Archive for November, 2009

Santiago v. State, Case No. 5D09-2912 (Fla. App. 11/20/2009) (Fla. App., 2009)

Friday, November 20th, 2009

JOHNNY SANTIAGO, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

Case No. 5D09-2912.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed November 20, 2009.

3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Robert J. Egan, Judge.

Johnny Santiago, Blountstown, Pro Se.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mary G. Jolley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Johnny Santiago appeals the summary denial of his motion for additional jail credit filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We affirm because the motion is legally insufficient.

Santiago’s motion alleged that he is entitled to ten days of additional jail credit on an Orange County felony case. An error in a trial court’s award of jail credit can be raised at any time in a motion filed pursuant to rule 3.800(a). However, the motion must

Page 2

affirmatively allege that the trial court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to relief. A mere conclusory allegation that the answer lies in the record is insufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements of the rule. Baker v. State, 714 So. 2d 1167, 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). At a minimum, a rule 3.800 motion should state where in the record the information can be located and explain how the record demonstrates entitlement to relief. Alfonso v. State, 901 So. 2d 939, 939 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Toro v. State, 719 So. 2d 947, 948 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). That was not done here, as Santiago merely alleges, without any reference to the record, that he is entitled to additional jail credit.1

If the claim cannot be resolved from the face of the record without resorting to fact-finding, Santiago must file a timely motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Maynard v. State, 763 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). We affirm without prejudice so that Santiago can file a legally sufficient motion.

AFFIRMED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

GRIFFIN, ORFINGER and TORPY, JJ., concur.

—————

Notes:

1. If Santiago’s motion was facially sufficient, we would be obligated to reverse the trial court’s order because it failed to attach any records to refute Santiago’s claim. Brown v. State, 912 So. 2d 61, 62 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

—————

In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, No. SC09-159 (Fla. 11/19/2009) (Fla., 2009)

Thursday, November 19th, 2009

IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

No. SC09-159.

Supreme Court of Florida.

November 19, 2009.

Original Proceeding — Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure Committee.

Fleur J. Lobree, Chair, Florida Criminal Procedure Rules Committee, Miami, Florida, and Judge Thomas H. Bateman, III, Past Chair, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida; John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director and Jodi Jennings, Staff Liaison, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioners.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, and John Eddy Morrison, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, on behalf of the Florida Public Defender Association, Inc., Responding with Comments.

PER CURIAM.

The Florida Criminal Procedure Rules Committee has filed with the Court its triennial report of regular-cycle proposed rule amendments in accordance with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.140(b)(4). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

Background

The Committee proposes amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.131 (Pretrial Release); 3.132 (Pretrial Detention); 3.190 (Pretrial Motions); 3.191 (Speedy Trial); 3.203 (Defendant’s Mental Retardation as a Bar to Imposition of the Death Penalty); 3.210 (Incompetence to Proceed: Procedure for Raising the Issue); 3.211 (Competence to Proceed: Scope of Examination and Report); 3.216 (Insanity at Time of Offense or Probation or Community Control Violation: Notice and Appointment of Experts); 3.220 (Discovery); 3.231 (Substitution of Judge); 3.240 (Change of Venue); 3.800 (Correction, Reduction, and Modification of Sentences); 3.851 (Collateral Relief After Death Sentence has been Imposed and Affirmed on Direct Appeal); 3.852 (Capital Postconviction Public Records Production); 3.853 (Motion for Postconviction DNA Testing); and 3.986 (Forms Related to Judgment and Sentence). In addition, the Committee proposes new rule 3.192 (Motions for Rehearing), an amendment to the title of Part VII (Disqualification and Substitution of Judge), and deletion of rule 3.984 (Application for Criminal Indigent Status).

In accordance with rule 2.140(b)(2), the Committee published its proposals for comment prior to filing them here in July 2008. No comments were received. The Committee also submitted the proposals to the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar, which voted unanimously to approve the proposals. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.140(b)(3). We republished the proposals, which appeared in the March 1, 2009, edition of The Florida Bar News.

The Florida Public Defender Association (FPDA) filed a comment, indicating its concerns with several of the rules proposals. In its response, the Committee agreed with some of the FPDA’s suggestions but reaffirmed some of its original proposals. After reviewing the proposals, comment, and response, and upon consideration of the oral arguments heard in this case, we hereby (1) adopt with modifications the Committee’s proposed amendments to rules 3.131, 3.191, 3.852, and 3.986; (2) adopt as proposed rules 3.190, 3.192, 3.203, 3.210, 3.211, 3.216, 3.220, 3.231, 3.240, 3.800, and 3.851; (3) decline to delete rule 3.984, the Application for Determination of Indigent Status; and (4) sua sponte amend rule 3.172. We have addressed the amendments to rule 3.132, Pretrial Detention, by separate opinion.1 We thank the Committee for its hard work under the capable leadership of its chair, Thomas Bateman, III, noting that most of the proposals were unanimously approved by the Committee.

Amendments

The first proposal addresses amendments to rule 3.131(a) (Right to Pretrial Release) to reflect that, pursuant to section 903.047(2), Florida Statutes (2009), a condition of pretrial release is that the defendant shall have no contact with the victim except for authorized pretrial discovery. The FPDA has pointed out that the proposed rule omits language from that same statute providing that the mandatory “no contact” provision may be modified if good cause is shown and the interests of justice so require. Although the statutory language need not always be incorporated into our rules, we agree with the FPDA that by amending the rule to include the “no contact” provision as a condition of pretrial release, the rule should also include a procedure to allow for the possibility of modification in accordance with the statute. Accordingly, we modify the Committee’s proposal to include the following additional language in accordance with section 903.045(2) pertaining to modification of the condition of no contact with the victim:

Upon motion by the defendant when bail is set, or upon later motion properly noticed pursuant to law, the court may modify the condition regarding victim contact if good cause is shown and the interests of justice so require. The victim shall be permitted to be heard at any proceeding in which such modification is considered, and the state attorney shall notify the victim of the provisions of this subsection and of the pendency of any such proceeding.

Rule 3.190 (Pretrial Motions) is amended largely to correct technical issues, including deleting the definition for the phrase “order quashing,” currently in subdivision (f), because section 924.07, Florida Statutes (2009), Appeal by state, no longer refers to “quashing”; renumbering subdivisions (g) through (k); and specifically identifying the contents required to be included in a motion to suppress a confession or admission illegally obtained.

Subdivision (i)(4) (When Time May Be Expanded) of rule 3.191 (Speedy Trial) is amended to permit extending the speedy trial period for DNA testing ordered on the defendant’s behalf pursuant to section 925.12(2), Florida Statutes (2009).

As to this rule, we adopt the suggestion by the FPDA that we clarify the rule to state that the court may postpone the proceeding on the defendant’s behalf “upon the defendant’s motion specifying the physical evidence to be tested.” This is in accordance with the intent of section 925.12(4). We also amend rule 3.172(d) on our own motion to provide: “If such physical evidence is known to exist, upon defendant’s motion specifying the physical evidence to be tested, the court may postpone the proceeding and order DNA testing.”

We next address proposed rule 3.192 (Motions for Rehearing), which is an entirely new rule. This rule would authorize the State to file a motion for rehearing from any order that is currently appealable by the State as an interlocutory appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c) or sections 924.07 or 924.071, Florida Statutes (2009). Rule 3.192 expressly states what shall be included in a motion for rehearing. The rule provides strict time limits for filing a motion for rehearing, for the defendant to file a response, and for the trial court to rule on the motion. The rule further provides that the time for filing the appeal is tolled during pendency of the motion for rehearing. The FPDA opposes adoption of new rule 3.192, asserting that the rule would “delay the trial for a month before any notice of appeal is filed, resulting in further delay of the defendant’s right to speedy trial.” It expresses further concern that the proposed rule would apply not only to authorized appealable nonfinal orders but also more broadly. The Committee, which approved this proposal unanimously, concluded that allowing the State to seek rehearing of orders that the state may appeal before trial could obviate the need for the appeal in some cases.

We have considered the arguments on both sides and defer to the collective expertise of the Committee that the rehearing rule will advance, rather than frustrate, the interests of justice. We also expressly note that this rule does not authorize or expand the category of authorized nonfinal appeals by the State. Further, to ensure that the time for appeal is not unduly delayed, we modify the Committee’s proposal to add a time period after which the trial court’s order is deemed denied if no written order is entered. This addition is in response to the FPDA’s concern that the motion for rehearing not unduly delay the proceedings. We have further added language in rule 3.192 to make clear that a timely motion for rehearing stays rendition of the trial court’s order for purposes of appellate review until a written order denying the motion for rehearing is entered or no later than forty days from the date of the order of which rehearing is sought. (The maximum time of forty days that rendition is stayed attempts to take into account situations where the defendant files a response following service of the motion by mail and the operation of rule 3.070, Additional Time after Service by Mail.)

Rule 3.203 (Defendant’s Mental Retardation as a Bar to Imposition of the Death Penalty) is amended to correct technical issues. Subdivision (b) corrects the citation to the Department of Children and Family Services’ rule setting forth its authorized standardized IQ test, to Rule 65G-4.011, Florida Administrative Code. Subdivision (d) is amended to remove obsolete references to time periods in 2004, while leaving intact the requirement that a motion for a determination of mental retardation as a bar to imposition of the death penalty shall be filed not later than ninety days prior to trial or as ordered by the court.

Subdivision (b) (Motion for Examination) of rule 3.210 (Incompetence to Proceed: Procedure for Raising the Issue) is amended to reflect statutory changes relating to funding of experts and examinations to determine mental competency. Rule 3.211 (Competence to Proceed: Scope of Examination and Report) is amended to delete subdivision (c), which pertains to court-ordered expert examination when the defendant files a notice of intent to rely on the defense of insanity. Subdivisions (d) and (e) are renumbered.

Rule 3.216 (Insanity at Time of Offense or Probation or Community Control Violation: Notice and Appointment of Experts) is amended to comport with the funding changes from county government to the state.

Subdivision (b)(1)(A)(i) of Rule 3.220 (Discovery) is amended to remove the reference to expert witnesses who will give testimony that will have to meet the test set out in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Subdivision (b)(1)(L) is added to reflect that the prosecutor’s discovery obligation includes “any tangible paper, objects or substances in the possession of law enforcement that could be tested for DNA.” Subdivision (h)(2) is amended to reflect the current funding scheme in respect to transcripts of discovery depositions; subdivision (h)(5) clarifies that law enforcement officers served notice to appear for depositions may be adjudged in contempt of court for failure to appear; and subdivision (h)(8) is amended to permit any witness to provide a statement by telephone in lieu of deposition upon consent of the parties and consent of the witness. Lastly, subdivision (o), pertaining to costs of indigents, is removed.

Part VII, Disqualification and Substitution of Judge, is amended to remove the phrase “Disqualification and” from the title. The only rule in Part VII, rule 3.231, addressed substitution of a judge. Accordingly, it is appropriate that Part VII be retitled “Substitution of Judge.”

Rule 3.231 (Substitution of Judge) is amended to include the requirement that in death penalty sentencing proceedings, “a successor judge who did not hear the evidence during the penalty phase of the trial shall conduct a new sentencing proceeding before a new jury.” The amendment is consistent with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.700(c)(2) and Corbett v. State, 602 So. 2d 1240, 1244 (Fla. 1992), both of which provide the same.

Subdivision (g) (Attendance by Witnesses) of rule 3.240 (Change of Venue) is amended to include plain English and to reflect that a witness’s failure to attend a proceeding for which the witness is lawfully required to attend but which has been removed to another venue, upon notice of the removal, may be adjudged in contempt of court for refusal to attend.

Subdivision (b)(2) of rule 3.800 (Correction, Reduction, and Modification of Sentences) is amended to correct a cross-reference to rule 9.140(d), Withdrawal of Defense Counsel after Judgment and Sentence or after Appeal by State.

Subdivision (i)(9) of rule 3.851 (Collateral Relief After Death Sentence has been Imposed and Affirmed on Direct Appeal) is amended to correct a cross-reference to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.142(b) (Petition Seeking Review of Nonfinal Orders in Death Penalty Postconviction Proceedings).

Rule 3.852 (Capital Postconviction Public Records Production) is amended to correct statutory references.

Subdivision (c)(4) of rule 3.853 (Motion for Postconviction DNA Testing) is amended to reflect that counsel may be appointed to assist the movant upon a determination of indigency pursuant to section 27.52, Florida Statutes (2009).

We decline to delete rule 3.984 (Application for Criminal Indigent Status) as suggested by the Committee, in light of our recent approval of the form in In re Approval of Application for Determination of Indigent Status Form Used by Clerks & Amendment to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.984, 5 So. 3d 662 (Fla. 2009). However, we recognize that the Committee is no longer responsible for proposing amendments to rule 3.984, because the Florida Clerks of Court Operations Corporation is responsible for developing the form and obtaining final approval from the Court. See § 27.52(1), Fla. Stat. (2009).

Subdivision (c) (Forms for Charges, Costs, and Fees) of rule 3.986 (Forms Related to Judgment and Sentence) is amended to correct statutory references and to remove obsolete statutory references.2 Subdivision (d) of rule 3.986 (Form for Sentencing) of the rule is also amended and includes corrected statutory citations, with a qualifying parenthetical where applicable, e.g., “Offenses committed before January 1, 1994,” and adds a section for including sexual offender/sexual predator determinations pursuant to chapter 2007-209, §§ 1-2, Laws of Florida.

We hereby adopt the amendments to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure as set forth in the appendix to this opinion. New language is indicated by underscoring; deletions are indicated by struck-through type. The committee notes are offered for explanation only and are not adopted as an official part of the rules. All amendments set forth in the appendix shall become effective on January 1, 2010, at 12:01 a.m.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THESE AMENDMENTS.

APPENDIX

RULE 3.131. PRETRIAL RELEASE

(a) Right to Pretrial Release. Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great, every person charged with a crime or violation of municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release on reasonable conditions. As a condition of pretrial release, whether such release is by surety bail bond or recognizance bond or in some other form, the defendant shall refrain from any contact of any type with the victim, except through pretrial discovery pursuant to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and shall comply with all conditions of pretrial release as ordered by the court. Upon motion by the defendant when bail is set, or upon later motion properly noticed pursuant to law, the court may modify the condition precluding victim contact if good cause is shown and the interests of justice so require. The victim shall be permitted to be heard at any proceeding in which such modification is considered, and the state attorney shall notify the victim of the provisions of this subsection and of the pendency of any such proceeding. If no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process, the accused may be detained.

(b) Hearing at First Appearance — Conditions of Release.

(1) [No change]

(2) The judge shall at the defendant’s first appearance consider all available relevant factors to determine what form of release is necessary to assure the defendant’s appearance. If a monetary bail is required, the judge shall determine the amount. Any judge setting or granting monetary bond shall set a separate and specific bail amount for each charge or offense. When bail is posted each charge or offense requires a separate bond.

(3)-(6) [No change]

(c)-(l) [No change]

Committee Notes [No change] Court Comment [No change]

RULE 3.172. ACCEPTANCE OF GUILTY OR NOLO CONTENDERE PLEA

(a)-(c) [No change]

(d) DNA Evidence Inquiry. Before accepting a defendant’s plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony, the judge must inquire whether counsel for the defense has reviewed the discovery disclosed by the state, whether such discovery included a listing or description of physical items of evidence, and whether counsel has reviewed the nature of the evidence with the defendant. The judge must then inquire of the defendant and counsel for the defendant and the state whether physical evidence containing DNA is known to exist that could exonerate the defendant. If no such physical evidence is known to exist, the court may accept the defendant’s plea and impose sentence. If such physical evidence is known to exist, upon defendant’s motion of counsel specifying the physical evidence to be tested, the court may postpone the proceeding and order DNA testing.

(e)-(j) [No change]

RULE 3.190. PRETRIAL MOTIONS

(a)-(e) [No change]

(f) Order Dismissing. For the purpose of construing section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (1969), the statutory term “order quashing” shall be taken and held to mean “order dismissing.”

(g)(f) Motion for Continuance.

(1)-(5) [No change]

(h)(g) Motion to Suppress Evidence in Unlawful Search.

(1)-(4) [No change]

(i)(h) Motion to Suppress a Confession or Admission Illegally Obtained.

(1) Grounds. [No change]

(2) Contents of Motion. Every motion made by a defendant to suppress a confession or admission shall identify with particularity any statement sought to be suppressed, the reasons for suppression, and a general statement of the facts on which the motion is based.

(2)(3) Time for Filing. The motion to suppress shall be made before trial unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion or an appropriate objection at the trial.

(3)(4) Hearing. The court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to be decided to rule on the motion.

(j)(i) Motion to Take Deposition to Perpetuate Testimony.

(1) [No change]

(2) If the defendant or the state desires to perpetuate the testimony of a witness living in or out of the state whose testimony is material and necessary to the case, the same proceedings shall be followed as provided in subdivision (j)(i)(1), but the testimony of the witness may be taken before an official court reporter, transcribed by the reporter, and filed in the trial court.

(3)-(6) [No change]

(k)(j) Motion to Expedite. On motion by the state, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, shall take into consideration the dictates of sections 825.106 and 918.0155, Florida Statutes (1995).

Committee Notes [No change]

RULE 3.191. SPEEDY TRIAL

(a)-(h) [No change]

(i) When Time May Be Extended. The periods of time established by this rule may be extended, provided the period of time sought to be extended has not expired at the time the extension was procured. An extension may be procured by:

(1)-(3) [No change]

(4) written or recorded order of the court for a period of reasonable and necessary delay resulting from proceedings including but not limited to an examination and hearing to determine the mental competency or physical ability of the defendant to stand trial, for hearings on pretrial motions, for appeals by the state, for DNA testing ordered on the defendant’s behalf upon defendant’s motion specifying the physical evidence to be tested pursuant to section 925.12(2), Florida Statutes, and for trial of other pending criminal charges against the accused.

(j) Delay and Continuances; Effect on Motion. If trial of the accused does not commence within the periods of time established by this rule, a pending motion for discharge shall be granted by the court unless it is shown that:

(1) a time extension has been ordered under subdivision (i) and that extension has not expired;

(2)-(4) [No change]

(k) Availability for Trial. [No change]

(l) Exceptional Circumstances. As permitted by subdivision (I)(i) of this rule, the court may order an extension of the time periods provided under this rule when exceptional circumstances are shown to exist. Exceptional circumstances shall not include general congestion of the court’s docket, lack of diligent preparation, failure to obtain available witnesses, or other avoidable or foreseeable delays. Exceptional circumstances are those that, as a matter of substantial justice to the accused or the state or both, require an order by the court. These circumstances include:

(1)-(6) [No change]

(m)-(p) [No change]

Committee Notes [No change]

RULE 3.192. MOTIONS FOR REHEARING

When an appeal by the state is authorized by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140, or sections 924.07 or 924.071, Florida Statutes, the state may file a motion for rehearing within 10 days of an order subject to appellate review. A motion for rehearing shall state with particularity the points of law or fact that, in the opinion of the state, the court has overlooked or misapprehended in its decision, and shall not present issues not previously raised in the proceeding. A response may be filed within 10 days of service of the motion. The trial court’s order disposing of the motion for rehearing shall be filed within 15 days of the response but not later than 40 days from the date of the order of which rehearing is sought. If no order is filed within 40 days, the motion is deemed denied. A timely filed motion for rehearing shall toll rendition of the order subject to appellate review and the order shall be deemed rendered 40 days from the order of which rehearing is sought, or upon the filing of a written order denying the motion for rehearing, whichever is earlier. This rule shall not apply to post-conviction proceedings pursuant to rule 3.800(a), 3.850, 3.851, or 3.853. Nothing in this rule precludes the trial court from exercising its inherent authority to reconsider a ruling while the court has jurisdiction of the case.

RULE 3.203. DEFENDANT’S MENTAL RETARDATION AS A BAR TO IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY

(a) Scope. [No change]

(b) Definition of Mental Retardation. As used in this rule, the term “mental retardation” means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18. The term “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning,” for the purpose of this rule, means performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test authorized by the Department of Children and Family Services in rule 65B-4.03265G-4.011 of the Florida Administrative Code. The term “adaptive behavior,” for the purpose of this rule, means the effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community.

(c) Motion for Determination of Mental Retardation as a Bar to Execution: Contents; Procedures. [No change]

(d) Time for filing Motion for Determination of Mental Retardation as a Bar to Execution.

(1) Cases in which trial has not commenced. In all cases in which trial has not commenced on October 1, 2004, tThe motion for a determination of mental retardation as a bar to execution shall be filed not later than 90 days prior to trial, or if the trial is set earlier than 90 days from October 1, 2004, at such time as is ordered by the court.

(2) Cases in which trial has commenced on October 1, 2004. In all cases in which trial has commenced on October 1, 2004, the motion shall be filed and determined before a sentence is imposed.

(3) Cases in which a direct appeal is pending. If an appeal of a circuit court order imposing a judgment of conviction and sentence of death is pending on October 1, 2004, the defendant may file a motion to relinquish jurisdiction for a mental retardation determination within 60 days of October 1, 2004. The motion shall contain a copy of the motion to establish mental retardation as a bar to execution and shall contain a certificate by appellate counsel that the motion is made in good faith and on reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant is mentally retarded.

(4) Cases in which the direct appeal is final; contents of motion; conformity with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.

(A) A motion for postconviction relief seeking a determination of mental retardation made by counsel for the prisoner shall contain a certification by counsel that the motion is made in good faith and on reasonable grounds to believe that the prisoner is mentally retarded.

(B) If a death sentenced prisoner has not filed a motion for postconviction relief on or before October 1, 2004, the prisoner shall raise a claim under this rule in an initial rule 3.851 motion for postconviction relief.

(C) If a death sentenced prisoner has filed a motion for postconviction relief and that motion has not been ruled on by the circuit court on or before October 1, 2004, the prisoner may amend the motion to include a claim under this rule within 60 days after October 1, 2004.

(D) If a death-sentenced prisoner has filed a motion for postconviction relief and that motion has been ruled on by the circuit court but the prisoner has not filed an appeal on or before October 1, 2004, the prisoner shall file a supplemental motion in the circuit court raising the mental retardation claim. The prisoner’s time for filing an appeal of the ruled-upon postconviction motion is stayed until the circuit court rules upon the mental retardation claim.

(E) If a death sentenced prisoner has filed a motion for postconviction relief and that motion has been ruled on by the circuit court and an appeal is pending on or before October 1, 2004, the prisoner may file a motion in the supreme court to relinquish jurisdiction to the circuit court for a determination of mental retardation within 60 days from October 1, 2004. The motion to relinquish jurisdiction shall contain a copy of the motion to establish mental retardation as a bar to execution, which shall be raised as a successive rule 3.851 motion, and shall contain a certificate by appellate counsel that the motion is made in good faith and on reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant is mentally retarded.

(F) If a death sentenced prisoner has filed a motion for postconviction relief, the motion has been ruled on by the circuit court, and that ruling is final on or before October 1, 2004, the prisoner may raise a claim under this rule in a successive rule 3.851 motion filed within 60 days after October 1, 2004. The circuit court may reduce this time period and expedite the proceedings if the circuit court determines that such action is necessary.

(e)-(i) [No change]

RULE 3.210. INCOMPETENCE TO PROCEED: PROCEDURE FOR RAISING THE ISSUE

(a) Proceedings Barred during Incompetency. [No change]

(b) Motion for Examination. If, at any material stage of a criminal proceeding, the court of its own motion, or on motion of counsel for the defendant or for the state, has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is not mentally competent to proceed, the court shall immediately enter its order setting a time for a hearing to determine the defendant’s mental condition, which shall be held no later than 20 days after the date of the filing of the motion, and shallmay order the defendant to be examined by no more than 3, nor fewer than 2, experts, as needed, prior to the date of the hearing. Attorneys for the state and the defendant may be present at theany examination ordered by the court.

(1)-(4) [No change]

Committee Notes [No change]

RULE 3.211. COMPETENCE TO PROCEED: SCOPE OF EXAMINATION AND REPORT

(a)-(b) [No change]

(c) Insanity. If a notice of intent to rely on the defense of insanity has been filed prior to trial or a hearing on a violation of probation or community control, and when so ordered by the court, the experts shall report on the issue of the defendant’s sanity at the time of the offense.

(d)(c) Written Findings of Experts. Any written report submitted by the experts shall:

(1)-(4) [No change]

(e)(d) Limited Use of Competency Evidence.

(1)-(2) [No change]

Committee Notes [No change] RULE 3.216. INSANITY AT TIME OF OFFENSE OR PROBATION OR COMMUNITY CONTROL VIOLATION: NOTICE AND APPOINTMENT OF EXPERTS

(a) Expert to Aid Defense Counsel. When in any criminal case counsel for a defendant is adjudged to be indigent or partially indigent, whether public defender or court appointed, shall have and is not represented by the public defender or regional counsel, and counsel has reason to believe that the defendant may be incompetent to proceed or that the defendant may have been insane at the time of the offense or probation or community control violation, counsel may so inform the court who shall appoint 1 expert to examine the defendant in order to assist counsel in the preparation of the defense. The expert shall report only to the attorney for the defendant and matters related to the expert shall be deemed to fall under the lawyer-client privilege.

(b)-(c) [No change]

(d) CourtAppointed Experts-Ordered Evaluations. On the filing of such notice the court may on its own motion, and shall on motion of the state, the court shall order the defendant to be examined by the state’s mental health expert(s) or the defendant, order that the defendant be examined by no more than 3 nor fewer than 2 disinterested, qualified experts as to the sanity or insanity of the defendant at the time of the commission of the alleged offense or probation or community control violation. Attorneys for the state and defendant may be present at the examination.The examination should take place at the same time as the examination into the competence of the defendant to proceed, if the issue of competence has been raised.

(e) Time for Filing Notice of Intent to Rely on a Mental Health Defense Other than Insanity. [No change]

(f) Court-AppointedOrdered Experts for Other Mental Health Defenses. If the notice to rely on any mental health defense other than insanity indicates the defendant will rely on the testimony of an expert who has examined the defendant, the court shall upon motion of the state order the defendant be examined by one qualified expert for the state as to the mental health defense raised by the defendant. Upon a showing of good cause, the court may order additional examinations upon motion by the state or the defendant. Attorneys for the state and defendant may be present at the examination. When the defendant relies on the testimony of an expert who has not examined the defendant, the state shall not be entitled to a compulsory examination of the defendant.

(g) Report of Experts to Court. The experts shall examine the defendant and shall file with the court in writing at such time as shall be specified by the court, with copies to attorneys for the state and the defense, a report that shall contain:

(1) a description of the evaluative techniques that were used in their examination;

(2) a description of the mental and emotional condition and mental processes of the defendant at the time of the alleged offense or probation or community control violation, including the nature of any mental impairment and its relationship to the actions and state of mind of the defendant at the time of the offense or probation or community control violation;

(3) a statement of all relevant factual information regarding the defendant’s behavior on which the conclusions or opinions regarding the defendant’s mental condition were based; and

(4) an explanation of how the conditions and opinions regarding the defendant’s mental condition at the time of the alleged offense or probation or community control violation were reached.

(h)(g) Waiver of Time to File. On good cause shown for the omission of the notice of intent to rely on the defense of insanity, or any mental health defense, the court may in its discretion grant the defendant 10 days to comply with the notice requirement. If leave is granted and the defendant files the notice, the defendant is deemed unavailable to proceed. If the trial has already commenced, the court, only on motion of the defendant, may declare a mistrial in order to permit the defendant to raise the defense of insanity pursuant to this rule. Any motion for mistrial shall constitute a waiver of the defendant’s right to any claim of former jeopardy arising from the uncompleted trial.

(i)(h) Evaluating Defendant after Pretrial Release. If the defendant has been released on bail or other release conditions, the court may order the defendant to appear at a designated place for evaluation at a specific time as a condition of the release provision. If the court determines that the defendant will not submit to the evaluation provided for herein or that the defendant is not likely to appear for the scheduled evaluation, the court may order the defendant taken into custody until the evaluation is completed. A motion made for evaluation under this subdivision shall not otherwise affect the defendant’s right to pretrial release.

(j)(i) Evidence. The appointment of experts by the court shall not preclude the state or the defendant from calling additional expert witnesses to testify at the trial. The Any experts appointed by the court may be summoned to testify at the trial, and shall be deemed court witnesses whether called by the court or by either party. Other evidence regarding the defendant’s insanity or mental condition may be introduced by either party. At trial, in its instructions to the jury, the court shall include an instruction on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

Committee Notes [No change]

RULE 3.220. DISCOVERY

(a) Notice of Discovery. [No change]

(b) Prosecutor’s Discovery Obligation.

(1) Within 15 days after service of the Notice of Discovery, the prosecutor shall serve a written Discovery Exhibit which shall disclose to the defendant and permit the defendant to inspect, copy, test, and photograph the following information and material within the state’s possession or control:

(A) a list of the names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecutor to have information that may be relevant to any offense charged or any defense thereto, or to any similar fact evidence to be presented at trial under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes. The names and addresses of persons listed shall be clearly designated in the following categories:

(i) Category A. These witnesses shall include (1) eye witnesses, (2) alibi witnesses and rebuttal to alibi witnesses, (3) witnesses who were present when a recorded or unrecorded statement was taken from or made by a defendant or codefendant, which shall be separately identified within this category, (4) investigating officers, (5) witnesses known by the prosecutor to have any material information that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant as to any offense charged, (6) child hearsay witnesses, and (7) expert witnesses who have not provided a written report and a curriculum vitae or who are going to testifyto test results or give opinions that will have to meet the test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

(ii) Category B. All witnesses not listed in either Category A or Category C.

(iii) Category C. All witnesses who performed only ministerial functions or whom the prosecutor does not intend to call at trial and whose involvement with and knowledge of the case is fully set out in a police report or other statement furnished to the defense;

(B)-(C) [No change]

(D) any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements made by a codefendantif the trial is to be a joint one;

(E)-(K) [No change]

(L) any tangible paper, objects or substances in the possession of law enforcement that could be tested for DNA.

(2)-(4) [No change]

(c)-(g) [No change]

(h) Discovery Depositions.

(1) Generally. [No change]

(2) Transcripts. No transcript of a deposition for which a countythe state may be obligated to expend funds shall be ordered by a party unless it is:

(A) agreed between the state and any defendant that the deposition should be transcribed and a written agreement certifying that the deposed witness is material or specifying other good cause is filed with the court or

(B) ordered by the court on a showing that the deposed witness is material or on showing of good cause.

This rule shall not apply to applications for reimbursement of costs pursuant to section 939.06, Florida Statutes, and article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution. in compliance with general law.

(3)-(4) [No change]

(5) Depositions of Law Enforcement Officers. Subject to the general provisions of subdivision (h)(1), law enforcement officers shall appear for deposition, without subpoena, upon written notice of taking deposition delivered at the address of the law enforcement agency or department, or an address designated by the law enforcement agency or department, five days prior to the date of the deposition. Law enforcement officers who fail to appear for deposition after being served notice are subject to as required by the rule may be adjudged in contempt proceedingsof court.

(6)-(7) [No change]

(8) Telephonic Statements. On stipulation of the parties and the consent of the witness, the statement of a law enforcement officerany witness may be taken by telephone in lieu of the deposition of the officerwitness. In such case, the officerwitness need not be under oath. The statement, however, shall be recorded and may be used for impeachment at trial as a prior inconsistent statement pursuant to the Florida Evidence Code.

(i)-(n) [No change]

(o) Costs of Indigents.After a defendant is adjudged insolvent, the reasonable costs incurred in the operation of these rules shall be taxed as costs against the state.

(p)(o) Pretrial Conference.

(1)-(2) [No change]

Committee Notes [No change] VII. DISQUALIFICATION AND SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGE

RULE 3.231. SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGE

If by reason of death or disability the judge before whom a trial has commenced is unable to proceed with the trial, or posttrial proceedings, another judge, certifying that he or she has become familiar with the case, may proceed with the disposition of the case., except in death penalty sentencing proceedings. In death penalty sentencing proceedings, a successor judge who did not hear the evidence during the penalty phase of the trial shall conduct a new sentencing proceeding before a new jury.

Committee Notes [No change]

RULE 3.240. CHANGE OF VENUE

(a)-(f) [No change]

(g) Attendance by Witnesses. When the cause is removed to another court, the witnesses who have entered into undertakings been lawfully subpoenaed or ordered to appear at the trial shall, on notice of such removal, attend the court to which the cause is removed at the time specified in the order of removal. A failure to so attend shall work a forfeiture of the undertaking. A witness who refuses to obey a duly served subpoena may be adjudged in contempt of court.

(h)-(j) [No change]

Committee Notes [No change]

RULE 3.800. CORRECTION, REDUCTION, AND MODIFICATION OF SENTENCES

(a) Correction. [No change]

(b) Motion to Correct Sentencing Error. A motion to correct any sentencing error, including an illegal sentence, may be filed as allowed by this subdivision. This subdivision shall not be applicable to those cases in which the death sentence has been imposed and direct appeal jurisdiction is in the Supreme Court under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. The motion must identify the error with specificity and provide a proposed correction. A response to the motion may be filed within 15 days, either admitting or contesting the alleged error. Motions may be filed by the state under this subdivision only if the correction of the sentencing error would benefit the defendant or to correct a scrivener’s error.

(1) Motion Before Appeal. [No change]

(2) Motion Pending Appeal. If an appeal is pending, a defendant or the state may file in the trial court a motion to correct a sentencing error. The motion may be filed by appellate counsel and must be served before the party’s first brief is served. A notice of pending motion to correct sentencing error shall be filed in the appellate court, which notice automatically shall extend the time for the filing of the brief until 10 days after the clerk of circuit court transmits the supplemental record under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(f)(6).

(A) The motion shall be served on the trial court and on all trial and appellate counsel of record. Unless the motion expressly states that appellate counsel will represent the movant in the trial court, trial counsel will represent the movant on the motion under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(5)(d). If the state is the movant, trial counsel will represent the defendant unless appellate counsel for the defendant notifies trial counsel and the trial court that he or she will represent the defendant on the state’s motion.

(B)-(C) [No change]

(c) Reduction and Modification. [No change]

Committee Notes [No change] Court Commentary [No change]

RULE 3.851. COLLATERAL RELIEF AFTER DEATH SENTENCE HAS BEEN IMPOSED AND AFFIRMED ON DIRECT APPEAL

(a)-(h) [No change]

(i) Dismissal of Postconviction Proceedings.

(1)-(8) [No change]

(9) If the court denies the motion, the prisoner may seek review as prescribed by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.142(b).

Court Commentary [No change]

RULE 3.852. CAPITAL POSTCONVICTION PUBLIC RECORDS PRODUCTION

(a) [No Change]

(b) Definitions.

(1)-(2) [No Change]

(3) “Records repository” means the location designated by the secretary of state pursuant to section 119.19(2) 27.7081(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998) (2009), for archiving capital postconviction public records.

(4)-(6) [No Change]

(c) [No Change]

(d) Action Upon Issuance of Mandate.

(1)-(3) [No change]

(4) Within 15 days after receiving written notification of any additional person or agency pursuant to subdivision (d)(2) or (d)(3) of this rule, the attorney general shall notify all persons or agencies identified pursuant to subdivisions (d)(2) or (d)(3) that these persons or agencies are required by section 119.19(6)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), law to copy, index, and deliver to the records repository all public records pertaining to the case that are in their possession. The person or agency shall bear the costs related to copying, indexing, and delivering the records.

(e)-(m) [No change]

RULE 3.853. MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING (a)-(b) [No change]

(c) Procedure.

(1)-(3) [No change]

(4) In the event that the motion shall proceed to a hearing, the court may appoint counsel to assist the movant if the court determines that assistance of counsel is necessary and upon making the appropriate finding of indigence a determination of indigency pursuant to section 27.52, Florida Statutes.

(5)-(8) [No change]

(d)-(f) [No change]

RULE 3.986. FORMS RELATED TO JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

(a)-(b) [No Change]

(c) Form for Charges, Costs, and Fees.

                                  In the Circuit Court,
                                  ______ Judicial Circuit, in and for
                                  _________ County, Florida
                                  Division _________________________
                                  Case Number ______________________

State of Florida

v.

_____________
Defendant

CHARGES/COSTS/FEES

The defendant is hereby ordered to pay the following sums if checked:

________ $50.00 pursuant to section 960.20938.03, Florida Statutes (Crimes Compensation Trust Fund).

________ $3.00 as a court cost pursuant to section 943.25(3)938.01, Florida Statutes (Criminal Justice Trust Fund).

________ $2.00 as a court cost pursuant to section 943.25(13)938.15, Florida Statutes (Criminal Justice Education by Municipalities and Counties).

________ A fine in the sum of $___ pursuant to section 775.0835, Florida Statutes. (This provision refers to the optional fine for the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund and is not applicable unless checked and completed. Fines imposed as part of a sentence to section 775.083, Florida Statutes, are to be recorded on the sentence page(s).)

________ $20.00 pursuant to section 939.015, Florida Statutes (Handicapped and Elderly Security Assistance Trust Fund).

________ A 10% surcharge in the sum of $___ pursuant to section 775.0836, Florida Statutes (Handicapped and Elderly Security Assistance Trust Fund).

________ A sum of $___ pursuant to section 27.3455, Florida Statutes (Local Government Criminal Justice Trust Fund).

________ A sum of $___ pursuant to section 939.01938.27, Florida Statutes (Prosecution/Investigative Costs).

________ A sum of $___ pursuant to section 27.56938.29, Florida Statutes (Public Defender Fees).

________ Restitution in accordance with attached order.

________ $201 pursuant to section 938.08, Florida Statutes (Funding Programs in Domestic Violence).

________ Other________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________

DONE AND ORDERED in open court in ______ County, Florida, on …..(date)……

                                         ___________________________
                                                    Judge

(d) Form for Sentencing.

Defendant ____________       Case Number ______________  OBTS Number ______________

SENTENCE (As to Count___)

The defendant, being personally before this court, accompanied by the defendant’s attorney of record, ____, and having been adjudicated guilty herein, and the court having given the defendant an opportunity to be heard and to offer matters in mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why the defendant should not be sentenced as provided by law, and no cause being shown,

(Check one if applicable)

________ and the court having on …..(date)….. deferred imposition of sentence until this date

________ and the court having previously entered a judgment in this case on …..(date)….. now resentences the defendant

________ and the court having placed the defendant on probation/community control and having subsequently revoked the defendant’s probation/community control

It Is The Sentence Of The Court That:

________ The defendant pay a fine of $___, pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes, plus $____ as the 5% surcharge required by section 960.25938.04, Florida Statutes.

________ The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections.

________ The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Sheriff of ______ County, Florida.

________ The defendant is sentenced as a youthful offender in accordance with section 958.04, Florida Statutes.

To Be Imprisoned (check one; unmarked sections are inapplicable):

________ For a term of natural life.

________ For a term of ________.

________ Said SENTENCE SUSPENDED for a period of _____ subject to conditions set forth in this order.

If “split” sentence complete the appropriate paragraph

________ Followed by a period of ____ on probation/community control under the supervision of the Department of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of supervision set forth in a separate order entered herein.

________ However, after serving a period of ____ imprisonment in ____ the balance of the sentence shall be suspended and the defendant shall be placed on probation/community control for a period of ____ under supervision of the Department of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of probation/community control set forth in a separate order entered herein.

In the event the defendant is ordered to serve additional split sentences, all incarceration portions shall be satisfied before the defendant begins service of the supervision terms.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS (As to Count___)

By appropriate notation, the following provisions apply to the sentence imposed:

Mandatory/Minimum Provisions:

Firearm

________ It is further ordered that the 3-year minimum imprisonment provision of section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

Drug Trafficking

________ It is further ordered that the _____ mandatory minimum imprisonment provision of section 893.135(1), Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

Controlled Substance Within 1,000 Feet of School

________ It is further ordered that the 3-year minimum imprisonment provision of section 893.13(1)(ec)1, Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

Habitual Felony Offender

________ The defendant is adjudicated a habitual felony offender and has been sentenced to an extended term in accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(a), Florida Statutes. The requisite findings by the court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in open court.

Habitual Violent Felony Offender

________ The defendant is adjudicated a habitual violent felony offender and has been sentenced to an extended term in accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(b), Florida Statutes. A minimum term of ____ year(s) must be served prior to release. The requisite findings of the court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in open court.

Law Enforcement Protection Act

________ It is further ordered that the defendant shall serve a minimum of ____ years before release in accordance with section 775.0823, Florida Statutes. (Offenses committed before January 1, 1994).

Capital Offense

________ It is further ordered that the defendant shall serve no less than 25 years in accordance with the provisions of section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes. (Offenses committed before October 1, 1995).

Short-Barreled Rifle, Shotgun, Machine Gun

________ It is further ordered that the 5-year minimum provisions of section 790.221(2), Florida Statutes, are hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count. (Offenses committed before January 1, 1994).

Continuing Criminal Enterprise

________ It is further ordered that the 25-year minimum sentence provisions of section 893.20, Florida Statutes, are hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count. (Offenses committed before January 1, 1994).

Taking a Law Enforcement Officer’s Firearm

________ It is further ordered that the 3-year mandatory minimum imprisonment provision of section 775.0875(1), Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count. (Offenses committed before January 1, 1994).

Sexual Offender/Sexual Predator Determinations:

Sexual Predator

The defendant is adjudicated a sexual predator as set forth in section 775.21, Florida Statutes.

Sexual Offender

The defendant meets the criteria for a sexual offender as set forth in section 943.0435(1)(a)1a., b., c., or d.

Age of Victim

The victim was ____ years of age at the time of the offense.

Age of Defendant

The defendant was ____ years of age at the time of the offense.

Relationship to Victim

The defendant is not the victim’s parent or guardian.

Sexual Activity [F.S. 800.04(4)]

The offense ____did____did not involve sexual activity.

Use of Force or Coercion [F.S. 800.04(4)]

The sexual activity described herein ____did____did not involve the use of force or coercion.

Use of Force or Coercion/unclothed Genitals [F.S. 800.04(5)]

The molestation ____did___did not involve unclothed genitals or genital area.

The molestation ____did____did not involve the use of force or coercion.

Other Provisions:

Retention of Jurisdiction

________ The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(34), Florida Statutes (1983).

Jail Credit

________ It is further ordered that the defendant shall be allowed a total of ____ days as credit for time incarcerated before imposition of this sentence.

CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED IN RESENTENCING AFTER VIOLATION OF PROBATION OR COMMUNITY CONTROL

________ It is further ordered that the defendant be allowed ____ days time served between date of arrest as a violator following release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Corrections shall apply original jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served and unforfeited gain time previously awarded on case/count_______. (Offenses committed before October 1, 1989)

________ It is further ordered that the defendant be allowed ___ days time served between date of arrest as a violator following release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Corrections shall apply original jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served on case/count. (Offenses committed between October 1, 1989, and December 31, 1993)

________ The Court deems the unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count forfeited under section 948.06(67).

________ The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count. (Gain time may be subject to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1)).

________ It is further ordered that the defendant be allowed ____ days time served between date of arrest as a violator following release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of Corrections shall apply original jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served only pursuant to section 921.0017, Florida Statutes, on case/count____. (Offenses committed on or after January 1, 1994)

Consecutive/Concurrent as to Other Counts

It is further ordered that the sentence imposed for this count shall run (check one) ____ consecutive to ____ concurrent with the sentence set forth in count ____ of this case.

Consecutive/Concurrent as to Other Convictions

It is further ordered that the composite term of all sentences imposed for the counts specified in this order shall run (check one) consecutive to concurrent with (check one) the following:

________ any active sentence being served.

________ specific sentences: _______________________________ _____________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________

In the event the above sentence is to the Department of Corrections, the Sheriff of ____ County, Florida, is hereby ordered and directed to deliver the defendant to the Department of Corrections at the facility designated by the department together with a copy of this judgment and sentence and any other documents specified by Florida Statute.

The defendant in open court was advised of the right to appeal from this sentence by filing notice of appeal within 30 days from this date with the clerk of this court and the defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel in taking the appeal at the expense of the state on showing of indigency.

In imposing the above sentence, the court further recommends ___________ ________________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________.

DONE AND ORDERED in open court at ____ County, Florida, on …..(date)……

                                                  _________________________
                                                           Judge

(e)-(g) [No Change]

—————

Notes:

1. Pursuant to the Court’s order issued on July 1, 2009, the proposed amendments to rule 3.132 were severed from the Committee’s other regular-cycle proposals. Rule 3.132 has been amended in that separate proceeding. See In re Amends. to Fla. Rule of Crim. Pro. 3.132, 34 Fla. L. Weekly S538 (Fla. Sept. 17, 2009).

2. The Court’s modification of the Committee’s proposal is limited to correcting a statutory citation.

—————

Orme v. State, No. SC08-182 (Fla. 11/19/2009)

Thursday, November 19th, 2009

RODERICK MICHAEL ORME, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

No. SC08-182.

Supreme Court of Florida.

November 19, 2009.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bay County, Judy P.M. Pittman, Judge — Case No. 92-442CFMA.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and David A. Davis, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Meredith Charbula, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Roderick Michael Orme appeals an order of the trial court sentencing him to death following resentencing. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the death sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

We summarized the facts of this case on Orme’s previous direct appeal as follows:

Roderick Michael Orme had an extensive history of substance abuse for which he previously had sought treatment at a recovery center in Panama City. On the morning of March 4, 1992, Orme suddenly appeared at the center again, despite a lapse of about a year since his prior treatment. He was disoriented and unable to respond to questions, but he did manage to write a message. It was “LEE’S MOT RM15.” While a breathalyzer returned negative results, Orme’s blood tested positive for cocaine and he was showing signs of acute cocaine withdrawal. He was cold, his face was flushed, and he was exhibiting symptoms like delirium tremens. An attending physician placed Orme in intensive care for thirty hours. Illegal barbiturates were found in Orme’s possession.

Lee’s Motel was located only a few blocks from the recovery center. Someone at the center telephoned the motel and said that a man who sounded hysterical had said to check room 15. The owner did so and found the body of a woman who had been badly beaten.

Semen was found in the victim’s orifices, but DNA testing could not identify a DNA match. One sample taken from the victim’s panties, however, held material that matched the pattern of Orme’s DNA. Orme’s underpants also had a mixed blood stain matching both Orme and the victim’s genotype. Orme’s fingerprints were found in the motel room, and his checkbook and identification card were found in the victim’s car, which was parked outside.

The cause of death was strangulation. There were extensive bruising and hemorrhaging on the face, skull, chest, arms, left leg, and abdomen, indicating a severe beating. The abdominal hemorrhaging extended completely through the body to the back and involved the right kidney. Jewelry the victim always wore was missing and was never found. Police later identified the body as that of Lisa Redd, a nurse.

Orme acknowledged that he had summoned Redd to his motel room the day she was killed because he was having a “bad high” after free-basing cocaine. Orme and Redd had known each other for some time, and Orme called her because she was a nurse.

On March 4, 1992, Orme told police he had last seen Redd twenty minutes after she arrived at his motel. Orme said she had knocked a crack pipe from his hands, apparently resulting in the loss of his drugs. He left to go partying soon thereafter. In this statement, he also said that this was the first time he had abused cocaine since 1990 and that he did not remember being at the addiction recovery center.

The following day Orme gave a lengthier statement to police. In this one, he said that Redd had arrived at his motel room between 9 and 10 p.m. She slapped his crack pipe out of his hands and swept several pieces of crack into the toilet. Orme said he then took the victim’s purse, which contained her car keys, and drove away in her car. Orme said he left and returned several times and that it was still dark when he realized something was wrong with Redd. The last time he returned, however, he could not enter because he had left the motel key inside the room.

Orme was arrested on March 6, 1992, after his release from the hospital. On March 26, 1992, he was charged by indictment with premeditated or felony murder, robbery, and sexual battery.

At trial, Orme testified that Redd had arrived at his motel room at 7, 8, or possibly 8:30 p.m. He again said he returned to the motel room at some point. At this time he realized Redd’s body was cold and that something was wrong. But he said the next thing he remembered was being in the hospital.

Robert Pegg, a cab driver, testified at trial that he had picked up Orme at Lee’s Motel around 8 p.m.

A man who lived across from the motel, Joseph Lee, also testified. He said that he generally kept track of what was happening at the motel and had first noticed the victim’s automobile there around 9:30 or 10 p.m. Lee said he saw Orme leave and return several times. Before going to bed around 2 a.m., Lee said he saw Orme leave in the victim’s car once more.

Another witness, Ann Thicklin, saw someone slowly drive the victim’s car into Lee’s Motel around 6:15 a.m.

The jury convicted Orme on all counts and recommended death by a vote of seven to five. The defense waived the mitigator of no prior criminal history and asked for the jury to be instructed on the age mitigator, the two statutory mental mitigators (substantial impairment and extreme emotional disturbance), and the catch-all mitigator. The state asked for three instructions: murder committed in the course of a sexual battery; heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and pecuniary gain.

Shortly before sentencing, the defense asked the court to consider the “no significant prior criminal history” factor based on the presentence investigation (“PSI”) and penalty-phase testimony. The defense stated that it had waived the factor to prevent the State from introducing a rebuttal witness about an alleged prior sexual assault committed by Orme.

The trial court stated that it had considered this motion. Shortly thereafter the judge sentenced Orme to death, finding all three aggravators argued by the State. In mitigation, the trial court found both statutory mental mitigators and gave them “some weight,” but concluded they did not outweigh the case for aggravation. The Court rejected the other factors argued by Orme: his age (30), his love for his family, an unstable childhood, potential for rehabilitation, and good conduct while awaiting trial.

Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258, 260-62 (Fla. 1996). On direct appeal, Orme raised eight issues.1 This Court affirmed Orme’s conviction of first-degree murder and the sentence of death. Id. Orme filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. That Court denied review on January 13, 1997. Orme v. Florida, 519 U.S. 1079 (1997).

Subsequently, Orme filed an amended motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, raising twenty-five claims. After an evidentiary hearing on four claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the trial court denied relief. Orme appealed the denial of postconviction relief to this Court, raising three claims.2 He also petitioned the Court for a writ of habeas corpus, raising eight claims.3 See Orme v. State, 896 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2005). This Court found defense counsel ineffective for failing to further investigate Orme’s diagnosis of bipolar disorder with respect to the penalty phase. As a result, a new penalty phase was ordered. Id.

In May 2007, a new penalty phase was conducted before a new jury, but before the original trial judge. By a vote of eleven to one, the new jury recommended a death sentence. The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Orme to death. The trial court found the following three statutory aggravating factors: (1) the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain; (2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit a sexual battery; and (3) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The trial court also found three statutory mitigators: (1) the defendant had no significant criminal history (little weight); (2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (little weight); and (3) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired (little weight). The trial court also found that the following mitigation was either irrelevant to the murder or did not exist and, as a result, gave them no weight: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) a bipolar disorder contributed significantly to the defendant’s substance abuse; (3) the defendant had a difficult childhood; (4) the defendant is a model prisoner; (5) the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation; and (6) the defendant tried to get the victim help.

On appeal, Orme presents nine claims. In addition to the claims asserted by Orme, the Court must also review the proportionality of the death sentence.

ANALYSIS Consideration of Remorse as a Mitigator

Orme contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to challenge for cause prospective jurors who could not consider remorse as a mitigator. During voir dire, defense counsel asked one of the prospective jurors whether evidence of Orme’s remorse could be significant in considering the case. The prosecutor objected. At first, the trial court sustained the objection and held that such a question about remorse was not appropriate during voir dire. However, after both the prosecutor and the trial judge acknowledged that remorse could be considered as a mitigator in sentencing, the trial judge held that defense counsel could inquire into remorse, but could not ask the jury what weight they would give it. However, in doing so, the trial judge also ruled that if a juror could not consider remorse as mitigating, it could only be a basis for a peremptory challenge, not a challenge for cause.

We agree with Orme that the trial court erred in holding that a juror’s refusal to consider remorse as a mitigator could only be a basis for a peremptory challenge. However, we find that the claim is not preserved for appeal because defense counsel failed to question any of the prospective jurors about their consideration of remorse as mitigation for the remainder of voir dire after the trial court ruled on the issue. To preserve the claim for appeal, counsel had to question the prospective jurors about whether they could consider remorse as a mitigator and then attempt to challenge the juror for cause if the juror answered that he or she could not consider remorse as a mitigator. Therefore, relief is not warranted on this claim.

Orme also asserts that the trial court erred in failing to consider Orme’s remorse as a mitigator in its sentencing order. This Court has consistently held that the trial court must expressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant to determine whether it is supported by the evidence. Griffin v. State, 820 So. 2d 906, 913 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990)). However, “a defendant must raise a proposed nonstatutory mitigating circumstance before the trial court in order to challenge on appeal the trial court’s decision about that nonstatutory mitigating factor.” Davis v. State, 2 So. 3d 952, 962 (Fla. 2008). In the instant case, Orme filed a supplemental sentencing memorandum after the Spencer4 hearing in which he requested the trial court to consider remorse as a mitigator. In that memorandum, Orme argued that he expressed his genuine remorse for his actions at the Spencer hearing and accepted responsibility for the crime. We agree with Orme that the trial court failed to expressly evaluate remorse in its sentencing order even though Orme proposed remorse as a mitigating circumstance and expressed his remorse at the Spencer hearing. However, we hold that any error on the trial court’s part in failing to consider remorse as a mitigating circumstance constitutes harmless error. The trial court found three aggravators: (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); (2) commission during a sexual battery; and (3) commission for pecuniary gain. The mitigation in the case was relatively weak. Therefore, even if the nonstatutory mitigator of remorse had been considered, the mitigating evidence would not have outweighed the aggravators. See Singleton v. State, 783 So. 2d 970, 977 (Fla. 2001) (holding that trial court’s error in failing to address nonstatutory mitigation was harmless because the mitigators would not outweigh the aggravation in the case); see also Bates v. State, 750 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1999).

Inquiry of Prospective Jurors—Mercy

Orme contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Orme to inquire of prospective jurors whether they could consider recommending a life sentence as a matter of mercy even if the aggravators outweighed the mitigation. The State argues that the trial court did not commit error because although the trial court initially denied defense counsel the opportunity to question prospective jurors about mercy during the first stage of jury selection, the trial court allowed counsel to question jurors about their willingness to consider mercy during the second stage of jury selection. We agree.

During the first stage of voir dire, defense counsel asked two prospective jurors whether the consideration of mercy had a part in the sentencing proceedings. After the first juror stated that he could not consider mercy, defense counsel challenged him for cause, which the trial court denied. Defense counsel then asked another juror the same question. The prosecutor objected, and the trial court sustained the objection and restricted defense counsel’s questions regarding mercy. Later during voir dire, defense counsel asked the trial court to reconsider the ruling restricting his ability to inquire about mercy. The trial court agreed to allow defense counsel to revisit the issue of mercy during the second stage of voir dire. After this ruling, although still during the first stage, defense counsel questioned three more prospective jurors about mercy without objection from the State, and then asked two different groups of prospective jurors during the second stage whether they could consider mercy. None of the prospective jurors indicated that they could not consider mercy in the case.

Orme concedes that the trial court allowed him to question prospective jurors about mercy and he did, in fact, ask the jurors about mercy. However, he argues that because the parties resumed their argument about the role of mercy during the second stage of jury selection, he was never able to raise the issue of mercy afterwards due to the trial court’s ruling. The record demonstrates that after defense counsel asked the last set of fourteen jurors about mercy, the parties resumed their argument about the role of mercy. The trial court ended the argument by ruling that the prosecutor could not bring up the issue of mercy unless defense counsel raised the issue. Orme now argues that he was never able to raise the issue of mercy after this decision because he did not want the State to make improper comments about the governor being the only one who could exercise mercy.5 However, we find the issue is not preserved for appeal because after the trial court’s decision, Orme did not attempt to question the jurors about mercy for the rest of voir dire. Accordingly, relief is not warranted.

The more troubling issue is the prosecutor’s comments during voir dire on how the trial judge could not consider mercy in his decision and the governor was the only person who could exercise mercy by way of a clemency hearing. We find that these statements by the prosecutor were improper and misleading to the jury. Thus, the trial court erred in overruling defense counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s statements. However, we hold that the statements constitute harmless error because none of the prospective jurors indicated they could not consider mercy, the jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of eleven to one, and the trial court found the three aggravators outweighed the relatively weak mitigation. Accordingly, relief is not warranted.

Refusal to Dismiss Venire

Orme argues that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the venire after one prospective juror indicated he was opposed to a life sentence without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years because Orme had been convicted fifteen years ago. We deny relief because the trial court properly instructed the jury on this matter.

During voir dire, one of the prospective jurors expressed his concern that parole was a possibility after twenty-five years because Orme committed the crime fifteen years ago. Defense counsel then moved to strike the venire panel, arguing that the prospective juror poisoned the entire pool by stating that Orme had been convicted fifteen years ago. The State then suggested that the trial court could remedy the situation by giving a special instruction to explain the sentence of life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years according to this Court’s decision in Green v. State, 907 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2005). The trial court then denied the motion, but read the agreed-to instruction to the jury.

The trial court’s decision on whether to dismiss a venire is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Hernandez v. State, 4 So. 3d 642 (Fla.), cert. denied, No. 08-10909 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2009). Also, “[i]n order for the statement of one venire member to taint the panel, the venire member must mention facts that would not otherwise be presented to the jury.” Johnson v. State, 903 So. 2d 888, 897 (Fla. 2005). In the instant case, the prospective juror did not mention a fact that would not otherwise be presented to the jury. The fact that Orme had committed the crime in 1992 was a fact presented to every prospective juror in the State’s brief explanation of the case during voir dire. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defense’s motion to dismiss the venire.

Orme further argues that although the trial court provided a jury instruction to clarify that there was no guarantee that Orme would be paroled after twenty-five years if given a life sentence without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years, this instruction should have been given at the beginning of voir dire. However, the trial court followed the procedure used by the trial court and affirmed by this Court in Green.6 The trial court used the same language used by the trial court in Green and explained to the jury that it was not guaranteed that the defendant would be granted parole after twenty-five years. Such an instruction actually favored Orme because it “served to remind any jurors leaning towards the death penalty based on the perception that [Orme] could be paroled in the near future due to the credit for time served that [Orme] could stay in jail for a longer period of time and that there was no guarantee that he would in fact be paroled.” Id. at 498-99. Even though this instruction was not provided at the beginning of voir dire, it still remedied and clarified the concern that several of the prospective jurors had with the sentencing option of life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. See Thompson v. State, 619 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1993) (finding that the trial court did not commit error in failing to strike the venire after it became apparent that one of the jurors was concerned that the defendant could be released within twelve years if given a life sentence).

We find that the trial court did not err in failing to strike the venire.

Waiver of Right to Sentencing Option of Life in Prison without Possibility of Parole for Twenty-five Years

Orme contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to waive his right to the sentencing option of life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years in favor of a harsher punishment of life in prison without the possibility of parole. In making this argument, Orme is essentially urging the Court to recede from its majority decision in Bates v. State, 750 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1999), and adopt the dissenting opinion in Bates. We decline to do so.

Before May 25, 1994, defendants convicted of capital murder faced two sentencing options: death or life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. § 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (1993). However, in 1994, the Legislature enacted chapter 94-228, Laws of Florida, section 1, which amended the statute to replace the option of life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years with life in prison without eligibility for parole. § 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1994). This amendment applies to offenses committed on or after May 25, 1994. See In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 678 So. 2d 1224, 1224 n. 1 (Fla. 1996). Because Orme committed the crime in 1992, his two sentencing options were death or life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. However, Orme wished to waive his right to the sentencing option of life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years in favor of a harsher punishment of life in prison without the possibility of parole.7

In Bates, the defendant raised a similar issue—whether the trial court’s refusal to instruct the sentencing jury that life without the possibility of parole was a sentencing alternative to death denied him due process and a fundamentally fair capital sentencing proceeding. 750 So. 2d at 9. This Court applied the rules of statutory construction and stated that “without clear legislative intent to the contrary, a law is presumed to apply prospectively.” Id. at 10. The Court then applied that rule to section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1995), and found that there was “no unequivocal language that the Legislature intended this amendment [to section 775.082(1)] to apply retroactively.” Id.

As we stated in Bates, under the rules of statutory construction, there must be a clear expression of intended retrospective application. See State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1983). In the instant matter, the Legislature did not, by clear and unequivocal language, express its intent for section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1995), to apply retroactively. Additionally, in In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, we recognized that the 1994 amendment applied to offenses committed on or after May 25, 1994. As a result, Orme is not eligible to receive a life sentence without the possibility of parole. See Hudson v. State, 708 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1998) (the 1994 amendment to section 775.082(1) cannot be applied retroactively); Craig v. State, 685 So. 2d 1224, 1230 n.12 (Fla. 1996) (because the defendant committed his crime in 1981, he was not eligible to receive a life sentence without the possibility of parole); Gore v. State, 706 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1997).

Because Orme was not eligible to receive the sentencing option of a life sentence without the possibility of parole and because there is no reason for us to recede from precedent on this issue, relief is denied on this claim.

Mitigation

In this claim, Orme argues that the trial court erred by failing to give weight to Orme’s difficult childhood, to the fact that Orme was a model prisoner, to Orme’s potential for rehabilitation, and to Orme’s attempt to get the victim help.

In Fennie v. State, 855 So. 2d 597, 608 (Fla. 2003), we reiterated the procedural requirements that a trial court must follow in its sentencing order in a capital case. A trial judge must

(1) expressly evaluate in his or her written order each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant to determine whether it is supported by the evidence and whether, in the case of nonstatutory factors, it is truly of a mitigating nature; (2) assign a weight to each aggravating factor and mitigating factor properly established; (3) weigh the established aggravating circumstances against the established mitigating circumstances; and (4) provide a detailed explanation of the result of the weighing process.

With regard to mitigating circumstances, “A trial court may reject a claim that a mitigating circumstance has been proven provided that the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the rejection.” Hurst v. State, 819 So. 2d 689, 697 (Fla. 2002); see also Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 636, 646 (Fla. 2000). Moreover, in Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d 1050, 1055 (Fla. 2000), we receded from our decision in Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 420 (Fla. 1990), and held that trial courts may assign no weight to a mitigating factor. In doing so, we recognized that a trial judge “may not preclude from consideration any evidence regarding a mitigating circumstance that is proffered by a defendant in order to receive a sentence of less than death.” However, there are circumstances where although a mitigator may be relevant and must be considered by the trial judge because it is generally recognized as a mitigator, the judge “may determine in the particular case at hand that it is entitled to no weight for additional reasons or circumstances unique to that case.” Trease, 768 So. 2d at 1055.

In the instant case, the trial judge found that having a difficult childhood was not relevant to the murder and assigned it no weight. In finding that the mitigator had no relevance to the murder, the trial judge stated the following in its sentencing order: “The defendant came from a divorced family and he was not raised by his biological mother, however, the defendant was raised by a loving and caring stepmother.”8 We find that although the trial court’s treatment of this mitigator was improper, the error was harmless given the severity of the three aggravators in the case and other relatively weak mitigation.

Several defense witnesses testified concerning Orme’s father’s violent and abusive behavior. They testified that Orme’s father was a violent man who abused people verbally, demeaned them, and belittled them, especially Orme, Orme’s stepbrother, Eric, and Orme’s biological mother, Linda Henley. Orme’s stepmother, Carol Orme, specifically testified that she believed Orme’s father suffered from bipolar disease and depression and that when he was depressed, he was a “fighter.” According to Carol, his father was diagnosed with depression and anxiety and had medicine prescribed. Linda testified that when she divorced Orme’s father, the father convinced her to let him have custody of Orme, but then he made it very difficult for her to visit Orme. When she found out that Orme’s father was going to move out of state and take Orme with him, she went to the school and took him out. Six months later, Orme’s father went to the school and grabbed him and when the teacher tried to stop him, he punched her in the mouth and took off with Orme. After that incident, Linda did not see Orme for ten years. When they reunited ten years later, Orme explained to Linda that he thought she had stopped loving him because his father told him that she did not want him and that she had sold him for a new car.

Thus, the record demonstrates that there was an abundance of evidence about Orme’s father’s violent temper and verbal abuse as well as his diagnosis for depression and anxiety. However, the trial court failed to discuss any of this evidence in its sentencing order. The trial court’s statement that Orme’s parents were divorced but that he had a loving stepmother was an insufficient analysis of this mitigator. Even though the trial court erred in its treatment of this mitigator, we find the error harmless. See Hurst, 819 So. 2d at 699. The trial court found three significant aggravators—HAC, pecuniary gain, and commission during a sexual battery—compared to relatively weak mitigation. Even if we consider the difficult childhood with the other mitigation, it does not change the balance of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Orme also challenges the trial court’s decision that the model prisoner mitigator was not relevant to the murder and to give it no weight. As to this mitigator, the trial court found: “The defendant has exhibited model behavior while in prison. He only has minor disciplinary reports, however, one including possession of marijuana.”9

During the resentencing proceeding, only one witness, a retired Florida prison warden, provided testimony as to Orme’s “model prisoner” behavior. He testified that Orme had been an absolutely model prisoner compared to other prisoners across the board and that his disciplinary issues were very low and minor. However, he also admitted that he never met Orme or observed him in prison; he only reviewed documents involving Orme’s time in prison. He further admitted that Orme did have two disciplinary reports, one involving possession of marijuana and another involving Orme throwing a tray of food on the floor because the food was not cooked properly. The possession of marijuana in prison is significant because he was in maximum custody, had a history of substance abuse problems, and had been in and out of detox because of the abuse. Under these circumstances, we find no error in the trial court’s decision regarding this mitigating factor.

The trial court also found that the potential for rehabilitation mitigator was not applicable.10 As the court noted, Orme was addicted to illegal drugs for over ten years and had received in-patient treatment for the addiction, but he continued to use drugs and the attempt at rehabilitation did not stop the murder. Moreover, we note that the defense failed to present any evidence to demonstrate that Orme had potential for rehabilitation. Family members testified that Orme began using drugs when he entered college and had been addicted since then. He was admitted to a detox center to get treated for the addiction, but on the night of the murder, Orme still chose to buy and abuse cocaine. Therefore, the trial court did not err in rejecting this mitigating circumstance.

Orme’s final contention under this claim is that the trial court erred in rejecting the “trying to get victim help” mitigator. To support this mitigator, the defense provided the testimony of an employee at Reliance House, the detox center where Orme showed up on the morning after the murder. The employee testified that when Orme walked in that morning, he was unable to speak, but wrote on a piece of paper “Lee’s Mot Rm 15.” This evidence of writing a note indicating where Redd was is not enough to prove that Orme tried to get Redd help. Moreover, the mitigator is contravened by other evidence in the record that demonstrates that Orme did not try to help Redd until many hours after he left her dead in the motel room, took her car, and went riding around town with another woman. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision rejecting this as a mitigating circumstance.11

Pecuniary Gain Aggravator

Orme contends that the trial court erred in finding the pecuniary gain aggravator because the taking of Redd’s property was not an integral part of the murder. To establish the pecuniary gain aggravator, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “the murder was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to obtain money, property, or other financial gain.” Green v. State, 907 So. 2d 489, 500 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Finney v. State, 660 So. 2d 674, 680 (Fla. 1995)). In its sentencing order, the trial court found that the pecuniary gain aggravator had been established based on evidence that demonstrated that Orme unlawfully took Redd’s purse, car, keys, money, necklace, and watch by force, violence, assault or putting her in fear.

The record demonstrates that the trial court’s finding of the pecuniary gain aggravator is supported by competent, substantial evidence. Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1997) (recognizing that on appeal, this Court’s task is to review the record to determine whether the trial court applied the right rule of law for each aggravator and to determine whether competent, substantial evidence supports its finding). The State presented evidence to show that Orme did not have money left when he asked Redd to come to the motel to medically assist him. While Redd was in the motel room attempting to assist Orme, she threw Orme’s cocaine into the toilet at which point Orme got angry and proceeded to brutally beat, rape, and murder Redd. Afterwards, he left the room with Redd’s purse and keys, jumped into her car, and rode around for the rest of the night. At some point during the night, Orme picked up another woman and partied with her all night in Redd’s car. Orme did not return Redd’s car to the motel until the morning. Redd’s purse and the jewelry she always wore were never found after the murder. Because Orme had been using drugs the entire day of the murder and Redd had thrown away Orme’s unused cocaine, Orme’s motivation to kill Redd was, at least in part, due to his desire to obtain her money, jewelry, and car so he could ride around town, purchase more drugs, and party with the another woman all night. Moreover, the trial court convicted Orme of robbery, which was affirmed by this Court on direct appeal. The robbery conviction coupled with the evidence presented by the State that Orme took Redd’s purse and keys to joyride in her car all night after he murdered her provides competent, substantial evidence to affirm the trial court’s finding of the pecuniary gain aggravator.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding the pecuniary gain aggravator.

HAC Aggravator

Orme contends that the trial court erred in finding the murder to have been committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) manner because the evidence did not show that he enjoyed the suffering of his victim. This Court has consistently held that the HAC aggravator does not necessarily focus on the intent and motivation of the defendant, but instead on the “means and manner in which death is inflicted and the immediate circumstances surrounding the death.” Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998); see also Stephens v. State, 975 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2007). The HAC aggravator is proper “only in torturous murders—those that evince extreme and outrageous depravity as exemplified either by the desire to inflict a high degree of pain or utter indifference to or enjoyment of the suffering of another.” Guzman v. State, 721 So. 2d 1155, 1159 (Fla. 2002); see also Cheshire v. State, 568 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1990). The crime must be “conscienceless or pitiless and unnecessarily torturous to the victim.” Guzman, 721 So. 2d at 1159 (citing Richardson v. State, 604 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1992)).

We find that the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that this murder was conscienceless and pitiless and was unnecessarily tortuous to Redd, both physically and emotionally. Dr. James Lauridson, a forensic pathologist, testified that Redd had significant bruising all over her body, including her face, neck, arms, legs, and abdominal area, which came from blunt force trauma. He explained that the blunt trauma was of such force that it tore the blood vessels under the skin, which bled out and caused discoloration. The blunt force injury on the abdomen was deep enough to injure the tissue surrounding the kidney, causing a significant amount of hemorrhaging. Dr. Lauridson further testified that there was ecchymosis (bleeding on the white of the eye) and petechiae (small pinpoint hemorrhages on eyelids), which are commonly seen in asphyxia deaths when there has been strangulation. There was also a significant amount of hemorrhaging at all levels of the neck including the back of the neck, which was consistent with someone being strangled from the front and back. Dr. Leroy Riddick, the forensic pathologist called by the defense, agreed that the cause of death was manual strangulation. He further stated that there was definitely an altercation and a struggle; Redd did not just sit there and get strangled. He also testified that by looking at the injuries, Orme delivered approximately twenty-four blows to Redd.

Evidence of Redd’s struggle indicates that Redd was aware of her impending death. See Belcher v. State, 851 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 2003) (finding that the HAC aggravator applied and noting that although the victim was probably only conscious for sometime between thirty seconds and a minute before her strangulation and drowning death, the evidence of a struggle between the victim and her attacker established that she was likely conscious at the outset of the strangling and was aware of her impending death). Moreover, because strangulation of a conscious victim involves foreknowledge and the extreme anxiety of impending death, death by strangulation constitutes prima facie evidence of HAC. See Bowles v. State, 804 So. 2d 1173, 1178 (Fla. 2001) (“Strangulation of a conscious murder victim evinces that the victim suffered through the extreme anxiety of impending death as well as the perpetrator’s utter indifference to such torture. Accordingly, this Court has consistently upheld the HAC aggravator in cases where a conscious victim was strangled.”); see also Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 636, 645 (Fla. 2000).

The testimony elicited during the penalty phase regarding strangulation of Redd, her struggle, and the significant amount of bruising over her body provides competent, substantial evidence to support the finding of the HAC aggravator. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s finding of HAC.

Sexual Battery Aggravator

Orme asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the “murder was committed in the course of a sexual battery” aggravator applied. Orme concedes that he had sexual relations with Redd on the night she was murdered, but argues that the evidence failed to establish Redd’s lack of consent. In its sentencing order, the trial court concluded that Orme committed sexual battery upon Redd by oral, vaginal, and anal penetration without her consent and in the process used force or violence likely to cause personal injury to Redd.

We find that there is competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding of the sexual battery aggravator. Two investigators testified that Redd’s clothing was disheveled when she was found in the motel room, that is, her shirt was unsnapped and pulled up just below her breast; her pants were not fully up; her bra was twisted and above the breast; her panties were only on one leg. Also, a significant amount of blood was found in the backside of Redd’s panties and on the rectal, vaginal, and oral swabs performed on Redd. One of the medical examiners testified that the blood on Redd’s panties came from an injury to the lining of the rectum where there was hemorrhaging and abrasions. He testified that these injuries were consistent with unlubricated anal intercourse. He also emphasized that such a significant amount of blood would not be normal in everyday consensual anal intercourse. The testimony presented also reveals that there was a significant amount of bruising to Redd’s body, specifically her legs, arms, abdomen, and upper chest area. Additionally, Orme was convicted of sexual battery by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt, which we affirmed on direct appeal.

Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in finding the sexual battery aggravator. See Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So. 2d 495, 509 (Fla. 2005) (rejecting the defendant’s contention that the sexual intercourse with the victim was consensual based on the evidence that the victim was found naked with her bloody undergarment wrapped around her waist near her breasts, her breasts were deep purple, and there was puffiness around her head, bruising on her arms, scratches covering her legs, and a cigarette burn on her leg).

Ring Violation

Orme raises the same Ring claim raised in his appeal of the denial of postconviction relief, but also recognizes that this Court has repeatedly rejected arguments that Ring has any application to Florida’s capital sentencing scheme. As we stated in Orme’s postconviction appeal and as Orme concedes, similar arguments have been addressed and rejected by this Court. Orme, 896 So. 2d at 736-37; see also Fennie v. State, 855 So. 2d 597, 607 n.10 (Fla. 2003); Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 963 (Fla. 2003). Moreover, Orme was convicted not only of first-degree murder, but also of two additional violent felonies: sexual battery and robbery. We have consistently found that Ring is satisfied when a defendant commits a murder in the course of an enumerated felony. See generally Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2004). Accordingly, relief is denied on this claim.

Proportionality Assessment

While not challenged by Orme, the proportionality of the death sentence is an issue that this court must review in every death penalty case. Beasley v. State, 774 So. 2d 649, 673 (Fla. 2000). “[T]o ensure uniformity in death penalty proceedings, `we make a comprehensive analysis in order to determine whether the crime falls within the category of both the most aggravated and the least mitigated of murders, thereby assuring uniformity in the application of the sentence.’” Floyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 564, 578 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 407-08 (Fla. 2003)).

Orme was convicted of murder, robbery, and sexual battery. The trial court found three aggravators: (1) HAC; (2) the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain; and (3) the capital felony was committed during the commission of a sexual battery. The court also found three statutory mitigators: (1) the defendant had no significant criminal history (little weight); (2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (little weight); and (3) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired (little weight). Because we find that the trial court erred as to the difficult childhood mitigator, we also give proper consideration to that mitigator in the proportionality assessment.

We find that Orme’s sentence is proportional in relation to other death sentences that this Court has upheld. See Johnston v. State, 841 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2002) (finding death sentence proportionate where defendant beat, raped, and strangled his victim and the trial court found four aggravators including the three that were found in the instant case, one statutory mitigator, and numerous nonstatutory mitigators); see also Bates v. State, 750 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1999) (upholding death sentence where the Court found three aggravators, including that the murder was committed during a kidnapping and sexual battery, was committed for pecuniary gain, and was HAC, versus two statutory mitigators and several nonstatutory mitigators); Hauser v. State, 701 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1997) (death sentence proportionate where victim was strangled and trial court found three aggravators of HAC, CCP, and pecuniary gain, balanced against one statutory mitigator and four nonstatutory mitigators).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm Orme’s sentence of death.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

CANADY, J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.

—————

Notes:

1. The following issues were raised: (1) the trial court should have directed a judgment of acquittal on grounds the case against him was circumstantial and the State had failed to disprove all reasonable hypotheses of innocence; (2) Orme’s statements to officers should have been suppressed on grounds he was too intoxicated with drugs to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to silence; (3) death is not a proportionate penalty because Orme’s will was overborne by drug abuse, and because any fight between the victim and him was a “lover’s quarrel”; (4) Orme’s mental state at the time of the murder was such that he could not form a “design” to inflict a high degree of suffering on the victim; (5) the trial court erred by failing to weigh in mitigation the fact that Orme had no significant prior criminal history; (6) the trial court erred in declining to give a special instruction that acts perpetrated on the victim after her death are not relevant to the aggravator of heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (7) the instruction on heinous, atrocious, or cruel violated the dictates of Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992); and (8) Orme was incapable of forming the specific intent necessary for first-degree murder and this fact bars his death sentence under Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).

2. Orme argued that (1) the trial court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim for trial counsel’s failure to present evidence of Orme’s diagnosis of bipolar disorder; (2) his death sentence is unconstitutional pursuant to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and its progeny; and (3) the general jury qualifications procedure in Bay County, where he was tried, was unconstitutional. Orme v. State, 896 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2005).

3. Three of the claims Orme raised were: (1) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on appeal the fact that Orme was involuntarily absent from two bench conferences which he claims were critical stages of his trial; (2) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on appeal the claim that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct rendering the conviction and sentence fundamentally unfair; and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on appeal the claim that the trial court erroneously allowed forty-three gruesome photographs to be shown to the jury. Orme raised five additional claims, all of which were found not to be properly raised in a habeas proceeding because they were either raised on direct appeal or in postconviction or should have been raised and were therefore procedurally barred. Orme v. State, 896 So. 2d 725, 740 (Fla. 2005).

4. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).

5. Immediately prior to the arguments about mercy, the prosecutor made comments to the prospective jurors about the governor being the only one that could grant mercy to the defendant.

6. In that case, during the penalty phase, the trial court instructed the jury that they had to recommend either death or life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. During deliberations, the jury asked the trial judge whether the life sentence without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years started when the crime was committed in 1987 or if it started on that day of deliberations. The trial court provided the jury with the following answer: “The defendant, if sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for 25 years, would be entitled to credit for all jail served [sic] against a life sentence. However, there is no guarantee that the defendant would be granted parole at or after 25 years.” Green, 907 So. 2d at 496. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court improperly responded to a question posed by the penalty phase jury during deliberations. With regard to the second part of the response, the Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion for two reasons. First, the trial court’s answer was not detrimental and was actually favorable to the defendant. Also, the trial court did not impermissibly comment on a question of fact, but instead answered a question of law. Id. at 498-99.

7. After the trial court ruled that the proper instruction for the jury included a life sentence with eligibility for parole after twenty-five years, Orme requested that he be sentenced under the 1994 sentencing scheme. The trial court did not approve the request but stated that the issue could be revisited during trial. Subsequently, Orme filed a Motion to Include Life Without Eligibility for Parole on the Verdict Form which requested that the jury be informed of three sentencing options—life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years, life without the possibility of parole, and death. The court denied the motion.

8. Although it appears that the trial court found this nonstatutory mitigator but assigned it no weight, the language of the court’s order is ambiguous and could be construed as rejecting this mitigator. We remind trial courts that rejecting a mitigator because it is not supported by the evidence is not the equivalent of assigning the mitigator no weight. As we have stated previously, a trial court may find that a mitigator is supported by the record, but nonetheless assign the mitigator no weight. See id. Alternatively, if competent, substantial evidence supporting the mitigator does not exist, there is no need for the trial court to engage in a weighing process of that mitigator.

9. Similar to the “difficult childhood” mitigator, the trial court’s discussion of this mitigator could be interpreted as either rejecting this mitigator or finding the mitigator and assigning it no weight.

10. Although the trial court stated that it gave this mitigator no weight, it appears that the court found that the mitigator was not supported by the record as it stated that “this [mitigating] circumstance does not exist.”

11. Again, the trial court gave this mitigator no weight but it appears that the mitigator was rejected by the court’s language that “this [mitigating] circumstance does not exist.”

—————

CANADY, J., specially concurring.

I concur in the affirmance of Orme’s death sentence. Except for the matters discussed below, I agree with the analysis in the per curiam opinion.

With respect to Orme’s claim that the trial court erred in refusing to permit a for-cause challenge to prospective jurors who refused to consider remorse as a mitigating factor, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the claim was not preserved. I would reject the issue on that basis and refrain from reaching its merits.

With respect to the claim that the trial court failed to consider Orme’s remorse as a mitigator, I would reject the claim on the basis that it was not preserved. Orme never did anything to bring the supposed deficiency in the sentencing order to the attention of the trial court. Accordingly, the issue is unpreserved. See Blackwelder v. State, 851 So. 2d 650, 652 (Fla. 2003); Ray v. State, 755 So. 2d 604, 611 (Fla. 2000).

R. A. V. v. State, Case No. 1D09-1694 (Fla. App. 11/17/2009) (Fla. App., 2009)

Wednesday, November 18th, 2009

R. A. V., a child, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

Case No. 1D09-1694

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Opinion filed November 17, 2009.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Gulf County, Fred N. Witten, Judge.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender; and Joel Arnold, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The trial court issued a juvenile disposition order finding the allegations of simple battery to be true, withholding an adjudication of delinquency, and placing the appellant on probation. Counsel for the appellant filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), noting that an adjudication of delinquency was withheld. After a full and independent review of the record, we

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affirm the disposition order but remand to the trial court with instructions to correct a relatively minor sentencing error by striking costs in the amount of $20.00 imposed pursuant to the Crime Prevention Fund and section 775.083(2), Florida Statutes (2008). See In re Anders Briefs, 581 So. 2d 149, 152 (Fla. 1991) (directing appellate courts to follow Anders procedure even where costs and other minor sentencing errors are raised in the Anders brief); J.S. v. State, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D1049 (Fla. 2d DCA May 29, 2009) (remanding with directions to strike costs imposed under section 775.083(2), where the adjudication of delinquency was withheld); C.M.S. v. State, 997 So. 2d 520, 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (noting that such costs under that statute can be assessed against a juvenile only upon an adjudication of delinquency).

AFFIRMED and REMANDED with instructions to strike costs assessed under section 775.083(2).

KAHN, BENTON, and CLARK, JJ., CONCUR.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED.

Pierre v. State, No. 4D07-3890 (Fla. App. 11/18/2009) (Fla. App., 2009)

Wednesday, November 18th, 2009

JERRY PIERRE, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

No. 4D07-3890.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

November 18, 2009.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County, Burton C. Conner, Judge, L.T. Case No. 562005CF003562A.

Dan Hallenberg of The Law Office of Dan Hallenberg, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Laura Fisher Zibura, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

WARNER, J.

Jerry Pierre appeals his convictions for first-degree felony murder and robbery and his sentence to life in prison, arguing that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress his statement to police. He claims that he unequivocally invoked his right to stop questioning, which was not honored by the police. Because the totality of circumstances shows that appellant unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent when he told the detective “I’m not saying anymore,” subsequent questioning by the detectives violated appellant’s Miranda rights. We reverse.

After receiving his weekly pay, the victim, Juan Paxtore, a Guatemalan, cashed his check and later went out riding his bike with $200 in his pocket. Meanwhile, Kinwend Taylor, Cordealria Collins, Edward Harris, a person known as “Black,” and appellant Pierre, all of whom lived in the same neighborhood and had known each other for a number of years, were hanging out near a store in Fort Pierce, Florida. Collins spotted Paxtore and said, “There go amigo,” meaning that they should rob him. Taylor grabbed Paxtore, and Collins hit him. The others, including Pierre, came from behind a building and also started hitting him, according to the co-defendants. The victim’s pockets were emptied, and the perpetrators left. Witnesses called the police who arrived to find Paxtore dead.

From their investigation, detectives determined that Pierre was a suspect in the robbery-murder. The police picked up Pierre and brought him to the station for questioning. In the interrogation, which was

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recorded, Pierre first denied any involvement whatsoever in the incident. However, Pierre eventually admitted being with the group and emptying the victim’s pockets of money ($3), but denied hitting the victim.

Pierre and four co-defendants were charged by indictment with firstdegree murder and robbery. Pierre’s trial was severed from that of his co-defendants. The principal evidence against Pierre consisted of testimony by co-defendant Kinwend Taylor, who had not yet been convicted but was not promised anything in exchange for his testimony, and Pierre’s own confession to police, which he unsuccessfully sought to suppress prior to trial. Pierre was found guilty as charged and sentenced to life in prison. He appeals.

Pierre contends that during his interrogation he twice unequivocally invoked his right to stop questioning, which the detectives ignored. He claims that his subsequent confession should have been suppressed, arguing that it was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The court’s detailed findings of fact in its order on suppression are based on the court’s viewing of the tape of the interrogation. The court found:

Findings of Fact

Defendant was questioned by Det. Tyrone Campbell and Det. Joseph Coleman in an interview room at the Fort Pierce Police Department. The entire interview was videotaped. Defendant was in custody. He was transported to the department in handcuffs, but the handcuffs were removed before the questioning started.

After obtaining some preliminary information concerning Defendant’s name, height, weight, age and social security number, Det. Campbell read Miranda warnings to Defendant. Defendant was given the warnings form to read, which he read to himself in a low voice. As the Miranda warnings were being discussed, Defendant gave responses indicating he clearly understood he had a right to have a lawyer present and could stop talking anytime. After he read the Miranda and indicated he understood them by moving his head up and down, the following exchange occurred (Transcript, page 5, lines 7-21):2

[Questioning by Det. Campbell]

Q Do you want to talk to us?

A I don’t even know why I’m in this.

Page 3

Q You don’t know why you’re here? [by Det. Coleman:]

Q You don’t know why you’re here?

A No.

[by Det. Campbell:]

Q So do you want to sign this [Miranda form] and tell us —

A Okay. Let me ask you — [by Det. Coleman:]

Q Basically you’ve been accused of being involved in a robbery. Okay? And we want to talk to you about it.

A What robbery?

Q Robbery of a Mexican man, all happened over on 27th Street. Friday.

The exchange involves the detectives speaking over each other and Defendant.

Defendant testified at the hearing that when he said, “Let me ask you —,” he was intending to ask for a lawyer to be present. However, upon viewing the exchange on the videotape, observing Defendant’s demeanor on the video, considering all of the statements during the interview, and observing Defendant’s demeanor while testifying at the hearing, the court does not find Defendant’s testimony on this issue to be credible. At no time during the interview did Defendant make any statements indicating he wanted a lawyer. From the context and flow of the conversation leading up to and following the above-quoted exchange, the court finds that the question Defendant wanted to ask is information about what offense he was being questioned about, rather than asking if he could have a lawyer present.

After Miranda warnings were given and Det. Coleman explained the subject of the interrogation was robbery of a Mexican man, Det. Campbell asked Defendant, “So do you want to talk to us then?” Defendant responded affirmatively by moving his head up and down. See, Transcript, page 6, lines 8-9. Viewing the videotape, it is obvious Defendant is responding affirmatively. Immediately thereafter, he cooperates with the interrogation by answering questions. The court finds that Defendant was given proper Miranda warnings, he understood the warnings, and he waived his

Page 4

right to remain silent and to have counsel present at that point.

During the hearing, Defendant contends there are two portions of the interview where he attempted to invoke his right to terminate questioning. The first portion of the transcript relied upon by Defendant is page 10, lines 21-25, however, the court determines that the context of the conversation is better understood by considering page 10, line 19, through page 11, line 3, in which the following exchange occurs:

[by Det. Campbell:]

Q What if I tell you that all of you guys going to be seeing each other soon?

A What do you mean, soon?

Q So you walk and say, hey, what’s up, bro.

A I don’t want to see no (inaudible) period. I don’t know what you’re talking about. So I’m just not going to talk anymore. I don’t know what you’re talking about. I was at home Friday night, waiting on my baby mama, me and my cousin, and I see those people.

Q Which Friday night?

A Friday night whenever that Meego night got killed.

Although Defendant makes the statement, “So I’m just not going to talk anymore,” he nonetheless continues speaking. It is obvious from viewing the videotape that Defendant is defensive about knowing the other co-defendants in this case, which is what Det. Campbell is questioning him about. The court finds the statement, “So I’m just not going to talk anymore,” is nothing more than an announcement at that point that Defendant was not going to admit to knowing the co-defendants and being friends with them, rather than an announcement that he wanted to terminate all questioning.

The second instance Defendant claims he wanted to stop all questioning occurs shortly after the first instance, according to the argument made at the hearing. Within a matter of minutes after Defendant first said, “So I’m just not going to talk anymore,” but continues talking, Det. Coleman advised Defendant he wanted to take his picture so that he can show it to witnesses to see if he can be identified by the witnesses. Det. Coleman took the pictures and then stepped

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out of the interrogation room. While he is out of the room, the following exchange occurs:3

[by Det. Campbell:]

Q Which shoes were you wearing?

A I was wearing some brown Dickies with a white shirt and some toast K-Swiss, brown and caramel, it’s dark brown and caramel strips going down. That’s only —

Q So when you were, when you were bragging

A — I wasn’t even —

Q the home boys in town did this Mexican —

A Did what? What are you talking about? I didn’t tell you nothing.

Q — did you laugh?

A You tripping, man. I didn’t say nothing. I was nowhere near them guys, I wasn’t with nobody. I was with my cousin, waiting on my baby mama. That’s where I was, 33rd Kentucky. I’m not saying anymore. [8 second pause before the next question]4

Q Okay. Are your shoes at your house? Huh? [3 second pause] Are your shoes at your house? Jerry.

[20 second pause] Jerry.

(Det. Coleman returns to the room)

[by Det. Coleman:]

Q Okay. You’re Turtle.

A Turtle?

Q That’s you.

A I’m not Turtle.

The total length of time between when Defendant states, “I’m not saying anymore,” and he says, “I’m not Turtle,” is 50 seconds. During that time, Defendant appears to be somewhat irritated with Det. Campbell for saying he was bragging about “doing the Mexican.” Defendant starts the long pause by leaning over in his chair, presumably doing something with his shoes, then he starts staring up at the ceiling shaking his head from side to side in a somewhat disdainful manner. The State contended at the suppression hearing that immediately after Defendant states, “I’m not saying anymore,” he continues speaking as if muttering to himself. The State argues you can see Defendant’s lips moving as he continues to talk. The court

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does not perceive Defendant to be muttering to himself after he said he was not going to say anything more.

When Det. Coleman came back into the room claiming Defendant is “Turtle,” Defendant resumes answering questions put to him by Det. Coleman and Det. Campbell.5 The transcript goes on for a total of 59 pages. The entire interrogation lasted approximately one hour and 35 minutes. There are no other words uttered by Defendant which suggest that he wanted to stop the questioning.

During the entire interview, Det. Coleman and Det. Campbell spoke in calm, normal tones. Neither detective raised his voice or acted in an intimidating fashion toward Defendant. Defendant remained calm during the interview, although there were times he seemed a little exasperated by the detectives [sic] attempts to get him to say something incriminating. For most of the interview, Defendant remained steadfast in his denial of being involved in either robbing or killing the victim.

The first time Defendant spoke words to the effect “I am not talking anymore,” he immediately continued talking with no pause. From the flow of the conversation and the context of the words leading up to and after he said, “So I’m just not going to talk anymore,” the court finds that Defendant was merely indicating he wanted to change the subject so as to avoid admitting he knew his co-defendants.

It is true that there is almost a minute pause after the second time Defendant said, “I’m not saying anymore,” before he begins talking again, and it is obvious that Defendant is ignoring anything Det. Campbell is saying to him during that pause. Again, however, from the flow of the conversation and the context of the words leading up to and after the pause when Defendant ignores Det. Campbell’s questions, the court finds Defendant again was trying to change the subject and resist any admission that he was bragging about his involvement in the crime. When Det. Coleman comes back into the room and identifies Defendant to be “Turtle,” Defendant begins talking again, and thereafter makes no expression indicating he wants to stop the questioning. The court does not find that Defendant’s second statement “I’m not talking anymore,” followed by a minute of not speaking and ignoring the questions by Det. Campbell during that pause, is an

Page 7

unequivocally [sic] indication he wanted to terminate all questioning. The court finds the statement and the pause to be an attempt to avoid admitting Defendant bragged about his participation in the robbery and murder.

2. The transcript admitted as State’s Exhibit 2 refers to Det. Coleman as “First Interviewer.” In portions of the transcript typed in this order, the court is identifying the speaker as Det. Coleman, rather than “First Interviewer.”

3. The portion of the transcript relied upon by Defendant is page 13, lines 13-15, however, the court determines that the context of the conversation is better understood by considering page 13, lines 4-23.

4. The notation as to the length of the pauses is not in the transcript. The court watched the video and tracked the transcript with a timer to obtain the length of the pauses.

5. There was no argument made or evidence presented to suggest that Det. Coleman came back into the room and accused Defendant of being “Turtle” in an attempt to keep Defendant talking. From the evidence, it appears Det. Coleman was not aware that Defendant had indicated a second time words to the effect “I don’t want to talk.”

Based upon the foregoing facts, the court concluded that Pierre had not unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent, and the detectives’ questions after those statements were not a violation of his rights.

I. Standard of Review

As a general principle, when reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court presumes the trial court’s findings of fact are correct and reverses only those findings not supported by competent substantial evidence. Cuervo v. State, 967 So. 2d 155, 160 (Fla. 2007). Review of the trial court’s application of the law to the facts is de novo. Id. As such, appellate courts must independently review mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine constitutional issues arising in the context of the Fifth Amendment and article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution. Id.

The supreme court recognizes an exception to that standard where the trial court relies on evidence other than live witnesses. In Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270, 279 (Fla. 2004), the court stated:

Generally, in reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court accords a presumption of correctness to

Page 8

the trial court’s findings of historical fact, reversing only if the findings are not supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviews de novo “whether the application of the law to the historical facts establishes an adequate basis for the trial court’s ruling.” Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 608 (Fla. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1103, 122 S. Ct. 2308, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1063 (2002). However, this deference to the trial court’s findings of fact does not fully apply when the findings are based on evidence other than live testimony. Cf. Thompson v. State, 548 So. 2d 198, 204 n. 5 (Fla. 1989) (“[T]he clearly erroneous standard does not apply with full force in those instances in which the determination turns in whole or in part, not upon live testimony, but on the meaning of transcripts, depositions or other documents reviewed by the trial court, which are presented in essentially the same form to the appellate court.”).

In Cuervo, the supreme court reviewed the taped confession viewed by both the trial court and the Fifth District and, based upon its review, held that competent substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s findings that Cuervo did not invoke his right of silence. In this case, the trial judge’s findings of fact exclusively relied on the judge’s viewing of the tape of the interrogation. Because the tape is available to this court, and we have viewed it,1 we do not agree with the trial judge’s conclusions based upon his observations, and thus we do not accord those findings deference. There are also other facts which bear upon the issue.

II. Factual Analysis Shows Invocation of Right to Remain Silent was Unequivocal

Having been brought to the police station in handcuffs and leg irons, the officers first removed the handcuffs on Pierre but did not remove the leg irons. At the very beginning of the interrogation, Detective Coleman asked Pierre his name. Then he asked, “Are you the guy they call Turtle?”

Pierre denied that was his nickname. Coleman asked if Pierre knew who Turtle was, and Pierre said he did not. Then the detectives discussed Pierre’s Miranda rights with him. He specifically asked about and understood that he could stop the questioning whenever he wanted. After they discussed those rights, the detectives asked if Pierre wanted to

Page 9

talk, and Pierre responded, “I don’t really know why I’m in here.” Coleman then told him he was accused of being involved in the robbery of a Mexican man on the previous Friday. Pierre said that he was not there, claiming he was at home at the time. Pierre then signed the waiver of rights form and the detectives began their questioning.

Coleman asked Pierre if he knew Corey and Kinwend. Pierre said that he had heard of them but did not “mess” with them. Coleman left the room. After several more questions from Campbell about whether Pierre could identify the two boys, Pierre then told Campbell he was not going to talk about it, but then proceeded to say that he was home. After that statement, Coleman re-entered the room with a camera. He told Pierre he was taking a picture of him. Coleman then told Pierre that the reason he was taking his picture was to show it to “to somebody, somebody who has made the accusations to make sure you’re that guy . . . . He says no, it ain’t you, you’re going home.” Detective Campbell added, “Yeah, but he just said to me a while that um, he met these guys and (INDISCERNIBLE) by their face, see them, how the clothes their [sic] wearing.” Detective Coleman took the picture and left the room.

After Detective Coleman left the room, Detective Campbell asked Pierre whether the clothes he was wearing were the clothes he wore on Friday night. Pierre described the clothes he was wearing on Friday. Campbell asked something indiscernible but ending with “did this Mexican,” to which Pierre responded, “Did what, what are you talking, I didn’t take nothing. You tripping, man, I didn’t say nothing. I was nowhere near them guys. I wasn’t with nobody, I was with my cousin waiting on my baby momma, that’s where I was, 33rd and Kentucky. I’m not saying anymore.” (Emphasis supplied). At that point, as the trial court notes in the findings of fact, Pierre says nothing further, even though Detective Campbell tries to ask another question. After that question, Detective Campbell sits silent as well. Pierre looks down, and then looks up at the ceiling. He appears to be muttering to himself. No sound is coming out. Pierre does do something with his feet, as the trial court noted, but it appears that he is adjusting the leg irons.

The silence lasts nearly a minute until Detective Coleman comes in and says in a firm, accusatory tone, “You’re Turtle.” His tone conveys that this is a statement of fact, as though whoever looked at the photo confirmed that nickname. Pierre then responds defensively.

MR. PIERRE: Turtle?

DETECTIVE COLEMAN: That’s you.

Page 10

MR. PIERRE: I’m not Turtle.

DETECTIVE COLEMAN: That’s you. So are you gonna, are you gonna tell us what happened that night, (INDISCERNIBLE)?

MR. PIERRE: (INDISCERNIBLE). Tell you about what, I ain’t telling you, I didn’t do nothing, I was at my house.

DETECTIVE COLEMAN: Well, right now I got . . .

MR. PIERRE: With my cousin.

DETECTIVE COLEMAN: I got 2 guys saying you were involved.

Pierre then responds to their questions for about forty-five minutes by continuing to deny involvement, sometimes sitting silent as the officers continued to try to get him to make a statement. Even when the officers told him there was video evidence from a store camera close to the location of the crimes which would show who was there, he maintained he was not there. The officers detailed what the other defendants had told them about Pierre’s involvement. They told Pierre he faced life in prison, yet he continued to maintain that he was not there. Only when Detective Campbell told Pierre that he would not see his child again for a while because he was going to jail for robbery and murder did Pierre then state that he did not stomp the victim. After several more questions, Pierre told them that the robbery was Edward’s idea and that Edward was the only one stomping the victim. Pierre took the money from the victim’s pockets. The interrogation continued for another twenty or thirty minutes, and Pierre made more incriminating statements until he finally said again, “I’m not talking anymore.” When Detective Coleman asked another question, Detective Campbell stopped him, telling Coleman, “He said he didn’t want to talk anymore, man.” The interrogation ended.

Generally, “if the suspect indicates in any manner that he or she does not want to be interrogated, interrogation must not begin or, if it has already begun, must immediately stop.” Cuervo, 967 So. 2d at 161 (quoting Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 966 (Fla. 1992)). The phrase “in any manner” simply means that there are no magic words that a suspect must use to invoke his rights. State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 719 (Fla. 1997). “[0]nce a defendant waives his or her right to remain

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silent, subsequent equivocal requests to terminate an interrogation do not automatically require police to cut off all questioning.” Cuervo, 967 So. 2d at 161. “A suspect must articulate his desire to cut off questioning with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent.” Owen, 696 So. 2d at 718. “[A] determination of the issues of both the voluntariness of a confession and a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances.” Lukehart v. State, 776 So. 2d 906, 917 (Fla. 2000).

From a review of the taped interrogation, there is no competent substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Pierre’s near minute of silence, after telling the detective he was not going to say anything, was an effort by Pierre to change the subject of the questioning. In fact, Detective Campbell did change the subject, because he asked where Pierre’s shoes were located, and Pierre refused to answer. Then Detective Campbell himself fell silent and discontinued questioning. The only interpretation that can be made from the tape is that, as a reasonable police officer, Detective Campbell understood Pierre’s statement to be a demand that questioning cease.

III. State v. Owen is Distinguishable

The state relies on State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1997), reaffirmed in Owen v. State, 862 So. 2d 687, 696-98 (Fla. 2003), involving a March 24, 1984, burglary, sexual battery, and murder in Delray Beach. The supreme court found competent substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that the defendant’s statements “I don’t want to talk about it” and “I’d rather not talk about it” were equivocal and did not require suppression of his confession. The state claims that Pierre’s statement “I’m not saying anymore” is virtually indistinguishable from those in Owen. However, the totality of the circumstances of that confession are far different than the present circumstances, and we find Owen distinguishable.

The detailed facts involved in Owen are found in Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1990). Owen had been picked up as a burglary suspect. While in custody, he initiated contact with the police to discuss various crimes, as well as a murder in Boca Raton. He wanted to clear up his involvement in several of these crimes. After confessing to numerous crimes, he invoked his right to silence with respect to the Boca murder, and the officers ceased questioning.

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Several days later Owen reinitiated contact with the police and confessed to more crimes. Based upon his confessions, police were able to expand their investigation. Meanwhile, Delray Beach police obtained footprint evidence from the Delray murder scene linking Owen to that crime. Armed with physical evidence in the Boca murder, police informed Owen several days later that they were charging him with the murder. He confessed to the Boca murder.

Immediately thereafter, Delray police interrogated Owen with respect to the Delray murder. At first he denied involvement but then confessed to this murder as well. As the supreme court noted, a decided pattern developed in the multiple interrogation sessions with Owen. Owen would confess to crimes where he thought that the officers had sufficient proof to convict. Thus, the officers would present their proof to Owen in an attempt to convince him to confess to the crimes.

During the interrogation regarding the Delray murder, the police presented Owen with the footprint evidence as well as the close similarities between the Boca murder, to which Owen had confessed, and the Delray murder. Owen studied the footprint carefully and appeared to acknowledge its conclusiveness. When the officers questioned him on what the supreme court stated was an “insignificant detail,” Owen said, “I’d rather not talk about it.” Id. at 211. Police did not stop questioning, but implored him to clear matters up about this murder too. After several more questions, and again after a question on an insignificant detail, Owen again said, “I don’t want to talk about it.” Id. He then confessed to the Delray murder.

The court in Owen concluded that Owen’s statements were “at the least, an equivocal invocation of the Miranda right to terminate questioning.” Id. at 211. The court held that, based upon its understanding of federal precedent, even the equivocal invocation of rights by Owen required that the police clarify whether the suspect had indeed intended to invoke his right before additional questioning. The court thus reversed Owen’s conviction and death sentence and remanded for a new trial.

Prior to Owen’s retrial, the United States Supreme Court decided Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), in which the Court held that police did not have to stop questioning upon ambiguous or equivocal requests for counsel. The state sought to admit Owen’s confession in the second trial on the basis that Owen’s statement, indicating that he did not want to talk, was ambiguous. In State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d at 179-20, our supreme court applied Davis and held that police did not have to

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ask clarifying questions when an invocation of a suspect’s right to terminate questioning was equivocal. Because the court found that Owen’s statement regarding the right to remain silent was equivocal, the court permitted the use of Owen’s confession.

Owen’s statement, “I don’t want to talk about it,” was equivocal or ambiguous under the circumstances. First, Owen had initiated several interrogation sessions with the police himself. Second, he had developed a pattern of confessing to crimes when the police produced enough evidence to convince him that they could prove his guilt, and he would continue the interrogation as the police produced evidence. Third, his refusal to talk about “it” followed a question about an insignificant detail of the crime. The “it” could have been the insignificant detail and not the crime itself. Given the fact that Owen had engaged in multiple interrogation sessions, seeking to answer the police questions, a reasonable police officer could have thought that Owen was not intending to cut off all questioning.

The facts of Owen are entirely different than the facts involved in Pierre’s demand to terminate questioning in this case. Here, unlike in Owen, Pierre’s statement that he was “not saying anymore,” followed by his actual silence for a period of nearly a minute, could not reasonably be interpreted as a desire to remain only “selectively silent” as to a particular line of questioning. Instead, Pierre’s conduct reflected an unequivocal invocation of Pierre’s right to remain silent. See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 467 S.E. 2d 428, 433-34 (N.C. 1996) (suspect’s statement “I got nothing to say” was a clear indication that he wished to terminate the interrogation and invoke his right to remain silent, which was not scrupulously honored); People v. R.C., 483 N.E. 2d 1241, 1243-44 (Ill. 1985) (minor suspect’s statement that he “did not wish to talk to” the investigating officer constituted an invocation of the right to remain silent).

IV. Police did not Scrupulously Honor Pierre’s Right to Terminate Questioning

Once Pierre invoked his right to silence, Miranda required that all questioning cease and that his right to cut off questioning be “scrupulously honored.” See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). In Mosley, the Court found that the police honored the right by ceasing questioning once the suspect invoked his right.

When Mosley stated that he did not want to discuss the robberies, Detective Cowie immediately ceased the

Page 14

interrogation and did not try either to resume the questioning or in any way to persuade Mosley to reconsider his position. After an interval of more than two hours, Mosley was questioned by another police officer at another location about an unrelated holdup murder. He was given full and complete Miranda warnings at the outset of the second interrogation . . . .

This is not a case, therefore, where the police failed to honor a decision of a person in custody to cut off questioning, either by refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or by persisting in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance and make him change his mind.

Id. at 104-06. The Florida Supreme Court distilled five relevant factors from Mosley to determine whether the authorities scrupulously honored a defendant’s invocation of his right to silence:

First, Mosley was informed of his rights both times before questioning began. Second, the officer immediately ceased questioning when Mosley unequivocally said he did not want to talk about the burglaries. Third, there was a significant lapse of time between the questioning on the burglary and the questioning on the homicide. Fourth, the second episode of questioning took place in a different location. Fifth, the second episode involved a different crime.

Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 663, 670 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Henry v. State, 574 So. 2d 66, 69 (Fla. 1991)). A variance of one or more factors is not dispositive, and each case requires a totality of the circumstances approach.

While Pierre received his complete Miranda warnings — satisfying the first Mosley factor — and Detective Campbell immediately ceased questioning Pierre, Detective Coleman’s assertion, upon re-entering the room, that Pierre was Turtle amounted to interrogation under the analysis of Origi v. State, 912 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Thus, the officers did not cease questioning after Pierre’s unequivocal invocation of his right to silence.

In Origi, a suspect invoked his right to remain silent after he was arrested in a traffic stop and read his Miranda rights. The officers searched the vehicle and discovered a large amount of illegal drugs. On

Page 15

the way to the jail, an officer said to Origi, “That’s a lot of drugs you had.” Id. at 70. Origi responded, “I have to make money and make a living.” Id. Origi moved to suppress his response on the ground that it was a violation of Miranda. This court relied on Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), to determine what constituted interrogation. Innis explained:

[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. . . .

[T]he term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.

Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-02 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).

Applying Innis, we held that the officer’s statement was the functional equivalent to interrogation because: (1) the officer directed the statement to Origi, not some other person; (2) the comment was accusatory and was intended to elicit a response from Origi (“The statement assumed that Origi possessed the drugs, and called for him to comment on the quantity. Confronting Origi about the drugs added an element of compulsion to the case.”); and (3) there was an element of physical coercion attendant to the statement in that the officer had Origi in his grasp. Origi, 912 So. 2d at 73.

Similarly, Detective Coleman’s statement to Pierre that “[y]ou’re Turtle” was directed at Pierre, not to another person. The statement was

Page 16

accusatory, because Coleman had already told Pierre that he was taking his picture to show to witnesses who could identify the participants in the robbery-murder, and at the beginning of the interrogation Coleman had already asked if Pierre was Turtle. It seems clear that witnesses had pointed out Turtle as a participant in the crime. Listening to the tape and the tone of the voice, Coleman’s assertion that Pierre was Turtle, immediately after he re-entered the room after the photo identification session with witnesses, was intended to evoke a response. Therefore, in line with Origi, Detective Coleman’s assertion constituted questioning in violation of Miranda.

That Detective Coleman may not have known that Pierre had invoked his right of silence does not avoid Miranda. Detective Campbell heard Pierre invoke his right and stopped questioning. Either Detective Coleman should have inquired as to whether Pierre was still answering questions before continuing the questioning, or Detective Campbell should have alerted Detective Coleman to Pierre’s invocation. In fact, when Pierre again invoked his right to terminate questioning later in the interview, by using the identical language to his prior invocation — “I’m not talking anymore,” — Campbell did stop Coleman from continuing questioning. Campbell should have stopped Coleman earlier when Coleman re-entered the room. As the Supreme Court said with respect to observance of the invocation of a right to an attorney, “custodial interrogation must be conducted pursuant to established procedures, and those procedures in turn must enable an officer who proposes to initiate an interrogation to determine whether the suspect has previously requested counsel.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 687 (1988). This same admonition should apply to an invocation of the right to remain silent. If that is not the rule, then a suspect’s Miranda rights could very easily be thwarted.

Returning to the Mosley factors, we conclude that Pierre’s invocation of the right to remain silent was not scrupulously honored. While Detective Campbell ceased questioning, Detective Coleman did not. Only about a minute passed between Pierre’s termination of questioning and Detective Coleman’s continuation of the interrogation, hardly a significant lapse of time. Pierre was never reread his Miranda rights, and the questioning continued in the same location before the same detectives. Moreover, even after Pierre responded to Detective Coleman that he was not Turtle, Pierre continued to deny involvement in the activity and tried to avoid the questions. Unlike Mosley, this was a case “where the police failed to honor a decision of a person in custody to cut off questioning, either by refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or by persisting in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance

Page 17

and make him change his mind.” Mosley, 423 U.S. at 105-06. That is exactly what occurred in the interrogation of Pierre.

Because Pierre unequivocally invoked his right to terminate questioning, which right was not scrupulously honored, the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress Pierre’s statement to police. We reverse and remand for a new trial during which the confession is excluded.

GROSS, C.J., and CIKLIN, J., concur.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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Notes:

1. The tape viewed was a VHS tape admitted at the hearing on the motion to suppress.

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Carswell v. State, No. 4D09-1814 (Fla. App. 11/18/2009) (Fla. App., 2009)

Wednesday, November 18th, 2009

FRED CARSWELL III, Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.

No. 4D09-1814.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

November 18, 2009.

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion being treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Mily Rodriguez-Powell, Judge, L.T. Case No. 02-19950 CF10A.

Fred Carswell III, Coleman, Pro Se.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Myra J. Fried, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

MAY, J.

The defendant appeals an order denying his motion for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. To prevent manifest injustice, we treat this appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and grant a belated direct appeal on a limited issue. See Lago v. State, 975 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (treating appeal as petition for habeas corpus and granting relief in order to correct a manifest injustice).1

The State charged the defendant with attempted second degree murder with a firearm for a fight that resulted in a shooting. The defendant claimed that he did not possess a gun and that the victim accidentally shot himself during the fight. At trial, the defendant objected to the State’s request for instructions on the permissive lesser included offenses, particularly, the aggravated battery instruction. The defense argued that the Information failed to allege all the essential elements, notably that the defendant “intentionally and knowingly” inflicted great bodily harm. The trial court overruled the objection and

Page 2

read the instruction on aggravated battery because the Information alleged that the defendant discharged a firearm and inflicted great bodily harm.

The jury found the defendant not guilty of attempted second degree murder with a firearm, but found him guilty of aggravated battery. The jury specifically found that the defendant did NOT possess, use, or discharge a firearm in its answer to a special interrogatory. After hearing argument, the trial court found that the only theory of aggravated battery of which the defendant could have been guilty was through the use of a deadly weapon, to wit: the firearm. Because the jury specifically found the defendant did not have a firearm, the trial court granted the defense motion for judgment of acquittal on the aggravated battery charge and entered a conviction for simple battery. The court sentenced the defendant to 364 days in jail. The State appealed.

In the State’s direct appeal, we concluded that the trial court had erred in granting the judgment of acquittal due to an inconsistency in the verdict “because the jury was lawfully exercising its pardon power.” State v. Carswell, 914 So. 2d 9, 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). We specifically declined to address the defendant’s argument that the jury could not have relied on the theory of aggravated battery for intentionally and knowingly causing great bodily harm because the Information did not allege that essential element. We did so under the mistaken belief that the defendant had to timely file a notice of cross-appeal, which he had not done.2 Id. at 12 (citing Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(g)); A-1 Racing Specialties, Inc. v. K & S Imports of Broward County, Inc., 576 So. 2d 421, 422 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)). We then reversed and remanded the case for reinstatement of the conviction for aggravated battery, and imposition of sentence. Our opinion advised that the reversal was without prejudice to the defendant filing an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.

On remand, the trial court reinstated the conviction and sentenced the defendant to fifteen years incarceration. The defendant appealed the new sentence, which we affirmed. See Carswell v. State, 947 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

The defendant then filed a petition arguing that appellate counsel was deficient in failing to file a notice of cross-appeal. We denied the petition

Page 3

finding no deficiency in counsel’s performance because the notice of cross-appeal was not jurisdictional and unnecessary to allow the defendant to make his argument in response to the State’s appeal. Carswell v. State, 4D06-212 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 16, 2006). See Lopez v. State, 638 So. 2d 931, 932 (Fla. 1994). Next, the defendant filed a Rule 3.800 motion alleging trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file the notice of cross-appeal. The trial court denied the motion. We redesignated the motion as an appeal from a Rule 3.850 summary denial. Again we affirmed because the error was not of defense counsel’s making, but rather our own. Carswell v. State, 962 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). The defendant then petitioned for a belated appeal, which we denied. Carswell v. State, 4D07-5043 (Fla. 4th DCA Feb. 15, 2008).

This brings us to the present appeal. Here, the defendant is appealing the summary denial of his second Rule 3.850 motion. In fairness to the petitioner, and after having received a response from the State, we treat this appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and grant a new limited direct appeal.3 We limit our review to the single argument we previously declined to consider—the trial court properly vacated the conviction for aggravated battery because the court had erred in giving the instruction on the lesser included offense, which allowed the jury to convict the defendant of a crime for which the essential element of intentionally and knowingly causing great bodily harm was not alleged in the Information. See Lane v. State, 861 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).4

“[D]ue process prohibits a defendant from being convicted of a crime not charged in the information or indictment.” Crain v. State, 894 So. 2d 59, 69 (Fla. 2004); see also N.H.M. v. State, 974 So. 2d 484, 485-86 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citing Jaramillo v. State, 659 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)). Defense counsel properly objected to the jury instruction on the aggravated battery charge because the Information failed to allege the “intentional and knowing” infliction of great bodily harm. It was error for

Page 4

the trial court to have given the charge as the trial court properly recognized. See Lane v. State, 861 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Yet, the defendant’s request for a new trial on the simple battery charge in his answer brief led this court astray from the true issue. Instead of relying on this argument solely to defend the State’s appeal, the defendant requested affirmative relief—relief that required the filing of a notice of cross-appeal. See, e.g., Padilla v. State, 905 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); see also Pope v. State, 884 So. 2d 328, 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Guerra v. State, 546 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).

We now hold that the trial court was correct to have entered the judgment of acquittal on the aggravated battery charge. This does not end the inquiry, however. A new trial may be required if the trial court erred in instructing the jury on an uncharged, alternate theory of aggravated battery. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 959 So. 2d 1232, 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); see also Negron v. State, 938 So. 2d 650, 652 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); K.H. v. State, 763 So. 2d 1187, 1188 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Yet, Sanders, Negron, and K.H. all resulted from the defendant appealing a conviction and arguing the error in the jury instructions leading to a conviction. In that instance, the proper remedy is a new trial for the defendant. When the State appeals a judgment of acquittal, however, the protection against double jeopardy prevents the retrial of the defendant on the aggravated battery charge. See Ramos v. State, 457 So. 2d 492, 494 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Watson v. State, 410 So. 2d 207, 208-09 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

Under the unique facts of this case, because the defendant preserved and raised the jury instruction issue on appeal, and we specifically refused to consider the argument, we grant extraordinary relief. In the extremely unusual circumstances presented in this case, the only appropriate remedy is to vacate the aggravated battery conviction and sentence and reinstate the battery conviction, which should be conducted expeditiously.

We therefore reverse and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

POLEN and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

—————

Notes:

1. See also Johnson v. State, 9 So. 3d 640, 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (granting habeas corpus to correct a fundamental sentencing error although relief had previously been denied on numerous occasions); Ross v. State, 901 So. 2d 252, 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (granting habeas corpus, even though an issue had been repeatedly raised and rejected, to correct manifest injustice where defendant did not receive the benefit of the same law as similarly-situated defendants).

2. The notice of cross-appeal was needed for the defendant to obtain the requested affirmative relief of a new trial on the battery charge. However, a notice of cross-appeal was unnecessary to allow us to consider the argument in defense of the State’s appeal.

3. The Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly held that procedural bars, such as the law of the case doctrine, must give way “where reliance on the prior decision would result in manifest injustice.” State v. Sigler, 967 So. 2d 835, 840 (Fla. 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Henry v. State, 649 So. 2d 1361, 1364 (Fla. 1994) (citing Preston v. State, 444 So. 2d 939, 942 (Fla. 1984)); Greene v. Massey, 384 So. 2d 24, 28 (Fla. 1980); Steele v. Pendarvis Chevrolet, Inc., 220 So. 2d 372, 376 (Fla. 1969)); see Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1965).

4. Because this issue has been briefed by both sides numerous times, we see no need to ask for additional briefs.

—————

Lowery v. State, Case No. 2D08-5316 (Fla. App. 11/18/2009) (Fla. App., 2009)

Wednesday, November 18th, 2009

CONNIE KAYE LOWERY, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

Case No. 2D08-5316.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed November 18, 2009.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Gregory P. Holder, Judge.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Pamela H. Izakowitz, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

VILLANTI, Judge.

Connie Kaye Lowery appeals her five-year sentence for possession of cocaine, arguing that it violated her negotiated plea agreement. We agree. Therefore,

Page 2

we reverse and remand with directions that the trial court sentence Lowery consistent with the plea agreement.

Lowery was charged with possession of cocaine, possession of cannabis, and possession of drug paraphernalia. On August 4, 2008, the court accepted Lowery’s negotiated best interests guilty plea, which capped at eighteen months’ imprisonment any sentence to be imposed for the cocaine charge.1 At counsel’s request, the court postponed sentencing until September 17, 2008, at 8:30 a.m. Lowery was present when the court set the date and time for sentencing. However, there is no record evidence that the court discussed with Lowery the potential consequences of her failure to timely appear at sentencing or that the plea agreement contained any provision indicating that the court would not honor the sentencing cap if Lowery failed to timely appear at sentencing.

As of 9:49 a.m. on the day of sentencing, Lowery was not in court, although her attorney indicated that he was waiting for her. The trial judge then, sua sponte, stated that he had warned Lowery about the consequences of her willful nonappearance at sentencing:

THE COURT: I was fairly clear with Miss Lowry [sic], as I am with every man or woman that enters a plea and asking [sic] for a deferred sentencing that, indeed, if there was some willful nonappearance at court — . . . .

. . . .

In any event, clearly, Miss Lowry [sic] is not here at this point. I have no information as to whether or not her nonattendance is willful and yet certainly if there’s some

Page 3

indication or evidence presented at some later date, I can always entertain a motion to resentence.

. . . .

THE COURT: Miss Lowry [sic] just — it’s just unfortunate. I did warn her, I did tell her, and I’m certain you did, [defense counsel], as you would with every client, and have for the last almost 14 years that you’ve practiced in front of this Court . . . in any event, having accepted Miss Lowry’s [sic] plea I adjudicate her guilty. I sentence her to five years Florida state prison on Count I.

(Emphasis added.) The trial judge also stated that he had warned Lowery during a “frank discussion” that “this could result” and had “begged her to be here.” Neither the plea hearing transcript nor the written plea agreement contains any such warnings or discussions with Lowery; it appears that the trial court was mistaken in its recollections of this particular case. Despite the lack of record evidence about these alleged discussions between the trial court and Lowery, Lowery’s counsel agreed with the court’s comments, responding, “I was here, I remember.”

The trial court sentenced Lowery in absentia to the maximum possible sentence for the crime charged—five years in prison—based on its erroneous belief that Lowery had agreed to this consequence if she willfully failed to timely appear at sentencing. Yet, the court acknowledged that there was no evidence that Lowery’s failure to appear was willful. Therefore, the court indicated that it would consider a motion to modify sentence if there was evidence of exigent circumstances causing Lowery’s nonappearance. Even though the court’s sentence exceeded the agreed-upon cap, about which Lowery’s counsel reminded the court at the sentencing hearing, counsel did not formally object to the harsher sentence and did not move to withdraw

Page 4

the plea. Instead, he immediately moved to withdraw from representing Lowery, and the court immediately granted his request.

At noon that same day, Lowery appeared in court, claiming that she had been waiting outside the courtroom since 8:25 a.m. A different assistant public defender indicated that she “did talk to [Lowery] before the break.” The trial court simply responded: “[Defense counsel] was here; you weren’t here, Ms. Lowry [sic]. Five years Florida State prison. Take her away.” Despite its prior acknowledgement that it had no evidence that Lowery’s nonappearance was willful and its previous commitment to reconsider her sentence if her nonappearance had been caused by exigent circumstances, the court took no evidence, refused to listen to Lowery, and made no findings regarding willfulness. As a result, Lowery now sits in prison serving the maximum sentence for possession of cocaine, a charge to which she entered a “best interests” plea. On appeal, she seeks to enforce the agreed-upon plea.

The State argues that this issue was not preserved for appellate review because Lowery did not file a motion to withdraw her plea. A defendant who enters a guilty or nolo contendere plea can appeal only under limited circumstances. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii). One such circumstance is when the defendant has filed a timely motion to withdraw her plea based on a violation of the plea agreement. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(b); Ruff v. State, 840 So. 2d 1145, 1146-47 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). However, even if the defendant fails to file a motion to withdraw the plea, the appellate court can consider a direct appeal such as Lowery’s “where the record on its face establishes ineffective assistance of trial counsel.” Smith v. State, 988 So. 2d 1258, 1260 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

Page 5

In Smith, the defendant entered a plea which included a sentence cap. 988 So. 2d at 1259. As in this case, the court accepted Smith’s plea but postponed sentencing. Id. at 1260. When Smith failed to appear at sentencing, the court imposed a sixty-month sentence. Id. Smith’s counsel did not object to the harsher sentence. Id. On appeal, the Fifth District addressed whether it had jurisdiction to consider Smith’s appeal where he had not filed a motion to withdraw the plea. It concluded that “in a circumstance like this, jurisdiction may still exist where the record on its face establishes ineffective assistance of trial counsel.” Id. at 1260. Because Smith’s trial counsel had not filed a motion to withdraw the plea despite the court’s enhanced sentence, ineffectiveness was apparent on the face of the record. Id. The court concluded that “when an enhanced sentence for failure to appear in court at a later time is not part of the negotiated plea, a court must allow the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea before it imposes the more severe sentence.” Id. at 1261. Because Smith was not given that opportunity, the court reversed and remanded to allow him to withdraw the plea or accept his sentence. Id.; see also Barber v. State, 901 So. 2d 364, 364 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (“Because the agreed upon sentence was not conditioned on [defendant's] appearance at sentencing, and because the failure of [defendant's] trial counsel to seek relief in the trial court amounts to an inadequacy of counsel on the face of the record, we are compelled to reverse.”).

In Taylor v. State, 919 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), this court reached a similar conclusion, albeit under different facts. In Taylor, the defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement which included three years’ probation and capped his sentence at nine months in jail. Id. at 670. The court accepted Taylor’s plea and

Page 6

postponed sentencing. Id. At the sentencing hearing, the defendant’s newly appointed counsel incorrectly represented to the court that Taylor had entered “a straight up plea” rather than a negotiated plea. Id. at 671. As a result, the trial court imposed a five-year prison sentence, exceeding the agreed-upon cap. Id. Yet, Taylor’s counsel did not bring the error to the trial court’s attention. Id. When Taylor filed a direct appeal without filing a motion to withdraw the plea, this court held that it could consider the error on direct appeal because the record on its face reflected ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 670-71. Trial counsel had provided the trial court incorrect information about Taylor’s plea agreement, and Taylor had “been obviously prejudiced by this ineffectiveness as he [was] currently in state prison instead of having already finished a nine-month county jail sentence.” Id. at 671. We reversed and remanded to allow Taylor the opportunity to withdraw his plea. Id.

In this case, as in Taylor and Smith, we find ineffective assistance of counsel on the face of the record. The trial court accepted Lowery’s negotiated plea, which included an eighteen-month cap on prison time. Although the trial court apparently believed that it had postponed Lowery’s sentencing on the condition that the agreed-upon cap would not be honored if she failed to timely appear at sentencing,2 this condition was not articulated as part of the plea. Thus, there was no agreement between the trial court and Lowery that the court could impose a greater-than-agreed-upon sentence if she failed to appear at sentencing. See Smith, 988 So. 2d at 1261

Page 7

(noting that the trial court accepted the plea without warning the defendant of the conse-quences of failure to appear at sentencing and without an agreement that it could impose a greater sentence if the defendant failed to appear for sentencing). As in Smith and Taylor, the ineffectiveness of Lowery’s counsel is evident on the face of the record: he failed to formally object when the court imposed a harsher sentence, and he did not file a motion to withdraw the plea. Even though the trial court stated that it would entertain a motion to modify Lowery’s sentence based on exigent circumstances, counsel withdrew from the case without even discussing with Lowery the possibility of filing such motion. Moreover, counsel actually agreed with the court’s erroneous recollection of the plea bargain. Lowery was obviously prejudiced by this ineffectiveness, as she received the maximum prison sentence possible for the crime charged. Therefore, she is entitled to relief.

While we recognize that in Taylor and Smith the district courts reversed and remanded with directions that the defendants simply be given the opportunity to withdraw their pleas, remand for enforcement of Lowery’s agreed-upon plea is the appropriate remedy in this case. See, e.g., Ingmire v. State, 9 So. 3d 1278, 1282 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (reversing and remanding case with directions that defendant be sentenced according to the plea agreement); Orange v. State, 983 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (ordering the trial court to sentence the defendant in accordance with plea agreement); Lee v. State, 471 So. 2d 195, 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (remanding case for enforcement of plea agreement where record did not contain evidence of willful failure to appear at sentencing and the only evidence on the record indicated that defendant’s failure to appear was accidental).

Page 8

We further note that, even if we were to accept the trial court’s statements that it had discussed with Lowery the perils of nonappearance at sentencing, our conclusion would be the same. The written plea and the plea hearing transcript clearly establish that no such discussion took place either before the plea was accepted or as part of Lowery’s plea. That only leaves the possibility that such discussion took place after the court accepted Lowery’s plea. However, merely advising Lowery after the plea agreement had been accepted that her sentence would be enhanced if she failed to appear at sentencing was insufficient to justify a sentence which exceeded the agreed-upon plea. See Smith, 988 So. 2d at 1261.

Moreover, the trial court was required to make a factual determination as to whether Lowery’s failure to appear at sentencing was willful. “`[W]here timely appearance for sentencing is made a condition of a plea agreement, a non-willful failure to appear will not vitiate the agreement and permit the trial court to impose some greater sentence.’” Robinson v. State, 946 So. 2d 565, 567 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (quoting Johnson v. State, 501 So. 2d 158, 160-61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)); see also Ingmire, 9 So. 3d at 1281 (holding that defendant did not forfeit his right to agreed-upon sentence when evidence was insufficient to establish that he willfully failed to appear for sentencing). Here, the trial court did not give Lowery an opportunity to explain why she had failed to timely appear at sentencing, and it received no evidence and made no findings on the issue of willfulness. The record itself also contains no evidence of willful nonappearance—the only evidence of record is Lowery’s unrefuted statement that she had been in the courthouse waiting since 8:25 a.m. the morning of sentencing. In the “absence of positive evidence to establish willfulness,” reversal and remand with

Page 9

instructions that Lowery be sentenced according to the plea agreement accepted by the trial court is appropriate. See Ingmire, 9 So. 3d. at 1282 (enforcing plea agreement terms where there was no evidence that defendant’s failure to appear at sentencing was caused by anything other than human error). Cf. Garcia v. State, 10 So. 3d 687, 689 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“[I]f Mr. Garcia’s failure to appear is found to be non-willful, he would be entitled to the bargained-for mitigation of his sentence.”). Based upon the unusual circumstances of this case, we reverse the judgment and sentence with directions that the trial court resentence Lowery in accordance with the plea agreement.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

NORTHCUTT and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

—————

Notes:

1. The other two charges were misdemeanors, each carrying a maximum penalty of 364 days in county jail.

2. This type of understanding is commonly referred to as a “Quarterman agreement,” for the supreme court decision which approved this practice. See Quarterman v. State, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1988) (affirming enforcement of plea agreement which provided for the release of the defendant between entry of plea and sentencing but allowed an upward departure sentence if defendant failed to appear at sentencing); Smith v. State, 988 So. 2d 1258, 1261 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

—————

Bowers v. State, Case No.S.W. v. State, No. 4D08-4040 (Fla. App. 11/18/2009)

Wednesday, November 18th, 2009

MICHELLE BOWERS, Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.

Case No. 2D08-3251

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed November 18, 2009.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit for Lee County; sitting in its appellate capacity.

Christopher E. Cosden of The Wilbur Smith Law Firm, Fort Myers, for Petitioner.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnes and Sara Elizabeth Macks, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, for Respondent.

FULMER, Judge.

In this second-tier certiorari proceeding, Michelle Bowers seeks review of the circuit court’s opinion reversing the county court’s order granting her motion to

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suppress. We grant Bowers’ petition for writ of certiorari and remand for the circuit court to affirm the county court’s order.

Following a traffic stop on March 27, 2007, Bowers was arrested and charged in county court with the misdemeanor offenses of possession of marijuana, possession of paraphernalia, and driving under the influence (DUI). She filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained during a search of her vehicle following the stop. She argued that the stop was illegal because it was not founded upon probable cause that she had committed a traffic infraction and thus the warrantless search of her vehicle was also illegal.

The county court held an evidentiary hearing on Bowers’ motion. The officer who performed the stop of Bowers’ vehicle, Officer Suskovich, did not appear for the hearing, despite the fact that he had been subpoenaed by the State. The State called Officer Tracy, who performed the DUI investigation and arrested Bowers, but who was neither involved in nor present at the scene of the stop of Bowers’ vehicle. Officer Tracy arrived at the scene after Bowers’ vehicle was already stopped. Therefore, he never observed Bowers’ driving, and his understanding of the reason she was stopped was based solely on what Officer Suskovich told him.

Bowers’ counsel raised a hearsay objection to Officer Tracy testifying as to what Officer Suskovich told him. The State responded that Officer Tracy’s testimony was admissible under the fellow officer rule. Defense counsel disagreed. The county court overruled the objection and permitted Officer Tracy to testify as to what Officer Suskovich told him was the basis for the stop of Bowers’ vehicle. Bowers also testified and gave her account of the events leading up to the stop. At the conclusion of the

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hearing, the county judge made comments reflecting that he was troubled by the inability to get clarification about details of the stop from Officer Suskovich. The judge expressed difficulty in reaching a decision about whether the officer had a reasonable basis to believe that Bowers committed a traffic infraction. The county court concluded the hearing by stating that the evidence would be suppressed. A written order was entered granting Bowers’ motion without explanation.

The State appealed the suppression order to the circuit court. The circuit court issued an opinion reversing the county court’s order. The circuit court found that Officer Tracy’s testimony regarding Officer Suskovich’s statements was admissible under the fellow officer rule and concluded that the county court’s decision to grant the motion to suppress was not supported by competent, substantial evidence or the law.

In considering Bowers’ petition for writ of certiorari, we must determine whether the circuit court afforded the parties procedural due process and whether it departed from the essential requirements of law. Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. 2000); Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995).

[T]he departure from the essential requirements of the law necessary for the issuance of a writ of certiorari is something more than a simple legal error. A district court should exercise its discretion to grant certiorari review only when there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885, 889 (Fla. 2003). Clearly established law may derive from various sources including recent controlling case law, rules of court, statutes, and constitutional law. Id. at 890.

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Bowers argues that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law by concluding that Officer Tracy’s testimony was properly admitted under the fellow officer rule and by reweighing the evidence to reach a different conclusion than the county court with respect to the validity of the stop. We conclude that the circuit court applied the wrong law in determining that Officer Tracy’s testimony was admissible. Because the only evidence presented by the State to meet its burden of proving a valid stop was the erroneously admitted testimony of Officer Tracy, the county court’s order granting Bowers’ motion to suppress must be affirmed. Our quashal of the circuit court’s opinion on the admissibility issue of Officer Tracy’s testimony renders moot the arguments on the issue of reweighing the evidence.

Officer Tracy’s testimony as to what Officer Suskovich told him about Bowers’ driving was hearsay and as such was not admissible to prove that Officer Suskovich witnessed Bowers’ violating a traffic law. See §§ 90.801(1)(c), 90.802, Fla. Stat. (2008). The circuit court relied on Ferrer v. State, 785 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), to conclude that Officer Tracy’s hearsay testimony was admissible under the fellow officer rule. Ferrer was wrongly decided because it misapplies the fellow officer rule to circumvent the hearsay rule of evidence.

The fellow officer rule provides a mechanism by which officers can rely on their collective knowledge to act in the field. Under this rule, the collective knowledge of officers investigating a crime is imputed to each officer and one officer may rely on the knowledge and information possessed by another officer to establish probable cause. See Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971); State v. Maynard, 783 So. 2d 226, 229 (Fla. 2001); Strickroth v. State, 963 So. 2d 366, 368 n.1

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(Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (“`[T]he collective knowledge of police investigating a crime is imputed to each member. . . .’”) (quoting Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 648, 657 (Fla. 1995)); State v. Boatman, 901 So. 2d 222, 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“[T]he rule operates to impute the knowledge of one officer in the chain of investigation to another.”). “It can involve direct communications between officers who have sufficient information and the officer who stops the suspect, or it can involve general communications among officers of whom at least one possesses the required level of suspicion.” Strickroth, 963 So. 2d at 368 n.1.

Under the rule, one officer may rely on the knowledge and information possessed by another officer to establish probable cause for an arrest for a felony or misdemeanor offense, Boatman, 901 So. 2d at 224, or to establish probable cause for a search, State v. Peterson, 739 So. 2d 561, 567 (Fla. 1999). See also Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Porter, 791 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (concluding that Deputy Watson had probable cause to believe that Porter had operated his vehicle while intoxicated based on his observations of Porter together with information from another deputy that Porter had been driving the vehicle); Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Shonyo, 659 So. 2d 352, 353 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (“The fellow officer[] rule allows the arresting officer to assume that probable cause to arrest a suspect exists when he relies upon the representations of an officer who has firsthand knowledge of the events.”).

The fellow officer rule is not a rule of evidence. It does not change the rules of evidence. And, it is not one of the enumerated exceptions to the hearsay rule. In its opinion, the circuit court states:

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The fellow officer rule, which is sometimes referred to as the collective knowledge doctrine, is premised on the theory that the collective knowledge of police investigating a crime is imputed to each member of the investigation. Dewberry v. State, 905 So. 2d 963, 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). “An `arresting officer is not required to have sufficient firsthand knowledge to constitute probable cause. It is sufficient if the police officer initiating the chain of communication … had firsthand knowledge.’” Ferrer v. State, 785 So. 2d 709, 711 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

While these recitals are correct statements of law regarding the fellow officer rule, the circuit court, as did the Ferrer court, misapplied the rule. The issue raised in Bowers’ motion to suppress was not whether there was probable cause for Officer Tracy to conduct a DUI investigation and make an arrest but rather whether there was probable cause for Officer Suskovich to stop Bowers. At that point of the traffic stop, there was no “investigative chain” during which collective knowledge was imputed to Officer Suskovich to provide probable cause for the traffic stop. Officer Suskovich was the sole officer with any knowledge leading up to and culminating in the traffic stop. Officer Suskovich did not rely on any knowledge or information possessed by Officer Tracy or any other officer to establish probable cause to stop Bowers. The fact that Officer Tracy was called to the scene after the stop was completed for the purpose of performing a separate DUI investigation does not make him a fellow officer for purposes of determining whether there was probable cause to support the traffic stop.

In Ferrer, the Fourth District similarly misapplied the fellow officer rule. Ferrer was charged with DUI and filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as the result of an illegal traffic stop. 785 So. 2d at 710. The State subpoenaed the officer who made the stop, Officer Claremont, to testify at the suppression hearing. When Officer Claremont failed to appear, over Ferrer’s hearsay objection, the trial court

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permitted Deputy Vila, who arrived after the stop, to testify as to Officer Claremont’s statements regarding the stop. Id. Officer Claremont told Deputy Vila that he stopped Ferrer after observing Ferrer driving with an expired tag. Id.

Ferrer argued that evidence of his intoxication should be suppressed because Officer Vila’s hearsay testimony was insufficient to establish a valid stop. Id. The trial court denied Ferrer’s motion, and the circuit court affirmed, finding that Officer Claremont’s knowledge was properly imputed to Deputy Vila under the fellow officer rule. Id. Again, the probable cause determination in dispute centered around Officer Claremont’s initial stop and not on any actions taken by Deputy Vila which were dependant on knowledge imputed to him.

We recognize that by relying on Ferrer the circuit court applied existing precedent from another district. Nevertheless, we grant certiorari relief on the basis that Ferrer misapplied the fellow officer rule and should be rejected.1 See Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Nader, 4 So. 3d 705 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

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We therefore grant the petition for certiorari, certify conflict with Ferrer v. State, 785 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), quash the circuit court’s opinion, and remand with directions to affirm the county court order granting the motion to suppress.

Petition granted, conflict certified, opinion quashed and remanded with directions.

SILBERMAN, J., and GALLEN, THOMAS M., ASSOCIATE SENIOR JUDGE, Concur.

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BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

Petitioner’s motion to correct opinion is granted. The prior opinion dated October 16, 2009, is withdrawn, and the attached opinion is issued in its place. No further motions for rehearing will be entertained.

I HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL COURT ORDER.

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Notes:

1. Ferrer‘s reliance on federal cases that allow hearsay evidence in suppression hearings is also misplaced. In United States v. Boyce, 797 F.2d 691, 693 (8th Cir. 1986), the court explained that Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) authorizes the use of hearsay in suppression hearings. Rule 104(a) provides:

(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.

The Ferrer opinion cites United States v. Maz

S.W., a juvenile, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

No. 4D08-4040.

No. 08-4047.

No. 08-4048.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

November 18, 2009.

Consolidated appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Moses Baker, Jr., Judge, L.T. Case Nos. 07-3909CJA02, 08-1172CJA02, and 07-1923CJA02.

Lewis K. Hanna, of Boca Raton, for appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melanie Dale Surber, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

GERBER, J.

The juvenile court adjudicated S.W. delinquent for her participation in a petit theft. Without further comment, we affirm the court’s denial of S.W.’s motion for judgment of acquittal. We also affirm the court’s departure from the Department of Juvenile Justice’s recommended disposition. We choose to address the departure issue in greater detail.

At the time of the offense, S.W. was seventeen years old. She was on juvenile probation for having committed misdemeanor battery, and on adult probation for having committed criminal mischief. In the past, she also received pretrial diversion for burglary of a dwelling.

Following the theft adjudication, the court held a disposition hearing. The Department’s pre-disposition report contained a comprehensive evaluation indicating that S.W. had psychiatric issues, suicidal ideations, and an extensive substance abuse history. The evaluation recommended that the court place S.W. in a highly-structured residential facility capable of handling her substance abuse issues. Based on the court’s review of the evaluation, the court commented that S.W. appeared to be an “out-of-control drug user who is lucky to be alive.” Nevertheless, the Department opined that S.W. was a low risk for re-offending or flight, and recommended that S.W. continue on probation, with the added special condition of residential drug treatment and aftercare. When the court challenged the Department’s representative as to how the Department could justify its recommendation in light of the evaluation’s recommendation, the representative responded, in pertinent part, “I cannot.”

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The court rejected the Department’s recommendation. Instead, the court committed S.W. to a Level 8, high-risk program. A high-risk program is, in pertinent part:

residential and do[es] not allow youth to have access to the community . . . . High-risk residential facilities are hardware-secure with perimeter fencing and locking doors. . . . Youth assessed and classified for this level of placement require close supervision in a structured residential setting. Placement in programs at this level is prompted by a concern for public safety that outweighs placement in programs at lower commitment levels.

§ 985.03(44)(d), Fla. Stat. (2007).

The court explained its reasoning for the high-risk program in great detail:

Number one, she’s been in a diversion program, that did not work. She’s been on juvenile probation, that did not work. She was the subject of a restraining order[,] she violated that, that did not work. She’s now on adult probation and none of these things have worked.

Her mother obviously loves her to death, but her mother has been unable to properly supervise her in the home[,] and that’s based on the record here before me. Probation is not the answer.

Last, but not least, the recommendation of probation is incredibly inconsistent with the well-documented and well-supported recommendations of the Comprehensive Evaluation[,] which states `that [S.W.] should be placed in a highly structured residential facility capable of handling her substance abuse issues.

…The Comprehensive Evaluation more than adequately supports a highly structured residential facility[,] and because of that recommendation, in part, I have chosen a high risk residential program, it is highly structured, it’s a program from which she cannot simply walk away at all.

The second reason why the Court has chosen a high risk as opposed to a Level 6 program, is because this child’s substance

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abuse problem is the most extensive one this Court has ever encountered . . . .

If I counted accurately, her substance abuse problem includes tobacco, alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, heroin, LSD, Extacy [sic], Roxycontin, Oxycontin, and Xanax, not to mention the fact that she overdosed and had to be hospitalized for her abuse of Xanax. The Level 8 commitment level will allow this child the maximum opportunity to once and for all address her substance abuse problem. Had the Court chosen probation[,] jurisdiction would end at 19.

If the Court had chosen a Level 6[,] jurisdiction would end at 19. A high risk residential program jurisdiction would not end until age 21[,] and the child could continue until age 22 if that is necessary to complete her substance abuse.

Choosing a high risk residential program[,] the Court has virtually guaranteed that all of the recommendations of the Comprehensive Evaluation this child could benefit from[;] that is the only commitment level that’s available to the Court that would ensure those recommendations the child could benefit from . . . .

Last, but not least, the Level 8 commitment will ensure that the child cannot, cannot leave the program if she chooses to, which the evidence and information contained in the Predisposition Report and the Comprehensive Evaluation seem to indicate [she would]. For those reasons I’ve chosen a high risk residential program.

S.W. filed a motion for rehearing, alleging that the evaluation upon which the court relied for the disposition contained numerous factual mistakes and was incomplete. At the resulting hearing, the court reserved ruling on the motion, but commented, “the decision I made I’m comfortable with because it kept this child alive. . . . I would never [have] agreed to probation under these types of circumstances on these facts as they were presented to me at that time.” The Department then informed the court that placing S.W. into a Level 8 program would not provide the intensive drug treatment which the court felt S.W. needed. Instead, the Level 8 program would provide only “overlay service” for the substance abuse. According to the Department, a Level 6 program would provide a true substance abuse component. After considering this information, the court responded, “she’s not placed in a Level 8 program for punishment.. . . [S]he’s there for treatment.. . . [If] she’s not going

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to be getting treatment in this program[,] I need to know about that. . . . It will affect my decision.”

Shortly thereafter, the court entered an order denying the motion for rehearing. The record does not indicate whether the Department ever followed through on the court’s direction to notify the court if S.W. would not be getting appropriate treatment in the Level 8 program.

This appeal followed. S.W. argues the juvenile court erred in departing from the Department’s recommendation to continue probation. According to S.W., competent, substantial evidence did not exist to support a Level 8, high-risk residential commitment. S.W. contends the evidence showed the majority of her drug use was two years earlier and she already began voluntary treatment. S.W. also alleges that, even if the court’s concern for intensive drug treatment was accurate, the evidence showed a Level 8 program would not provide such treatment.

Our review of the juvenile court’s departure from the Department’s recommendation is two-pronged: (1) whether the juvenile court employed the proper legal standard in providing its on-the-record departure reasons; and, if so, (2) whether its stated reasons are supported by a preponderance of the competent, substantial evidence contained within the record. E.A.R. v. State, 4 So. 3d 614, 638-39 (Fla. 2009). Regarding the proper legal standard, the juvenile court must satisfy the following criteria:

(1) Articulate an understanding of the respective characteristics of the opposing restrictiveness levels including (but not limited to) the type of child that each restrictiveness level is designed to serve, the potential `lengths of stay’ associated with each level, and the divergent treatment programs and services available to the juvenile at these levels; and

(2) Then logically and persuasively explain why, in light of these differing characteristics, one level is better suited to serving both the rehabilitative needs of the juvenile — in the least restrictive setting — and maintaining the ability of the State to protect the public from further acts of delinquency.

Id. at 638.

Here, even though the juvenile court rendered its decision before the supreme court issued E.A.R., the juvenile court satisfied E.A.R.’s criteria.

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The juvenile court articulated an understanding of the respective characteristics of the opposing restrictiveness levels including the type of child that each restrictiveness level is designed to serve. The court recognized that a high-risk program was justified for a child who had been in a diversion program, on probation, and under parental supervision, of which none “have worked.” The court also acknowledged that a high-risk program, unlike probation, is a “highly structured residential facility . . . from which [a child] cannot simply walk away.” The court also expressed that a high-risk program was justified for a child who, based on her history, would attempt to “leave the program.”

The court also articulated an understanding of the potential “lengths of stay” associated with each level. The court stated, “Had the Court chosen probation[,] jurisdiction would end at 19. If the Court had chosen a Level 6[,] jurisdiction would end at 19. A [Level 8] high risk residential program jurisdiction would not end until age 21[,] and the child could continue until age 22.”

The court further articulated an understanding of the divergent treatment programs and services available to the juvenile at these levels. At the disposition hearing, the court initially appeared to believe a Level 8 program would provide the intensive substance abuse treatment which the court desired. The Department then informed the court at the rehearing that a Level 8 program would provide only overlay services. Having heard that information, the court instructed the Department, “[if] she’s not going to be getting treatment in this program[,] I need to know about that.” The record does not indicate whether the Department ever followed through on the court’s direction to notify the court if S.W. would not be getting appropriate treatment in the Level 8 program.

The court logically and persuasively explained why, in light of these differing characteristics, a high-risk program was better suited to serving S.W.’s rehabilitative needs — in the least restrictive setting — while maintaining the state’s ability to protect the public from further delinquent acts. Although the Level 8 program’s overlay services would not provide the most intensive substance abuse treatment which the court desired, jurisdiction for the Level 8 program would not end until S.W. turned twenty-one, and S.W. could continue the program until age twenty-two if necessary to complete any treatment. On the other hand, jurisdiction for probation or a Level 6 program would end when S.W. turned nineteen, and S.W. already had turned eighteen by the time of the commitment. Thus, the court decided it was in S.W.’s best interests to place the length of treatment over the intensity of treatment. S.W.’s

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psychiatric and substance abuse history, which the court found credible, served as competent, substantial evidence for that decision.

Even if the court erred in reasoning that a Level 8 program was appropriate to address S.W.’s substance abuse problem, the court described that problem as only the “second reason” why the court chose the Level 8 program. The “number one” reason for the court’s choice was its desire to place S.W. in a “highly structured” program from which she “cannot leave the program if she chooses to, which the evidence and information . . . seem to indicate [she would].” Thus, the trial court found that S.W. was a flight risk, and that “[keeping] this child alive” was of highest priority. The fact that neither diversion, probation, nor parental supervision “have worked” to control S.W.’s self-destructive behavior served as competent, substantial evidence for that decision.

In sum, the court employed the proper legal standard in providing its on-the-record departure reasons. The court’s stated reasons also are supported by a preponderance of the competent, substantial evidence contained within the record. Therefore, the trial court satisfied its duty to determine the most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available setting.

Affirmed.

POLEN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

a, 93 F.3d 1390 (8th Cir 1996), which relies on Boyce. However, Boyce and Maza are not applicable here because “[t]here is no counterpart to rule 104(a) in the Florida Evidence Code.” Romani v. State, 542 So. 2d 984, 986 (Fla. 1989) (rejecting federal approach concerning what proof is required to establish a conspiracy where that approach relies on federal rule 104(a)). Section 90.105(1), Florida Statutes (2008), is similar to federal rule 104(a) but omits the one sentence that the court relies upon in Boyce. Section 90.105(1) provides that “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (2), the court shall determine preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence.” Thus, we conclude that the federal cases cited in Ferrer are governed by a different evidentiary rule and do not support the circuit court’s decision in this case.

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State v. Abbey, No. 4D09-88 (Fla. App. 11/18/2009) (Fla. App., 2009)

Wednesday, November 18th, 2009

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellant,
v.
BRANDON ABBEY, Appellee.

No. 4D09-88.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

November 18, 2009.

Appeal of non-final order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Stanton S. Kaplan, Judge, L.T. Case No. 06-22827 CF 10A.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L. Bettendorf, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Mardi Levey Cohen of the Law Office of Mardi L. Cohen, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

TAYLOR, J.

In this prosecution for vehicular homicide, the state appeals the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized after execution of a search warrant. The trial court found that the affidavit and application for a search warrant for the “black box” from the defendant’s vehicle lacked sufficient facts to establish probable cause for issuance of the warrant. We disagree and reverse.

On September 25, 2006, around 12:48 p.m., the defendant was driving his Corvette northbound on Military Trail in the right lane, when Joseph Hatton, driving a Toyota Camry southbound in the left lane of Military Trail, attempted to make a left turn onto N.W. 5th Street in Deerfield Beach. The cars collided, and Hatton died as a result of his injuries from the crash.

Detective John Grimes of the Broward County Sheriff’s Office investigated the accident and filed a General Affidavit and Application for Search Warrant for the sensing and diagnostic module (“SDM”) (also known as a “black box”) from the defendant’s vehicle. The officer alleged in his affidavit that his investigation revealed that the defendant was traveling well in excess of the 40 m.p.h. posted speed limit. He stated that the “[p]ost impact distance traveled by both vehicles was greater than one hundred twenty five feet. There were no pre-impact tire marks, suggesting that no braking took place before impact. Post impact tire marks along with physical evidence on scene suggest that [the defendant's] vehicle was traveling in excess of 70 [m.p.h.].” The affidavit further reported that an eyewitness “stated that she heard the tires on the vehicle that [the defendant] was driving `chirp’ as the vehicle was changing into a faster gear.”

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The officer explained in the affidavit that the “black box” located in the defendant’s vehicle “may contain electronically stored data including, but not limited to, data pertaining to the pre impact speed of the vehicle, airbag system deployment time and status, engine RPM’s, brake circuit status, seat belt circuit status, Delta V readings, and ignition cycles.” A reviewing magistrate issued the search warrant. Subsequently, information downloaded from the “black box” revealed that the defendant’s speed was 103 m.p.h. five seconds before impact and 98 m.p.h. one second before impact.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress physical evidence from his vehicle, including information downloaded from the black box. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence. The court concluded “[t]hat the general affidavit and application for search warrant did not contain specific and sufficient facts to establish probable cause that a crime had been committed and that the evidence of that crime would be found in the defendant’s vehicle. Speed alone was insufficient.”

A search warrant for property may be issued “[w]hen any property constitutes evidence relevant to proving that a felony has been committed.” § 933.02(3), Fla. Stat. (2006).

We review an appeal of an order granting a motion to suppress under the following standard of review:

Typically, “[t]he standard of review applicable to a motion to suppress evidence requires that this Court defer to the trial court’s factual findings but review legal conclusions de novo.” Backus v. State, 864 So. 2d 1158, 1159 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citing Batson v. State, 847 So. 2d 1149, 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)). However, where the issuance of a search warrant based on a probable cause affidavit is at issue, the standard of review is not de novo, but rather a standard of “great deference.” See United States v. Soderstrand, 412 F.3d 1146, 1152 (10th Cir. 2005). This standard of “great deference” is defined as follows:

“The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the `veracity’ and `basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of reviewing courts is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a `substantial basis for … conclud[ing]‘ that probable cause existed.”

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DeLaPaz v. State, 453 So. 2d 445, 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)); see also Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404, 409 (Fla.1991) (same). When so reviewing the issuance of a warrant based on a probable cause affidavit, a court is confined to a consideration of the four corners of the probable cause affidavit. See Schmitt, 590 So. 2d at 409; Brachlow v. State, 907 So. 2d 626, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). In sum, “[a]lthough the reviewing court `should afford a magistrate’s probable cause decision great deference,’ it should `not defer if there is no “substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.”‘” United States v. Beck, 139 Fed.Appx. 950, 954 (10th Cir.2005).

State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1180-81 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (alterations in original).

The Florida Supreme Court “defined `probable cause’ as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a cautious person in the belief that the person is guilty of the offense charged. The reasons cited by the police must be sufficient to create a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed. As long as the neutral magistrate has a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the requirement of probable cause is satisfied.” Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404, 409 (Fla. 1991) (internal citations omitted). Further, the “existence of probable cause is not susceptible to formulaic determination. Rather, it is the `probability, not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity [that] is the standard of probable cause.’” Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 952-53 (Fla. 2003) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-39 (1983)) (alterations in original). The issuing magistrate’s duty “is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1180 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Vehicular homicide is “the killing of a human being . . . caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another.” § 782.071, Fla. Stat. (2006). Vehicular homicide, by definition, requires proving reckless driving, which is “driving with a willful or wanton disregard for safety.” D.E. v. State, 904 So. 2d 558, 561 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); accord § 316.192(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006).

We have held that “the rate of speed of a vehicle can be firmly shown . . . to be so excessive under the circumstances that to travel that fast under the conditions is by itself a reckless disregard for human life or the safety of

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persons exposed to the speed.” Copertino v. State, 726 So. 2d 330, 332 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). In Copertino, we explained that speeding above the limit—for example, only five miles per hour above—does not normally prove the gross, wanton, or willful conduct that is associated with the “reckless disregard for human life or safety.” Id. We distinguished between speeding slightly over the speed limit, and speeding at “such an immensely excessive rate that no one could reasonably drive.” Id. Reckless disregard can be shown where a person drives “at an enormously excessive rate at a time and in a place where it might have been dangerous to exceed the posted limits by even a little.” Id. at 333.

In Copertino, the defendant, a young, inexperienced driver, was operating his vehicle in the late evening with reduced visibility at a major thoroughfare near residential areas in a large city. He had nine passengers crowded into his compact car, seven of whom were in the back seat not wearing seatbelts. Id. His speedometer was locked at 90.41 m.p.h. Id. We affirmed his conviction for manslaughter by culpable negligence, stating: “Driving this fast under these circumstances so logically evinces to us the required reckless disregard for human life . . . that we frankly cannot see the plausibility of arguing otherwise.” Id.

In Pozo v. State, 963 So. 2d 831, 833 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Copertino, 726 So. 2d at 332-33), we reiterated that “grossly excessive speed alone can constitute such reckless conduct as to support a charge of manslaughter by culpable negligence.” Pozo, a high school student, was driving between 67 and 90 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. residential zone in a rain storm, holding the steering wheel with one hand and selecting a CD to play with the other, when he lost control of the vehicle on a curve and hit a tree. His passenger was killed. Id. at 832-33. We held that all these factors, combined with his speed, provided sufficient evidence to withstand his motion for judgment of acquittal. Id. at 833. We noted, however, that the mere fact that he was driving at an excessive speed in a residential neighborhood was enough to bring his case in line with Copertino and justify denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. Id. at 833-34. We explained that “the recklessness necessary to prove vehicular homicide is less than that of culpable negligence.” Id.

Here, the detective presented enough facts in his affidavit for the magistrate to make a practical, common-sense decision, based on the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, that there was a fair probability that evidence of vehicular homicide would be recovered from the Corvette’s black box. The affidavit alleged that the accident occurred on a Monday afternoon at 12:48 p.m. at the intersection of North Military Trail and N.W. 5th Street in Deerfield Beach, which is a residential area. The affidavit further alleged that the defendant was traveling in excess of 70 m.p.h. in a 40-m.p.h. zone. Finally, the affidavit alleged that the vehicles traveled one-hundred-twenty-five feet after impact,

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that the lack of pre-impact tire marks suggested braking did not occur, and that a witness heard the gears “chirp” as the car accelerated to a faster gear. These facts showing excessive speed in a residential area, like those in Copertino, were enough to evince “a reckless disregard for human life or the safety of persons exposed to the speed.” 726 So. 2d at 332.

The magistrate needed only to determine whether the facts related in the supporting affidavit were sufficient to justify a probable cause determination, not whether the facts made a prima facie showing that the crime occurred. Doorbal, 837 So. 2d at 952-53. Because the general affidavit and application for the search warrant in this case contained sufficient facts to establish probable cause that vehicular homicide was committed and that the evidence of that crime would be found in the defendant’s vehicle, the magistrate properly issued the search warrant. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence.

Reversed.

GROSS, C.J., and HAZOURI, J., concur.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

Lewis v. State, No. 4D08-295 (Fla. App. 11/18/2009) (Fla. App., 2009)

Wednesday, November 18th, 2009

LINWOOD LEWIS, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

No. 4D08-295.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

November 18, 2009.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Edward A. Garrison, Judge, L.T. Case No. 2007CF2338BXX.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and David John McPherrin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Katherine Y. Mclntire, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

GERBER., J.

The defendant below, Linwood Lewis, appeals his convictions for first degree murder and attempted robbery with a firearm. Lewis raises three issues: (1) an alleged inadequate Richardson1 hearing; (2) an alleged improper denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal; and (3) an alleged erroneous jury instruction. Finding no error, we affirm.

On January 20, 2007, Marc Thiebault went outside the front of his house to call in his son for the night. While Thiebault was outside, his wife Sylvia heard three gunshots. Sylvia ran outside, saw three young men running away, and found her husband on the ground, shot and bleeding. Three weeks later, Thiebault died from his wounds.

The police initially arrested Leotis Lester as one of the men involved in the incident. After the police arrested Lester, their investigation led them to Lewis as one of the other men involved. The police interviewed Lewis. He denied any involvement.

The police later interviewed Lewis again, and his story changed. Lewis said, on the night in question, Lester called and said to come with him and another man named Federick Tavares Lee. Lester said they were “fittin’ to go to handle something,” and wanted Lewis to “watch out” for Lester. During the car ride, Lester and Lee told Lewis that they were “fittin’ to go get this money,” and that Lewis would get some of the money. According to Lewis, Thiebault’s daughter told Lester there was a

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lot of money in a closet in her house. Later that night, the three men drove to Thiebault’s gated community. They jumped over the gate to get into the community. Lester and Lee had guns. The three men walked up to a house which Lester identified. They stood across the street for about ten to fifteen minutes. Lester and Lee told Lewis to “stand right here, just stand over here, man, just watch me so ain’t nothing happen, so nobody coming up, security.” Lewis stood in the grass on the side of the house, about ten feet from the other two men. Lewis heard Lester ask Lee what he wanted to do, and Lee responded that they would “run up on him.” Lewis understood that “running up on someone” meant robbing that person. Lewis saw a man walk out of the garage and all three men went towards him, with Lewis stopping by a truck in the driveway. Lester, with his gun drawn, approached the man. When the man tried to hit the gun away, Lester fired. Lewis ran back to the car with Lester and Lee, and they fled the scene.

The state charged Lester and Lewis with first degree murder with a firearm and attempted robbery with a firearm, and the court below held separate trials for each defendant.2 At Lewis’s trial, the state relied on Lewis’s statements to argue that he aided and abetted Lester and Lee in an attempt to rob the victim, and that, during the attempted robbery, Lester or Lee shot and killed the victim. Lewis’s defense was that, while he was present when Lester and Lee committed the crimes, he did not aid and abet their commission.

During the state’s case, Thiebault’s wife Sylvia testified that, when she ran outside, she saw all three men standing very close together on her lawn before they ran away. Lewis objected, alleging that, during discovery, the state failed to disclose this statement. The prosecutor told Lewis’s counsel that neither the state nor the police ever had any such statement in their possession. Lewis requested the trial court to conduct a Richardson hearing. The trial court did not determine whether the state committed a discovery violation. Instead, the trial court asked Lewis, if the state committed a discovery violation, how he was prejudiced. Lewis responded that he would have called his investigators as witnesses and he would have recalled a state witness whose testimony was consistent with Sylvia’s statement. The trial court concluded that Lewis was not prejudiced. The court then proceeded with the trial.

After the state rested, Lewis moved for a judgment of acquittal. Lewis argued that, while he was present when the crimes occurred, the state did not prove he acted as a principal in the crimes. Specifically, Lewis

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contended the state did not prove that he participated in the crimes, that he had a conscious intent for the crimes to be committed, or that he did something to assist Lester and Lee to commit the crimes. The trial court denied the motion.

During the charge conference, Lewis objected to the following portion of the state’s proposed felony murder instruction:

In order to prove a robbery, the state must prove these elements beyond a reasonable doubt: that Linwood Lewis and/or Leotis Lester and/or Federick Tavares Lee took something from the person or custody of Mark [sic] Thiebault.

Lewis argued that the instruction should not include the other men’s names because the other men were not on trial. According to Lewis, the jury should decide its verdict based upon his name and the instruction on principals. The trial court overruled the objection.

The jury found Lewis guilty on both counts. The trial court sentenced Lewis to life in prison for first degree murder and to a concurrent fifteenyear term for attempted armed robbery.

On appeal, Lewis raises three arguments: (1) the trial court did not conduct an adequate Richardson hearing; (2) the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal; and (3) the felony murder jury instruction should not have included the other men’s names joined by the “and/or” conjunction. We will address each of Lewis’s arguments in turn.

Once a trial court has notice of an alleged discovery violation, the trial court is obligated to conduct a Richardson hearing. Duest v. State, 12 So. 3d 734, 742 (Fla. 2009). “The focus of this hearing is to determine `whether the state’s violation was inadvertent or willful, whether the violation was trivial or substantial, and most importantly, what effect, if any, did it have upon the ability of the defendant to properly prepare for trial.’” Id. at 742-43 (citation omitted). “In the past, the court’s failure to conduct a Richardson hearing was per se reversible error.” Smith v. State, 7 So. 3d 473, 505 (Fla. 2009). However, “[i]n State v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016, 1020 (Fla. 1995), [the supreme court] concluded that `there are cases . . . where a reviewing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was not prejudiced.’” Smith, 7 So. 3d at 505. “When the reviewing court makes such a determination, then the discovery violation is deemed harmless and reversal is not warranted.” Id. at 505-06. “The

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inquiry is whether the violation `materially hindered the defendant’s trial preparation or strategy.’” Id. at 506 (citation omitted).

Here, the trial court did not conduct an adequate Richardson hearing. The court never determined whether the state committed a discovery violation. See Tarrant v. State, 668 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (where trial court did not make formal finding on the record whether there was a discovery violation, trial court’s inquiry was inadequate). Specifically, the court never determined whether the state or the police ever possessed Sylvia’s statement that she saw all three men standing very close together on her lawn before they ran away. See id. (“It is wellsettled that the state is charged with constructive knowledge and possession of evidence withheld by state agents, including law enforcement officers.”).

However, we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that, if the state committed a discovery violation in not disclosing Sylvia’s statement regarding where the men stood, Lewis was not prejudiced. Lewis’s response below has not persuaded us that the alleged non-disclosure affected his trial preparation or strategy. In his brief to this court, Lewis now argues that he may have: (1) explored the three men’s interaction and how it supported his defense; (2) investigated ways to impeach Sylvia’s testimony; or (3) decided against pursuing his chosen line of defense. Even if Lewis had raised these arguments below, we remain unconvinced that Lewis was procedurally prejudiced. Sylvia’s testimony did not relate to Lewis’s chosen defense, and she made no contradictory statements by which Lewis could have impeached her testimony. Thus, on Lewis’s first ground for appeal, we affirm.

On Lewis’s second ground for appeal, “[t]he standard for reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal is de novo.” Straway v. State, 13 So. 3d 1100, 1101 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). In ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, a court’s proper task is to review the evidence “to determine the presence or absence of competent evidence from which the jury could infer guilt to the exclusion of all other inferences. That view of the evidence must be taken in the light most favorable to the state.” Hill v. State, 958 So. 2d 549, 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (citation omitted). “In order to be guilty as a principal for a crime physically committed by another, one must intend that the crime be committed and do some act to assist the other person in actually committing the crime.” Id. (citation omitted). “We recognize that mere knowledge that an offense is being committed does not equate to participation with criminal intent, and mere presence at the scene, including . . . a display of questionable behavior after the fact, is not,

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alone, sufficient to establish participation.” Id. “The focus in a felony murder charge is not on the accused’s participation in the murder but in the underlying felony.” Hodge v. State, 970 So. 2d 923, 927 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

From our review of the record, we find the evidence was sufficient to establish that Lewis aided and abetted Lester and Lee in the attempted robbery and, as a result, a jury reasonably could have found Lewis guilty of both attempted robbery and felony murder. The jury reasonably could have inferred that Lewis consciously intended to commit a robbery because he heard Lester’s statement that they were “fittin’ to go get this money,” he was told he would get some of the money, he joined Lester and Lee in jumping over a gate into the community, and he knew that Lester and Lee had guns. The jury also could have inferred that Lewis assisted Lester and Lee in attempting to commit the robbery when he watched out while they “ran up” on Thiebault. Thus, on Lewis’s second ground for appeal, we affirm.

On Lewis’s third ground for appeal, “`[g]enerally speaking, the standard of review for jury instructions is abuse of discretion.’” Newman v. State, 976 So. 2d 76, 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citation omitted). “[H]owever, discretion, as with any issue of law is strictly limited by case law.” Id. (citation omitted). “A trial court `should not give instructions which are confusing, contradictory, or misleading.’” McKenzie v. State, 830 So. 2d 234, 236 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citation omitted). “Reversible error occurs when an instruction is not only an erroneous or incomplete statement of the law, but is also confusing or misleading.” Id. at 236-37. “The test is not whether a particular jury was actually misled, but instead the inquiry is whether the jury might reasonably have been misled.” Id. at 237.

We find that a jury would not reasonably have been misled by an instruction regarding the state proving robbery by “Linwood Lewis and/or Leotis Lester and/or Federick Tavares Lee” even though Lester and Lee were not tried as codefendants. In Garzon v. State, 980 So. 2d 1038, 1043-45 (Fla. 2008), our supreme court held that a trial court’s use of the “and/or” conjunction between the names of codefendants in jury instructions was not fundamental error so as to warrant a new trial. There, the trial court instructed the jury that it could not convict one defendant on the actions of another unless the law of principals was met. Instead, the supreme court’s greater concern appeared to be whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the elements of the crime and on the law of principals. Id. at 1043-44. In this case, the trial court gave such correct instructions. But see Gilley v. State, 996 So. 2d 936, 939

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(Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (trial court erred in repeatedly referring to defendant “and/or” two codefendants who were being tried separately).

Even if the instruction in question was error as found in Gilley, “[a]n error is deemed harmless where there is no reasonable possibility that the faulty instruction contributed to the verdict.” Hunter v. State, 8 So. 3d 1052, 1071 (Fla. 2008). Here, any error was harmless. The state presented evidence which showed beyond a reasonable doubt that Lewis intentionally participated in, and aided and abetted, an attempted robbery. Thus, on Lewis’s third ground for appeal, we affirm.3

Affirmed.

POLEN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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Notes:

1. Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).

2. It appears that, at the time of trial, the police had not apprehended Lee.

3. In their briefs, the parties disputed whether Lewis preserved his objection not only to the use of Lester’s and Lee’s names in the instruction, but also to the use of the “and/or” conjunction between their names and Lewis’s name. Without further comment, we find that Lewis preserved his objection and, therefore, have addressed the issue’s merits above.

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