Florida Criminal Law Opinions

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Third District.

Cleveland BROWN, Petitioner,

v.

The STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 3D07-471.

May 30, 2007.

A Case of Original Jurisdiction–Mandamus.

Cleveland Brown, in proper person.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Before FLETCHER and SHEPHERD, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

PER CURIAM.

*1 We deny the defendant, Cleveland Brown’s, petition for writ of mandamus wherein he seeks to compel the trial court to rule on his motion to correct sentence filed on or about November 17, 2005. The State of Florida has responded that it is unable to locate a copy of the motion. We therefore direct Mr. Brown to re-file his motion to correct sentence in case number 97-1309 in order that the trial court may timely rule on it.
Petition for writ of mandamus denied.

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District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Fourth District.

Gerald L. SMITH, Appellant,

v.

STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D07-1312.

May 30, 2007.

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Edward A. Garrison, Judge; L.T. Case No.2004CF005970AXX.

Gerald L. Smith, Belle Glade, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

*1 The order denying appellant’s motion for postconviction relief is summarily reversed. When a trial court denies a rule 3.850 motion without an evidentiary hearing, it must “either state its rationale in its decision or attach those specific parts of the record that refute each claim presented in the motion.” Anderson v. State, 627 So.2d 1170, 1171 (Fla.1993) (citing Hoffman v. State, 571 So.2d 449, 450 (Fla.1990)). The trial court’s order in this case does neither.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
STEVENSON, C.J., WARNER and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.

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District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Fourth District.

Dipnarine MAHARAJ, Appellant,

v.

STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D06-2946.

May 30, 2007.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Geoffrey D. Cohen, Judge; L.T. Case No. 04-19190CF10A.

Fred Haddad of Fred Haddad, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Heidi Bettendorf, and Claudine M. LaFrance, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

*1 We affirm the circuit court’s revocation of probation and the resulting judgment and sentence. The trial court’s oral findings at the violation of probation hearing and the written disposition order satisfied due process requirements. See Lacey v. State, 831 So.2d 1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Drayton v. State, 710 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Singletary v. State, 290 So.2d 116, 121 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
SHAHOOD, GROSS and MAY, JJ., concur.

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District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Fifth District.

Donald Shawn THOMAS, Appellant,

v.

STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D06-2169.

May 25, 2007.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County, Steven G. Rogers, Judge.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Leonard R. Ross, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anthony J. Golden, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

EVANDER, J.

*1 Thomas appeals a final judgment of conviction and sentence after a jury found him guilty of fleeing a law enforcement officer, [FN1] resisting an officer without violence, [FN2] and reckless driving. [FN3] During his trial, Thomas advised the court that he wanted to represent himself for the remainder of the trial. The trial court denied his request without first conducting a Faretta [FN4] inquiry. We affirm.

FN1. § 316.1935(1), Fla. Stat. (2005).

FN2. § 843.02, Fla. Stat. (2005).

FN3. § 316.192(1), (2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005).

FN4. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), which dealt with a request for self-representation made prior to the commencement of the trial, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel includes the right to represent oneself. However, a defendant may waive his right to self-representation, just as he may waive his right to counsel. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 182 (1984).

The waiver of the right to self-representation may be found where a defendant fails to timely assert that right. United States. v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1096 (4th Cir.1997). Consequently, some federal courts have recognized that if a defendant proceeds to trial with counsel and asserts his right to self-representation only after a trial has begun, the court may deny the defendant’s request, or may otherwise limit or condition the request. Id. See also United States v. Young, 287 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir.2002).

In Florida, it has been held that after a trial has begun with the defendant being represented by counsel, the decision of whether to allow a defendant to proceed pro se rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Lyons v. State, 437 So.2d 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

When exercising this discretion, the trial court should make inquiry of the defendant as to why the defendant desires to represent himself. The trial court must then balance the legitimate interest of the defendant against the potential disruption of the proceedings already in progress. Id. at 712.

In the present case, the state had rested and Thomas had testified prior to Thomas stating that he wanted to represent himself. The record reflects that immediately prior to this statement, Thomas was upset and having considerable difficulty in deciding whether he even wanted to remain in the courtroom for his trial. He continuously interrupted the trial judge when the judge tried to explain the benefits of remaining in the courtroom. Furthermore, it appears Thomas’ actual complaint was that the trial was unfair because the initial witnesses were law enforcement officers.

We conclude that under the facts of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Thomas’ request for self-representation.

AFFIRMED.
PLEUS, C.J. and ORFINGER, J., concur.

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District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Fifth District.

Antonio B. ADDERLY, Petitioner,

v.

STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 5D07-1151.

May 25, 2007.

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, A Case of Original Jurisdiction.

James Purdy, Public Defender, and Blaise Trettis, Assistant Public Defender, Viera, for Petitioner.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.

LAWSON, J.

*1 Antonio B. Adderly seeks relief from an order denying his motion for resentencing filed pursuant to section 958.045(5)(c), Florida Statutes (2007). Because Adderly has successfully completed the Department of Correction’s, (”DOC”), “boot camp” program, section 958.045(5)(c) mandates that Adderly be resentenced to a term of probation. We treat Adderly’s filing as a petition for writ of mandamus, grant the writ, and remand with instructions that the trial court resentence Adderly in accordance with section 958.045(5)(c), Florida Statutes.

Adderly was originally charged with second-degree murder with a firearm. He entered a plea agreement with the State, pursuant to which he pled nolo contendere to the reduced charge of manslaughter with a firearm in exchange for a sentence of ten years in prison, followed by two years of supervised probation. Although Adderly was sixteen years old at the time of the plea, he was sentenced as an adult. The sentence was pronounced on January 25, 2001.

On July 11, 2006, the DOC sent a letter to the trial judge stating that Adderly qualified for its “basic training” (or “boot camp”) program, authorized by section 958.045, Florida Statutes, and requesting the judge’s approval for Adderly to participate in the program. On July 19, 2006, the trial judge responded by approving Adderly for the program. Thereafter, DOC placed Adderly in the program, which Adderly successfully completed on January 9, 2007.

On February 9, 2007, Adderly filed a motion for resentencing, seeking release to probation pursuant to section 958.045(5)(c), Florida Statutes. The statute provides in pertinent part:

Upon the offender’s completion of the basic training program, the department shall submit a report to the court that describes the offender’s performance. If the offender’s performance has been satisfactory, the court shall issue an order modifying the sentence imposed and placing the offender on probation.

(Emphasis added).

Because Adderly successfully completed DOC’s boot camp program, the trial court has a clear legal duty to comply with the provisions of this statute by modifying Adderly’s sentence to a term of probation. See, e.g., Sada v. State, 807 So.2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Smith v. State, 750 So.2d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

We note that section 958.045(5)(c), Florida Statutes, was amended effective July 1, 2006, and now provides that a youthful offender who violates the probationary term imposed following successful completion of the boot camp program may be sentenced, upon revocation of the probation, to any sentence that could have originally been imposed on the charge. See Ch. 06-270, § 1, Laws of Fla. Prior to this statutory change, a defendant who violated probation after completing boot camp could only be sentenced to 364 days in jail. See, e.g., Fettler v. State, 885 So.2d 411, 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (”It is well-established in the courts of Florida that when a youthful offender successfully completes boot camp, he may not be sentenced to more than 364 days of incarceration upon a violation of the subsequent period of probation.”). [FN1]

FN1. Similar to Fettler, we have identified the following cases stating and applying the old rule, which has now been superseded by the amendment to section 958.045(5)(c), approved by chapter 06-270, Laws of Florida: Porter v. State, 940 So.2d 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Eason v. State, 932 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Diaz v. State, 929 So.2d 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Cutler v. State, 927 So.2d 249 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Claridy v. State, 911 So.2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Green v. State, 902 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Holmes v. State, 899 So.2d 432 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Lee v. State, 884 So.2d 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Mims v. State, 871 So.2d 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Blaxton v. State, 868 So.2d 620, 621 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Mason v. State, 864 So.2d 1225 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Lawson v. State, 845 So.2d 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Williams v. State, 841 So.2d 685 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Thomas v. State, 825 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Burkett v. State, 816 So.2d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Geri v. State, 797 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); and Bloodworth v. State, 769 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).

*2 WRIT GRANTED; REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS TO MODIFY SENTENCE.
ORFINGER and TORPY, JJ., concur.

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