 2d 1205] [O>andO< ] 1992 [603 So. 2d 1175] and 2007.

13.2 POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS

§ 810.06, Fla. Stat.

To prove the crime of Possession of Burglary Tools, the State must prove the following three [O>fourO< ] elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. (Defendant) intended to commit a burglary or trespass.
 
[O>1.O< ] 2. (Defendant) had in [his] [her] possession a [tool] [machine] [implement]. that [he] [she] intended to use, or allow to be used, in the commission of the burglary or trespass.
 
[O>2. (Defendant) intended to use the tool in the commission of a burglary or trespass.
 
3. (Defendant) intended to commit a burglary or trespass.
 
4.O< ] 3. (Defendant) did some overt act toward the commission of a burglary or trespass.

Lesser Included Offenses

No lesser included offenses have been identified for this offense.

Comment

This instruction was adopted in 1981  [*16]  and amended in 1989 [543 So. 2d 1205], [O>andO< ] 1995 [665 So. 2d 212], and 2007.

13.21 IMPAIRING OR IMPEDING TELEPHONE OR POWER TO A DWELLING TO FACILITATE OR FURTHER A BURGLARY

§ 810.061, Fla. Stat.

To prove the crime ofImpairing or Impeding Telephone or Power to a Dwelling to Facilitate or Further a Burglary, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

Give as applicable.
 
1. (Defendant)

a. damaged a [wire] [line] that transmitted [telephone service] [power] to a dwelling.
 
b. impaired equipment necessary for [telephone] [power] transmission to a dwelling.
 
c. [impaired] [impeded] [telephone] [power] transmission to a dwelling.

2. (Defendant)did so for the purpose of facilitating or furthering the [commission] [attempted commission] of a burglary of that dwelling.
 
To define a burglary, see the elements of burglary in instruction 13.1.
Definitions.

§ 810.011(2), Fla. Stat.  [*17] 

“Dwelling” means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether such building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the enclosed space of ground and outbuildings immediately surrounding it.

§ 810.011(3), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable.

“Conveyance” means any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad car, trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car; and “to enter a conveyance” includes taking apart any portion of the conveyance.

“Impaired” means to be diminished, damaged, or weakened.

“Impeded” means to slow something down or prevent an activity from making progress at its previous rate.

“Facilitate” means to help or assist, or to make something possible or easier.

An “attempt” to commit a crime is the formation of an intent to commit that crime and the doing of some act toward the commission of the crime other than mere preparation to commit the crime.

Comment

This instruction was adopted in 2007.

In Re: Amendments to FRCrP

Thursday, March 29th, 2007

IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3.170 AND 3.172.

No. SC06-1739

SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

 March 29, 2007, Decided

NOTICE:    [*1]  NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.

COUNSEL:   William C. Vose, Chair, The Florida Bar Criminal Procedure Rules Committee, Orlando, Florida and John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner.
 
Paula S. Saunders, Office of the Public Defender, Tallahassee, Florida, and Michael Robert Ufferman, Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, Co-Chairs, The Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers Amicus Curiae Committee; Honorable Nancy Daniels, Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, Responding with comments.

JUDGES:   LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., concur.

OPINION:   Original Proceeding — Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure
 
PER CURIAM.

The Court sua sponte amended Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.170 and 3.172 on an emergency basis to ensure consistency between the rules and section 925.12, Florida Statutes (2006). See Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.170  [*2]  & 3.172, 938 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 2006). Because the amendments were not published for comment prior to adoption, the Court gave interested persons sixty days to file comments. Comments now have been filed. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

BACKGROUND

The history of the procedural rules governing DNA testing is set forth in the Court’s prior opinions in this area. n1 Originally, subdivision (d) of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853 set forth a deadline for filing certain motions for postconviction DNA testing, and that deadline, which was October 1, 2003, was later extended to October 1, 2005. Prior to expiration of the October 1, 2005, deadline, the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee (rules committee) filed in this Court an emergency report, which recommended eliminating the deadline altogether. In order to give the Court time to consider the report and to seek and consider comments, the Court on September 29, 2005, issued an order amending rule 3.853(d) on an interim basis, extending the deadline to July 1, 2006. Because the Legislature was considering the matter, the Court  [*3]  held the rules committee’s report in abeyance pending legislative action.

- – - – - – - – - – - – - – Footnotes – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -

n1 See Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.170 & 3.172, 938 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 2006); Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.853(d), 938 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 2006); Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.853(d)(1)(A), 884 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 2004); Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.853(d)(1)(A), 857 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 2003); Amendment to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. Creating Rule 3.853, 807 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 2001).
 

- – - – - – - – - – - – End Footnotes- – - – - – - – - – - – - -

The Legislature ultimately enacted chapter 2006-292, Laws of Florida (the Act), which amended chapter 925, Florida Statutes (2006), in several respects, and the Court responded by amending the corresponding rules. First, the Act removed the deadline for filing postconviction DNA motions, and the Court  [*4]  responded by adopting the rules committee’s proposed amendment to rule 3.853(d). See Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.853(d), 938 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 2006) (hereinafter Amendments I). And second, the Act provided that courts should inquire into the existence of DNA evidence before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony, and the Court responded by sua sponte adopting emergency amendments to rules 3.170 and 3.172. See Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.170 & 3.172, 938 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 2006) (hereinafter Amendments II). The emergency amendments to rules 3.170 and 3.172 were published for comment in the October 15, 2006, edition of The Florida Bar News, and comments have now been filed by several entities, including the rules committee. n2

- – - – - – - – - – - – - – Footnotes – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -

n2 Comments have been filed by the rules committee, the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (FACDL), and the Florida Public Defenders Association (FPDA).
 

- – - – - – - – - – - – End Footnotes- – - – - – - – - – - – - –  [*5] 

AMENDMENTS

The Court in Amendments II added subdivision (2) to rule 3.170(k), Responsibility of Court on Pleas, to provide that courts shall inquire into the existence of DNA evidence before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony. The rules committee now points out that the Court’s emergency amendments to this rule are unnecessary in light of the committee’s proposed amendments to rule 3.172(d), which are discussed below. After considering the various comments, n3 we conclude that the committee’s proposed amendments to rule 3.172(d) render the prior emergency amendments to rule 3.170(k) redundant–there is no reason to include the same language in two separate places in the rules. Accordingly, we adopt the committee’s proposed amendments to rule 3.170(k), which have the effect of returning this rule to its original form.

- – - – - – - – - – - – - – Footnotes – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -

n3 FACDL agrees with the Court’s emergency amendments, and FPDA objects to the emergency amendments on various grounds.
 

- – - – - – - – - – - – End Footnotes- – - – - – - – - – - – - -

Next, the Court in Amendments II amended  [*6]  rule 3.172(d), Inquiry Concerning DNA Evidence, to do the following: to provide that courts shall inquire into the existence of DNA evidence before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony, and to set forth a list of issues that the judge must inquire into during the plea proceeding. The committee now proposes that the Court adopt a revised version of this rule; the revised version is an amalgam of both sections 925.12(2) and 925.12(3), Florida Statutes (2006). With regard to the concern raised by Justice Anstead in Amendments II that courts should be required to make a DNA finding during the plea proceeding, n4 the committee is of the opinion that the detailed colloquy required by subdivision (d) will necessarily cause trial judges to reveal their findings and that no additional explanatory language is necessary in this regard.

- – - – - – - – - – - – - – Footnotes – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -

n4 See Amendments II, 938 So. 2d at 979 (Anstead, J., specially concurring) (“I would require that the trial court actually make a finding as to the existence of DNA evidence during the plea proceedings.”).
 

- – - – - – - – - – - – End Footnotes- – - – - – - – - – - – - –  [*7] 

FACDL agrees with the Court’s emergency amendments to this rule but also agrees with Justice Anstead’s position that the trial court should make a DNA finding during the plea proceeding. FPDA, on the other hand, disagrees with the Court’s emergency amendments for several reasons. FPDA contends as follows: (a) that the DNA inquiry is a matter that falls outside the Legislature’s purview, (b) that the rule places an undue burden on the defendant, and (c) that the DNA inquiry will result in the impermissible waiver of potentially meritorious postconviction claims. We conclude, however, that the matters raised by FPDA are matters that should be addressed in a proper case and controversy, not in this rules case. See In re Amendments to the Fla. Evidence Code, 825 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. 2002); In re Amendments to the Fla. Evidence Code, 782 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. 2000). Because the rules committee’s proposed amendments address the statutory requirements clearly and concisely, we adopt the proposed amendments to this rule.

Finally, the Court in Amendments I adopted the rules committee’s proposed amendments to rule 3.853(d), Time Limitations, which eliminated  [*8]  the deadline for filing certain motions for postconviction DNA testing. The rules committee now proposes that the Court further amend the rule by deleting language that provides that certain motions for DNA testing “shall be treated as raising a claim of newly discovered evidence and the time periods set forth in rules 3.850 and 3.851 shall commence on the date that the written test results are provided,” and by adding the following language: “The motion for postconviction DNA testing may be filed or considered at any time following the date that the judgment and sentence in the case becomes final.” Because these proposals render the rule consistent with the statute, we adopt the rules committee’s proposed amendments to this rule.

We hereby adopt the amendments to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure as set forth in the appendix to this opinion. n5 New language is indicated by underscoring; deletions are indicated by struck-through type. The amendments shall become effective immediately upon the release of this opinion.

- – - – - – - – - – - – - – Footnotes – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -

n5 In addition to the changes discussed above, there are also several additional amendments–to render the rules consistent with the Act in other regards and to correct grammar and syntax–as reflected in the appendix.
 

- – - – - – - – - – - – End Footnotes- – - – - – - – - – - – - –  [*9] 

It is so ordered.
 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., concur.

CONCUR BY:   ANSTEAD

 CONCUR:   ANSTEAD, J., specially concurring.

I remain convinced that a trial court express finding as to the existence of DNA evidence would bring more clarity and certainty to the plea process, and more importantly, would reduce the need for future litigation on the issue.
 
PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX
 
RULE 3.170. PLEAS

(a) — (j) [No change]
 
(k) Responsibility of Court on Pleas.

[EDITOR'S NOTE: TEXT WITHIN THESE SYMBOLS [O> O< ] IS OVERSTRUCK IN THE SOURCE.]

[O>(1)O< ] No plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall be accepted by a court without the court first determining, in open court, with means of recording the proceedings stenographically or mechanically, that the circumstances surrounding the plea reflect a full understanding of the significance of the plea and its voluntariness and that there is a factual basis for the plea of guilty. A complete record of the proceedings at which a defendant pleads shall  [*10]  be kept by the court.

[O>(2) No plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony shall be accepted by a court without the court first inquiring of the defendant and of counsel for the defendant and the state as to physical evidence containing DNA known to exist that could exonerate the defendant. If no physical evidence containing DNA that could exonerate the defendant is known to exist, the court may proceed with consideration of accepting the plea. If physical evidence containing DNA that could exonerate the defendant is known to exist, the court may postpone the proceeding on the defendant's behalf and order DNA testing upon motion of counsel specifying the physical evidence to be tested.

(3) A complete record of the proceedings at which a defendant pleads shall be kept by the court.O< ]
 
(l) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]
 
RULE 3.172. ACCEPTANCE OF GUILTY OR NOLO CONTENDERE PLEA

(a) Voluntariness; Factual Basis. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the trial judge shall [O>be satisfiedO< ] determine that the plea is voluntarily entered and that [O>thereO< ] is a factual basis for it the  [*11]  plea exists. Counsel for the prosecution and the defense shall assist the trial judge in this function.

(b) [No change]

(c) Determination of Voluntariness . Except when a defendant is not present for a plea, pursuant to the provisions of rule 3.180(d), the trial judge should, when determining voluntariness, place the defendant under oath and shall address the defendant personally and shall determine that he or she understands:

(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the maximum possible penalty, and any mandatory minimum penalty provided by law[O>, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by lawO< ];

(2) if [O>the defendantO< ] is not represented by an attorney, that the defendant has the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding [O>against him or herO< ] and, if necessary, [O>oneO< ] an attorney will be appointed to represent him or her;

(3) [O>that the defendant hasO< ] the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been made, [O>and that the defendant hasO< ] the right to be tried by a jury, and at that trial a defendant has the right to the assistance  [*12]  of counsel, the right to compel attendance of witnesses on his or her behalf, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him or her, and the right not to testify or be compelled to incriminate himself or herself;

(4) that [O>if the defendant pleadsO< ] upon a plea of guilty, or nolo contendere without express reservation of the right to appeal, he or she gives up the right to appeal all matters relating to the judgment, including the issue of guilt or innocence, but does not impair the right to review by appropriate collateral attack;

(5) — (7) [No change]

(8) that if he or she pleads guilty or nolo contendere [O>the trial judge must inform him or her thatO< ], if he or she is not a United States citizen, the plea may subject him or her to deportation pursuant to the laws and regulations governing the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. It shall not be necessary for the trial judge to inquire as to whether the defendant is a United States citizen, as this admonition shall be given to all defendants in all cases; and

(9) that if the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere, and the offense to which the defendant is pleading is a sexually  [*13]  violent offense or a sexually motivated offense, or if the defendant has been previously convicted of such an offense, the plea may subject the defendant to involuntary civil commitment as a sexually violent predator upon completion of his or her sentence. It shall not be necessary for the trial judge to determine whether the present or prior offenses were sexually motivated in this respect, as this admonition shall be given to all defendants in all cases.

[O>(d) Inquiry Concerning DNA Evidence. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony, the trial judge must inquire of the defendant and of counsel for the defendant and the state as to physical evidence containing DNA known to exist that could exonerate the defendant. The judge must inquire into the following:

(1) whether counsel for the defense has reviewed the discovery disclosed by the state and whether such discovery included a listing or description of physical items of evidence;

(2) whether the nature of the evidence against the defendant disclosed through discovery has been reviewed with the defendant;

(3) whether the defendant or counsel for the defendant is aware of any physical evidence  [*14]  disclosed by the state for which DNA testing may exonerate the defendant; and

(4) whether the state is aware of any physical evidence for which DNA testing may exonerate the defendant.

O< ]

(d) DNA Evidence Inquiry. Before accepting a defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony, the judge must inquire whether counsel for the defense has reviewed the discovery disclosed by the state, whether such discovery included a listing or description of physical items of evidence, and whether counsel has reviewed the nature of the evidence with the defendant. The judge must then inquire of the defendant and counsel for the defendant and the state whether physical evidence containing DNA is known to exist that could exonerate the defendant. If no such physical evidence is known to exist, the court may accept the defendant's plea and impose sentence. If such physical evidence is known to exist, upon motion of counsel the court may postpone the proceeding and order DNA testing.

(e) -- (j) [No change]

Committee Notes

[No change]
 
RULE 3.853. MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING

(a) Purpose. This rule provides procedures  [*15]  for obtaining DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) testing under sections 925.11 and 925.12, Florida Statutes.

(b) Contents of Motion. The motion for postconviction DNA testing must be under oath and must include the following:

(1) a statement of the facts relied upon in support of the motion, including a description of the physical evidence containing DNA to be tested and, if known, the present location or last known location of the evidence and how it originally was obtained;

(2) a statement that the evidence was not previously tested previously for DNA, or a statement that the results of previous DNA testing were inconclusive and that subsequent scientific developments in DNA testing techniques likely would produce a definitive result establishing that the movant is not the person who committed the crime;

(3) — (6) [No change]
 
(c) Procedure.

(1) Upon [O>OnO< ] receipt of the motion, the clerk of the court shall file it and deliver the court file to the assigned judge.

(2) The court shall review the motion and deny it if it is facially insufficient. If the motion is facially sufficient,  [*16]  the prosecuting authority shall be ordered to respond to the motion within 30 days or such other time as may be ordered by the court.

(3) Upon [O>OnO< ] receipt of the response of the prosecuting authority, the court shall review the response and enter an order on the merits of the motion or set the motion for hearing.

(4) In the event that the motion shall proceed to a hearing, the court may appoint counsel to assist the movant if the court determines that assistance of counsel is necessary and upon making the appropriate finding of indigence.

(5) — (6) [No change]

(7) The court-ordered DNA testing shall be ordered to be conducted by the Department of Law Enforcement or its designee, as provided by statute. However, the court, upon a showing of good cause, may order testing by another laboratory or agency certified by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors or the National Forensic Science Training Center [O>whenO< ] if requested by a movant who can bear the cost of such testing.

(8) [No change]

(d) Time Limitations. [O>A motion to vacate filed under rule 3.850 or a motion for postconviction or collateral relief filed under rule 3.851,  [*17]  which is based solely on the results of the court-ordered DNA testing obtained under this rule, shall be treated as raising a claim of newly-discovered evidence and the time periods set forth in rules 3.850 and 3.851 shall commence on the date that the written test results are provided to the court, the movant, and the prosecuting authority pursuant to subsection (c)(8).O< ] The motion for postconviction DNA testing may be filed or considered at any time following the date that the judgment and sentence in the case becomes final.

(e) -- (f) [No change]

Scruggs v. State

Wednesday, March 28th, 2007

Homer Scruggs, Appellant, vs. The State of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D04-2723

COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT

 
 March 28, 2007, Opinion Filed

NOTICE:    [*1]  NOT FINAL UNTIL DISPOSITION OF TIMELY FILED MOTION FOR REHEARING.
PRIOR HISTORY:   An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Rosa I. Rodriguez, Judge. Lower Tribunal No. 02-35050.
COUNSEL:   Joseph W. Gibson, for appellant.
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Linda S. Katz, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

JUDGES:   Before GERSTEN, and CORTINAS, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
OPINION:   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Albarran v. State, 890 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

Curry v. State

Wednesday, March 28th, 2007

Gregory S. Curry, Appellant, vs. The State of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D07-22

COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT

 
 March 28, 2007, Opinion Filed

NOTICE:    [*1]  NOT FINAL UNTIL DISPOSITION OF TIMELY FILED MOTION FOR REHEARING.
PRIOR HISTORY:   An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b) (2) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lawrence A. Schwartz, Judge. Lower Tribunal No. 91-33233 B.

DISPOSITION:   Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

COUNSEL:   Gregory S. Curry, in proper person.
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, for appellee.

JUDGES:   Before COPE, C.J., and SUAREZ and LAGOA, JJ.
OPINION:   PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal of an order summarily denying a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. On appeal from a summary denial, this Court must reverse unless the postconviction record, see Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(A), shows conclusively that the appellant is entitled to no relief. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(D).

Because the record now before us fails to make the required showing, we reverse the order and remand for an evidentiary hearing or other appropriate relief. If the trial court again enters an order summarily denying the postconviction motion, the court  [*2]  shall attach record excerpts conclusively showing that the appellant is not entitled to any relief.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Castro v. State

Wednesday, March 28th, 2007

Enrique Castro, Appellant, vs. The State of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D06-3068

COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT

 
 March 28, 2007, Opinion Filed

NOTICE:    [*1]  NOT FINAL UNTIL DISPOSITION OF TIMELY FILED MOTION FOR REHEARING.
PRIOR HISTORY:   An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b) (2) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Roberto M. Pineiro, Judge. Lower Tribunal Nos. 04-12225; 01-19726; 00-37367.

DISPOSITION:   Case number 04-1225 affirmed. Case numbers 00-37367 and 01-19726 reversed and remanded.

COUNSEL:   Enrique Castro, in proper person.
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Michele Samaroo, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

JUDGES:   Before SHEPHERD, SUAREZ, and ROTHENBERG, JJ.

OPINION BY:   ROTHENBERG

OPINION:   ROTHENBERG, Judge.

The defendant, Enrique Castro, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct sentencing errors filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), and his motion for rehearing. As we conclude that the defendant’s motions in case numbers 00-37367 and 01-19726 are well-taken, we reverse as to those two cases and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. As to case number 04-12225 the record conclusively refutes the defendant’s claims. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s orders in that case.  [*2] 

On May 25, 2001, the defendant pled guilty to the charges in case number 00-37367 and was sentenced to probation. While on probation, the defendant committed several new criminal offenses which resulted in the filing of an affidavit for violation of probation in case number 00-37367 and a new information charging him with these new offenses in case number 01-19726.

On August 9, 2001, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charges in case number 01-19726; admitted to violating his probation in case number 00-37367; was adjudicated guilty of the charges in both cases; and was sentenced to two years prison followed by three years of probation on each case. The trial court ordered that the sentences run concurrent and that the defendant receive forty-seven days credit for the time served as to each case.

After completing the incarcerative portion of his sentences, and while still on probation in both cases, the defendant was arrested and charged with robbery and resisting without violence in case number 04-12225; affidavits for violation of probation were filed; and the State filed a motion to seek an enhanced penalty as an habitual violent offender in case number 04-12225.  [*3] 

On October 6, 2004, the defendant pled guilty to the new charges and admitted to violating his probation in the two probation cases and received a sentence of five years prison on each (00-37367 and 01-19726) and five years prison as an habitual violent offender in case number 04-12225. Each sentence was ordered to run concurrent. The plea colloquy reflects that the trial court awarded the defendant credit for time served in case number 04-12225, calculated from the day of his arrest on April 20, 2004, to October 6, 2004, the day of the defendant’s plea. In case numbers 00-37367 and 01-19726, the trial court ordered that the defendant receive credit for the two years he served in prison.

As the record reflects that the defendant received the correct credit for time served ordered by the trial court in case number 04-12225 (170 days), we affirm the denial of the defendant’s 3.800(a) motion in that case.

It appears, however, that the defendant only received credit for 170 days, not two years as ordered by the trial court in case numbers 00-37369 and 01-19726. While the plea transcript reflects that the trial court awarded the defendant credit for two years on these two cases based  [*4]  upon the defendant’s counsel’s representations, which may be in conflict with the time the defendant actually served on the two-year sentences imposed, the trial court failed to attach anything to its order that reflects either its investigation or findings on the issue. We, therefore, reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion in case numbers 00-37367 and 01-19726.
 
Case number 04-1225, affirmed.
 
Case numbers 00-37367 and 01-19726 reversed and remanded.

Major v. State

Wednesday, March 28th, 2007

Fritz Major, Appellant, vs. The State of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D06-2668

COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT

 
 March 28, 2007, Opinion Filed

NOTICE:    [*1]  NOT FINAL UNTIL DISPOSITION OF TIMELY FILED MOTION FOR REHEARING.
PRIOR HISTORY:   An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Roberto M. Pineiro, Judge. Lower Tribunal Nos. 93-3709 and 92-26832. Major v. State, 907 So. 2d 538, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 13062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist., 2005)

 

COUNSEL:   Fritz Major, in proper person.
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, for appellee.

JUDGES:   Before RAMIREZ, WELLS, and CORTINAS, JJ.
OPINION:   PER CURIAM.

Fritz Major appeals the trial court’s “Order Denying Defendant’s Pro Se Motion Seeking Ruling On Motion To Appeal Denial Of Post Conviction Relief.” The defendant also appeals the trial court’s “Order Denying Defendant’s Pro Se Motion For Request For Permission To Appeal.”
 
Major filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the trial court. The trial court denied the motion on January 13, 2006 because all issues raised in the motion already had been litigated and considered by the trial court. Thus, the trial court denied the motion as successive. n1 Major has never appealed the January 13, 2006 order, but instead filed a pro se “Motion for Request for Permission to Appeal in the trial court.” The trial court denied the motion. Major also filed a pro se “Motion Seeking a Ruling on Motion to Appeal Denial of Post Conviction Relief,” which the  [*2]  trial court also denied, as the motion had been ruled on.

- – - – - – - – - – - – - – Footnotes – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -

n1 Furthermore, in case number 3D05-1242, we affirmed per curiam the trial court’s denial of Major’s first motion to correct illegal sentence, wherein he raised the exact same issues he raised before the trial court in this case.
 

- – - – - – - – - – - – End Footnotes- – - – - – - – - – - – - -

Both of the orders on appeal before this Court are non-appealable orders under either Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130 or 9.110. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Troville v. State

Wednesday, March 28th, 2007

BRYANT TROVILLE, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

No. 4D04-4016

COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, FOURTH DISTRICT

 

 March 28, 2007, Decided
NOTICE:    [*1]  NOT FINAL UNTIL DISPOSITION OF TIMELY FILED MOTION FOR REHEARING.
PRIOR HISTORY:   Appeal and cross-appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Miette K. Burnstein, Judge; L.T. Case No. 99-08094JR(21).

DISPOSITION:   Affirmed.

COUNSEL:   Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Ian Seldin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Sue-Ellen Kenny, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

JUDGES:   Klein, J. Hazouri and May, JJ., concur.

OPINION BY:   Klein

 OPINION:   Klein, J.

Appellant was found to be a sexually violent predator under the Jimmy Ryce Act and argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony of therapists, which he contends was privileged. He also argues that the court erred in prohibiting him from denying his guilt of the underlying crimes, which were convictions based on guilty pleas. We affirm.

Appellant was scheduled to be released in 1999 from incarceration for multiple convictions for armed sexual battery, which had occurred in 1988. His argument that the trial court should not have admitted the testimony of therapists begins with the fact that, when the state filed a petition  [*2]  for his commitment under the Ryce Act, it was just before the Act was amended and renumbered from sections 916.32-916.49, Florida Statutes to sections 394.910-394.931, Florida Statutes. Chapter 99-222, § 3, Laws of Fla. (1999). After the amendment the trial court granted the state’s motion to amend the petition to proceed under the amended statute, which contained a new provision eliminating the psychotherapist-patient privilege in Ryce Act proceedings. § 394.9155. Appellant argues that the elimination of the privilege is substantive, not procedural, and cannot be applied in this case. We need not reach that argument because we conclude that there was no privilege for these communications before the amendment.

The psychotherapist-patient privilege is found in our evidence code, section 90.503; however, there is a specific exception provided in section 90.503(4)(a):

(4) There is no privilege under this section:

(a) For communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to compel hospitalization of a patient for mental illness, if the psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has reasonable cause to believe the  [*3]  patient is in need of hospitalization.
In Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 102 (Fla. 2002), our supreme court noted that this exception applied to the Baker Act, which provides for involuntary commitment of a person who is mentally ill and there is “a substantial likelihood that without care or treatment the person will cause serious bodily harm . . . to others in the near future.” § 394.463, Fla. Stat. (1998). The definitions in the Ryce Act, section 394.912(4) and (5) provide:
(4) “Likely to engage in acts of sexual violence” means the person’s propensity to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others.
 
(5) “Mental abnormality” means a mental condition affecting a person’s emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses.
Those definitions were unchanged from the earlier version of the Ryce Act. § 916.32(4) and (5), Fla. Stat. (1998). There are enough similarities between the definition of mental illness under the Baker Act, and “mental abnormality” under the Ryce Act, to lead us to conclude that  [*4]  the communications to the therapists in this case fell within the section 90.503(4)(a) exception and were not privileged.

Appellant next argues that section 394.9155, entitled “Rules of procedure and evidence,” which was not in the original Ryce Act, and which, in section 394.9155(5), allows hearsay evidence, should not have been applied by the trial court. Appellant argues that this cannot be applied retroactively because it is substantive rather than procedural. In Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988), our supreme court held that a statute permitting the admission in evidence of hearsay statements by child sexual abuse victims could be applied retroactively, because it was procedural, not substantive. Applying the same reasoning here, we conclude that the trial court properly applied the new statute.

Appellant next argues that the court erred in not allowing him to contest the fact that he had committed the crimes. As we noted earlier, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the crimes, and the trial court ruled that he could not now deny his guilt because of the rule of collateral estoppel. Kelly v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 610 So. 2d 1375, 1377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)  [*5]  (“where a judgment of conviction is based upon a guilty plea . . . a defendant is estopped from denying his guilt of the subject offense in a subsequent civil action.”). Appellant’s contention that collateral estoppel does not apply because this case does not involve the identical issue being litigated between the same parties, Trucking Employees of North Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Romano, 450 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1984), is without merit. Although an involuntary commitment under the Ryce Act requires proof of additional elements, besides the prior criminal conviction of a sexually violent offense, that does not preclude the application of collateral estoppel, which applies to issues, unlike res judicata, which applies to causes of action. Romano, 450 So. 2d at 845.

Nor can we agree with appellant’s argument that his plea was the equivalent of a no contest plea, which does not constitute an admission of guilt for purposes of collateral estoppel. Appellant entered a plea of guilty which contained a protestation of innocence. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). In Blohm v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 1542, 1554 (11th Cir. 1993),  [*6]  the court explained why an Alford plea can result in an application of collateral estoppel:
Once accepted by a court, it is the voluntary plea of guilt itself, with its intrinsic admission of each element of the crime, that triggers the collateral consequences attending that plea. Those consequences may not be avoided by an assertion of innocence. As long as the guilty plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among alternative courses of action open to the defendant, see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), and a sufficient factual basis exists to support the plea of guilt, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f), the collateral consequences flowing from an Alford plea are the same as those flowing from an ordinary plea of guilt.
We have considered the remaining issues raised by appellant and find them to be without merit.

Affirmed.
 
Hazouri and May, JJ., concur.

State v. Ratner

Wednesday, March 28th, 2007

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellant, v. JEFFREY SCOTT RATNER, Appellee.

No. 4D04-2513

COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, FOURTH DISTRICT

 

 March 28, 2007, Decided

 
PRIOR HISTORY:    [*1]  Appeal of a non-final order from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Sheree Davis Cunningham, Judge; L.T. Case No. 03-14582 MMA02. State v. Ratner, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 1 (Fla., Jan. 11, 2007)

 

COUNSEL:   Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
 
James L. Eisenberg and Kai Li Aloe Fouts of Eisenberg & Fouts, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

JUDGES:   Klein, J. Shahood and Polen, JJ., concur.

OPINION BY:   Klein

 OPINION:   Klein, J.

This non-final appeal has been remanded by the Florida Supreme Court. State v. Ratner, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 1, 32 Fla. L. Weekly S23 (Fla. Jan. 11, 2007). The issue presented involves the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004).

This case arises out of a domestic violence incident in which the wife refused to testify and involves her statement to a police officer. Immediately after an alleged battery, the wife got in her car and drove to a nearby police station, which was only minutes away. The testimony of the officer, which the state seeks to admit in evidence, includes the following:

A.  [*2]  I was in the parking lot sitting in my police car. A car pulled into the parking lot. A lady got out of her car. I saw her walking toward me. It was apparent that she had either been battered or had an accident. Her eyes were swollen. She was bleeding from the left eyebrow, and she was crying. I stepped out of my vehicle and my exact words were, my goodness what happened to you?
 
* * *
 
Q. What was her reply?
 
A. Her reply was, I want to report that my husband beat me up, punched me, knocked me down and kicked me in the face.
The officer further testified that he immediately took her into the police station and instructed the dispatcher to call the paramedics to take her to the hospital.

The state filed a motion in limine, seeking to admit the wife’s statement implicating her husband, as an excited utterance. The county court denied the motion based on Crawford and certified the question as one of great importance:
SHOULD THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004) BE INTERPRETED TO PRECLUDE THE ADMISSION OF A STATEMENT WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE BE ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE  [*3]  EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION TO HEARSAY?
Whether we review a certified question is discretionary under rule 9.030(b)(4)(B). We are exercising our discretion not to answer the certified question, because our review of the record indicates that, despite the wording of the certified question, the trial court has not yet found if the statement was admissible as an excited utterance. If the wife’s statement to the officer does not qualify as an excited utterance, it would be inadmissible, and there will be no need to address whether Crawford applies.

In order for the statement to the officer to be admissible as an excited utterance, the state would have to demonstrate that the wife did not have time for reflective thought between the beating and the statement to the officer. Stoll v. State, 762 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 2000). There is evidence that, after she was battered, the wife gathered up her small child and dog, put them both in the car, and then drove to the police station. On this record, the state has not carried its burden of demonstrating that there was no time for reflective thought.

Trial judges, before certifying questions of great public importance to be  [*4]  answered by appellate courts, should resolve any preliminary issues which could make the question moot, such as the excited utterance issue in this case.

We accordingly transfer the appeal to circuit court.
 
Shahood and Polen, JJ., concur.


[O>FELONS; POSSESSION OF FIREARMS UNLAWFUL; EXCEPTION;
PENALTY -- 790.23
FELONS CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPON OR POSSESSING
FIREARM/AMMUNITION/ELECTRIC WEAPON OR DEVICE -- 790.23
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. CO.
None      
  Attempt (may be 777.04(1) 5.1
  applicable when    
  concealed weapon is    
  charged)    
  Carrying concealed 790.01(2) 10.1
  weapon    
  Carrying concealed 790.01(1) 10.1
  weapon    
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