Florida Criminal Law Opinions

Willy Palmer, Okeechobee, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

Per Curiam.

We affirm the trial court’s order summarily denying appellant’s rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief. Appellant claimed that the trial court’s application of the 2001 amendment to section 948.06(1), Florida Statutes was retroactive in violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. We do not agree. While the underlying offense for which appellant was placed on probation is alleged to have occurred before the statutory change, appellant was not placed on probation until well after the statutory change. See Harper v. State, 955 So. 2d 617, 618 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). To the extent that our decision conflicts with the First District’s decisions in Frye v. State, 885 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) and Harris v. State, 893 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) regarding the crucial date, we certify a conflict.¹ See Shenfeld v. State, 14 So. 3d 1021, 1024 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (holding that retroactive application of the 2007 amendment to section 948.06(1)(d), Florida Statutes, did not constitute an ex post facto violation).²

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Affirmed.

Taylor, May and Damoorgian, JJ., concur.

* * *Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Geoffrey D. Cohen, Judge; L.T. Case No. 01-5032 CF10A.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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^1. In Harris v. SState, the First District reiterated its holding from Frye that the 2001 amendment to section 948.06(1), Florida Statutes, would violate ex post facto protections if applied to sentences of persons whose offenses were committed before the effective date of the amendment (emphasis added). 893 So. 2d at 670.

^2. This court in Shenfeld previously certified a conflict with the First District’s decisions in Frye and Harris with respect to whether retroactive application of amendments to section 948.06, Florida Statutes constituted an ex post facto violation under the second prong of the ex post facto test.
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Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, David John McPherrin and Alan T. Lipson, Assistant Public Defenders, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Katherine Y. McIntire, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

Appellant, Derrick Gibson, once again appeals a trial court order denying his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). This court reversed previous trial court orders summarily denying this same motion in Gibson v. State, 944 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) and Gibson v. State, 967 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

This time, the trial court, after holding an evidentiary hearing and considering additional documentation, concluded in the order now being appealed that the exhibits presented by the state clearly indicated that Gibson’s release from Department of Corrections’s custody was within three years of his robbery charge, qualifying him for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender. We have reviewed the order and its attachment of those documents and cannot agree. The state has not shown evidence to refute Gibson’s claim that his last release was from temporary detention.

We, therefore, reverse and remand for the trial court to grant this motion and for the court to conduct resentencing consistent with this opinion. See Tumblin v. State, 965 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Reversed and Remanded.

Stevenson, Hazouri and Damoorgian, JJ., concur.

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Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Paul L. Backman, Judge; L.T. Case No. 98-9994 CF10B.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Gail E. Anderson, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Thomas H. Duffy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.

Joseph Quincy Tarbuck, Judge.

WEBSTER, J.

In this appeal from his involuntary civil commitment as a sexually violent predator under the Jimmy Ryce Act following a jury trial, appellant claims that the

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trial court committed reversible error in denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the state’s petition because appellant was not brought to trial within thirty days of the finding of probable cause. We agree that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the state’s motion to continue the trial beyond the statutory thirty-day deadline. We agree further that, where appellant had completed his criminal sentence and was being detained awaiting a trial under the Jimmy Ryce Act, the failure to bring him to trial within thirty days without a valid continuance would require appellant’s release from detention and a dismissal without prejudice of the pending proceedings. Nevertheless, we affirm because we conclude that appellant waived his claim by waiting to raise it by this appeal rather than seeking immediate relief by habeas corpus upon expiration of the thirty-day deadline. We also certify a question of great public importance to our supreme court.

While serving a prison sentence for sexual battery, appellant was referred to the multidisciplinary team of the Department of Children and Families for an assessment to determine whether he should be involuntarily committed as a sexually violent predator under the Jimmy Ryce Act. On July 9, 2008, the multidisciplinary team issued a written assessment finding that appellant met the definition of a sexually violent predator pursuant to the Act and recommending that the state attorney initiate proceedings for the involuntary civil commitment of appellant under the Act.

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On October 1, 2008, the state attorney filed a petition to involuntarily commit appellant as a sexually violent predator under the Act. The petition alleged that appellant was scheduled to be released from the custody of the Department of Corrections on October 5, 2008. On the day the petition was filed, the trial court entered an order finding probable cause to believe that appellant met the criteria of a sexually violent predator under the Act, ordering appellant’s transfer to the custody of the Department of Children and Families upon the completion of his sentence, and setting the case for trial on October 20, 2008. On October 8, 2008, the court appointed counsel for appellant who invoked his right to go to trial within thirty days of the finding of probable cause. The court again set the trial for October 20, 2008.

On October 10, 2008, the state filed a motion to continue the trial up to 120 days for good cause under the Act. The motion claimed that Dr. Jeffrey Musgrove, one of the two forensic psychologists on the multidisciplinary team, who personally evaluated appellant to determine whether he should be committed as a sexually violent predator under the Act, was out of the country and unavailable for trial. The motion also claimed that neither side would be able to complete discovery before the scheduled trial date. On October 13, 2008, a hearing was held on the state’s motion for continuance. Appellant’s counsel opposed the motion, claiming that appellant would be ready for trial on the scheduled date; that

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appellant would be substantially prejudiced by a continuance which would extend his pretrial detention beyond thirty days; and that the state had been dilatory when, without explanation, it delayed filing the commitment petition for almost three months, waiting until the eve of appellant’s release from prison. The state responded that appellant’s opposition to a continuance was “simply an attempt to put [the state] on the ropes and deprive the state of a fair trial,” and that the state was not at fault for the fact that appellant’s release date from prison had been moved up. The trial court indicated that it was not concerned about whether the state had shown good cause for a continuance under the Act, but was concerned whether appellant would be substantially prejudiced by a continuance. The trial court deferred making a ruling until the following day to allow the parties to submit any case law on the definition of “substantial prejudice.” The following day, the court entered an order granting the state’s motion for continuance, finding that the state demonstrated good cause and that the defense did not establish substantial prejudice as required by section 394.916(2), Florida Statutes. The court then scheduled the trial for the week of February 2, 2009. The trial was later continued to the week of February 9, 2009, by the stipulation of both parties.

On February 9, 2009, prior to jury selection, appellant moved to dismiss the state’s petition for failure to hold the trial within thirty days of the finding of probable cause. The trial court denied the motion. At the conclusion of the trial,

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the jury returned a unanimous verdict finding that appellant was a sexually violent predator. The following day, the trial court entered a final judgment that found appellant was a sexually violent predator and involuntarily committed him to the custody of the Department of Children and Families under the Act. This appeal follows.

Section 394.916, Florida Statutes (2008), provides in pertinent part:

(1) Within 30 days after the determination of probable cause, the court shall conduct a trial to determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator.

(2) The trial may be continued once upon the request of either party for not more than 120 days upon a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own motion in the interests of justice, when the person will not be substantially prejudiced. No additional continuances may be granted unless the court finds that a manifest injustice would otherwise occur.

Although our supreme court has held that the thirty-day deadline to conduct a trial is mandatory, it also has concluded that it is not jurisdictional because the statutory language authorizes continuances under certain circumstances. State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817, 828 (Fla. 2002). Thus, “[i]n cases where the alleged sexually violent predator will not be substantially prejudiced, a trial court is given authority to grant a continuance when one of the parties shows good cause or the court determines that the interests of justice so dictate.” Id. However, “where a respondent has completed his criminal sentence and is being detained awaiting a

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Ryce Act trial and the trial period has exceeded thirty days without a continuance for good cause, the respondent’s remedy is release from detention and a dismissal without prejudice of the pending proceedings.” Osborne v. State, 907 So. 2d 505, 509 (Fla. 2005).

Initially, we must determine whether the thirty-day deadline was validly extended in this case when the trial court granted the state’s motion for continuance. Generally, a trial court’s ruling on a motion for continuance is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Overton v. State, 976 So. 2d 536, 548 (Fla. 2007); Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119, 1127 (Fla. 2000). While we concede that the trial court could find that the state demonstrated good cause for a continuance, we believe that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the continuance because appellant was substantially prejudiced.

The statute does not define “substantially prejudiced.” Our supreme court has recognized that, because involuntary commitments ordinarily are supposed to take place while the person is still incarcerated, there will be situations where the thirty-day deadline would expire while the respondent is still incarcerated in which case “the State may be entitled to a continuance, because the respondent would not be substantially prejudiced.” Goode, 830 So. 2d at 828. However, in this case, appellant served his criminal sentence and would have been free but for his detention under the Jimmy Ryce Act. The only case in Florida to address a similar

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situation is Meadows v. Krischer, 763 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), which held that the respondent did not establish any substantial prejudice arising from a brief seven-day continuance under the Jimmy Ryce Act. In this case, the continuance was considerably longer, over three months. Although the state argues that appellant was not substantially prejudiced because the statute allows a continuance for good cause if it does not exceed 120 days, we conclude that such an interpretation would render the “substantially prejudiced” language superfluous. The statute allows a continuance for good cause up to 120 days if the person will not be substantially prejudiced. We conclude that appellant was substantially prejudiced by the extension of his pretrial detention by over three months. This problem could have been avoided if the state had not waited three months to file the petition as appellant was approaching his release date from prison. Appellant would not have been substantially prejudiced by a continuance if he was still serving his prison sentence.

Appellant agrees that if the thirty-day deadline was not validly extended when the trial court granted the state’s motion for continuance, the proper remedy is appellant’s release and the dismissal of the state’s petition without prejudice. This remedy contemplates that “the State may be entitled to continue the proceedings, but the respondent may be entitled to his freedom where the State has not scrupulously complied with the Act’s provisions.” Mitchell v. State, 911 So.

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2d 1211, 1219 (Fla. 2005). Thus, dismissal without prejudice would release appellant from custody without depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over the case. See Madison v. State, 27 So. 3d 61, 63 (Fla. 1st DCA) (holding that the only jurisdictional requirement is that the respondent is in lawful custody when the state initiates commitment proceedings under the Jimmy Ryce Act by referring the respondent to the multidisciplinary team for evaluation), rev. denied, 24 So. 3d 559 (Fla. 2009). However, any relief provided by a dismissal without prejudice would be moot in this case because appellant already has been tried and committed under the Act. A dismissal without prejudice would only prolong the proceedings by allowing the state to refile the petition and requiring yet another trial. The purpose of the thirty-day deadline is to minimize pretrial detention by requiring commitment trials to be held promptly, not to give respondents a proverbial “second bite at the apple.”

We believe that, to further the legislature’s intent that such trials be held promptly, the proper remedy in such cases is for the respondent to file a motion to dismiss the petition as soon as the thirty-day deadline has expired, and to seek immediate relief by habeas corpus if the motion is denied. See Murray v. Regier, 872 So. 2d 217, 221-22 (Fla. 2002) (recognizing that a habeas corpus petition is a proper means to challenge the legality of pretrial detention under the Jimmy Ryce Act); Williams v. State, 870 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (considering the

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merits of a petition for writ of habeas corpus which sought immediate release because petitioner was not brought to trial within thirty days of the trial court’s finding of probable cause under the Jimmy Ryce Act); Ennis v. Regier, 869 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that the habeas corpus petitioner would be entitled to immediate release if he was not brought to trial within thirty days and the state did not properly seek a continuance under the Jimmy Ryce Act); Meadows, 763 So. 2d at 1088-89 (considering the merits of a petition for writ of habeas corpus and/or prohibition challenging the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss for failure to hold the trial within thirty days under the Jimmy Ryce Act). See also Kinder v. State, 779 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (granting a petition for writ of prohibition, which the court treated as a petition for writ of mandamus, challenging the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss for failure to hold the trial within thirty days under the Jimmy Ryce Act), approved, 830 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 2002). Thus, we conclude that appellant waived his claim by waiting to raise it in this appeal rather than seeking immediate relief by habeas corpus upon expiration of the thirty-day deadline. However, because this issue appears to be one of first impression, we certify the following question as one of great public importance:

WHEN A RESPONDENT WHO HAS SERVED HIS OR HER PRISON SENTENCE IS NOT BROUGHT TO TRIAL WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF THE FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE UNDER THE JIMMY RYCE

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ACT, MUST THE RESPONDENT FILE A MOTION TO DISMISS AND, IF THE MOTION IS DENIED, SEEK RELIEF BY HABEAS CORPUS, TO PRESERVE THE CLAIM THAT THE MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED?

In conclusion, we affirm appellant’s involuntary civil commitment under the Act, but certify the above question to our supreme court.

Jeffrey Lewis, Regional Conflict Counsel, and Laura Anstead, Assistant Conflict Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Donna A. Gerace, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Angela C. Dempsey, Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Mr. Johnny Rosier appeals his judgment and sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Mr. Rosier raises several issues on appeal; however, we address only one issue here. Mr. Rosier asserts that the trial judge erred by not

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conducting a competency hearing as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210 after a prior judge appointed a medical expert to evaluate Mr. Rosier’s competency to proceed to trial. The state properly concedes error. See Cochran v. State, 954 So. 2d 1279, 1279 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). In relevant part, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b) requires,

If, at any material stage of a criminal proceeding, the court of its own motion, or on motion of counsel for the defendant or for the state, has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is not mentally competent to proceed, the court shall immediately enter its order setting a time for a hearing to determine the defendant’s mental condition, which shall be held no later than 20 days after the date of the filing of the motion….

Here, the original trial judge ordered a medical expert to evaluate Mr. Rosier’s competency to proceed to trial after conducting the following colloquy with Mr. Rosier:

THE COURT: You had a stroke, right?

MR. ROSIER: Left side, yes, sir.

THE COURT: Left side stroke. I think I need to send you to a doctor, all right? And I think that’s what I’m going to do. I’m going to send you to go see a doctor….

THE COURT: Go to the doctor. I’m not going to give you a new lawyer. You’re not going to get a better lawyer than that one over there. So I’m going to send you to a doctor. Ms. McMullen, would you submit me an order?

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DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes. The doctor that we requested was Doctor D['E]errico.

THE COURT: Perfect. That will be so ordered and we’ll get the order. You go see this doctor and remember I’m the guy who let you out and trust me that I’m trying to follow the law. Okay, Mr. Rosier?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. But you’re sending me to a doctor, I don’t trust every–I done already had a stroke on my left side and sending me to a doctor that I’m not aware of

THE COURT: The doctor’s not going to do anything to you. He’s going to–MR. ROSIER: I don’t trust people.

THE COURT: Well, you don’t have to trust him. He’s not going to do anything to you. He’s not going give you any medicine or cut on you or anything like that. He’s going to tell me about you is what he’s going to do. That’s all he’s going to do. All right?

MR. ROSIER: To test my competency.

THE COURT: Exactly. That’s exactly right.

Based upon the colloquy, the court recognized that Mr. Rosier’s competency to proceed to trial was in question; therefore, a competency hearing was required under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b). Accordingly, we reverse Mr. Rosier’s conviction and sentence, and we remand to the trial court to hold a competency hearing, and once Mr. Rosier is found competent to proceed, to conduct a new trial. See Cochran, 954 So. 2d at 1279.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Michael T. Kennett, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County. Paul A. Rasmussen, Judge.

PER CURIAM.

In this direct criminal appeal, appellant seeks review of his conviction for lewd and lascivious molestation by a person 18 years of age or older on a person

younger than 12, and of his resulting sentence to life in prison. He raises four issues. We conclude that all lack merit. We address each issue briefly, however, for the benefit of the parties and their lawyers.

Appellant first claims that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of collateral acts of child molestation because those acts were not sufficiently similar and because they became a feature of the trial. We disagree. We believe the collateral acts were “strikingly similar” to that with which appellant was charged, and that they did not become a feature of the trial.

Appellant next claims that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a mistrial made after appellant responded in the affirmative to the prosecutor’s question regarding whether appellant was in the country illegally. The trial court sustained appellant’s objection, and instructed the jury that whether appellant was in the country illegally was irrelevant to the factual determinations they must make and, therefore, should be disregarded. Given the single brief mention of appellant’s status as an illegal immigrant and the overwhelming evidence of guilt, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.

Appellant also claims that the trial court erroneously overruled an objection to a question regarding appellant’s residence. Again, we disagree. The prosecutor asked appellant his address on the date of the incident. In a non-responsive

answer, appellant testified that he had been living in a “Christian ministry program” which he was not permitted to leave. The question was clearly relevant because it was designed to establish that appellant was living in relatively close proximity to the place where the incident occurred. It only became problematic when appellant gave a non-responsive answer. Moreover, it is equally possible that the answer helped, rather than hurt, appellant because the jury might have inferred that, because appellant was not free to leave the property, he could not have committed the offense.

Appellant’s final claim is that, as applied to him, the statutory scheme which requires a sentence of either life in prison or not less than 25 years in prison followed by probation or community control for the remainder of the offender’s life constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the state and federal constitutions. We are unable to agree that this punishment is “grossly disproportionate” to the offense appellant committed. Accordingly, pursuant to the analysis set out in Adaway v. State, 902 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 2005), the punishment is not cruel and unusual pursuant to either the state or the federal constitution.

Appellant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Richard M. Summa, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Charlie McCoy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Mark H. Mahon, Judge.

CLARK, J.

The appellant was convicted of sale or delivery of cocaine, as proscribed by section 893.13(1)(a)(1), Florida Statutes. In this appeal he challenges the constitutionality of that statute, in that it makes the offense a felony without

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requiring that guilty knowledge be an element of the crime. Relying on language in Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994), and Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996), the appellant argues that this offends substantive due process. Staples and Chicone referred to regulatory offenses in the public welfare, and the level of punishment thereunder, in discussing principles of statutory construction where there has not been a clear expression of legislative intent as to whether guilty knowledge is an element of a crime. But in response to Chicone and Scott v. State, 808 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 2002), the Florida legislature clearly expressed its intent in section 893.101, Florida Statutes, by stating that “knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance” is not an element of an offense under chapter 893, and that instead lack of such knowledge is an affirmative defense. That provision has been upheld in other cases upon due process challenges. See e.g. Harris v. State, 932 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). The appellant’s due process challenge is likewise without merit.

Georgette E. Beller, Assistant Public Defender, Panama City, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.

Michael C. Overstreet, Judge.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal is untimely. The appellant sought review of a judgment and sentence rendered on January 8, 2010. The notice of appeal, filed on March 23,

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2010, was filed more than thirty days after this date of rendition. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b). In response to a sua sponte order, the appellant argued that the Court’s jurisdiction was timely invoked because rendition had been delayed until March 19, 2010, by a timely Motion to Modify Sentence that was filed to correct a sentencing error. A timely motion to correct a sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(1) will stay rendition under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h). However, the attached motion did not raise a sentencing error or otherwise challenge the sentence as erroneous. Rather, the appellant sought a reduction and modification of his sentence due to mitigating factors that were detailed in the motion, which was brought pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c). “A motion to reduce a sentence is not a post-judgment motion which tolls the time for filing an appeal.” Klemba v. State, 490 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). See Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h); Jones v. State, 28 So. 3d 981 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Additionally, an order on a 3.800(c) motion is not appealable. Davis v. State, 745 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Daniels v. State, 568 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the orders on appeal.

DISMISSED.

Robert D. Kornagay, pro se, Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. L. P. Haddock, Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Robert D. Kornagay, Appellant, challenges the trial court’s denial of his postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel filed pursuant to

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Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The trial court’s denial of claims III and V was proper. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of these claims.

The trial court’s summary denial of claims I, II, IV, VI, and VII was improper. Appellant sufficiently alleged that he is entitled to postconviction relief on these grounds. The State correctly concedes that the trial court improperly relied on its response to Appellant’s postconviction motion in summarily denying Appellant’s facially sufficient claims on grounds I, II, IV, and VI. Additionally, in ground I, Appellant argues that both his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. His claim against appellate counsel is not cognizable in a Rule 3.850 motion. Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 21 (Fla. 2003) (holding that “claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are not cognizable in postconviction motions, and should be raised in a habeas petition”). Consequently, we do not consider his claim against appellate counsel here. Regarding his remaining claims in grounds I, II, IV, VI, and VII, we reverse and remand for the trial court to either attach portions of the record conclusively refuting these claims or for an evidentiary hearing. See Foster v. State, 993 So. 2d 97, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED and REMANDED in part, with directions.

Michael Ufferman, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Michael T. Kennett, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Walton County. Kelvin C. Wells, Judge.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm appellant’s convictions for false swearing to any oath or false certification of nomination and submission of false voter registration information.

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However, as conceded by the State, the trial court did err in failing to conduct an inquiry pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), at appellant’s sentencing hearing. “Sentencing is a crucial stage of a criminal proceeding, so that the offer of assistance of counsel must be renewed then, even if the defendant has previously waived counsel at other stages.” Travis v. State, 969 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); see also Descault v. State, 20 So. 3d 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). We affirm appellant’s convictions but strike his sentence and remand for resentencing following a proper Faretta inquiry.