Archive for the ‘5th District Court of Appeal’ Category

BILL PLOWMAN, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

Friday, December 30th, 2011

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2011

BILL PLOWMAN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

Case No. 5D10-3422

Opinion filed December 30, 2011

3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hernando County,

Jack Springstead, Judge.

Bill Plowman, Crawfordville, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PALMER, J.

Bill Plowman appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Plowman’s rule 3.850 motion raised ten grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied one ground after an evidentiary hearing and summarily denied the rest. We find merit in the arguments raised as to grounds 2 and 8.

In ground 2, Plowman alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress statements he made during his arrest, as well as notes and letters found in his truck.1 The trial court summarily denied this ground, concluding that Plowman waived any suppression issues by entering his plea of nolo contendere and, thus, that a suppression motion would not have been supported by law. Regarding the notes and letters, the court stated alternatively that Plowman lacked standing to seek suppression of these items that “he left in a company truck.”

Plowman argues that he did not waive this ineffective assistance of counsel claim by entering his plea. We agree. A plea waives certain defenses for purposes of direct appeal. Lacey v. State, 831 So. 2d 1267, 1271 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Boddie v. State, 328 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). However, a plea does not waive ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding counsel’s failure to raise those defenses. See Skellie v. State, 849 So. 2d 1220, 1220 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“Although [defendant] waived all defenses by entering the plea, he nevertheless may be entitled to 3.850 relief if he can show that counsel did not adequately investigate or pursue a viable defense.”); Robinson v. State, 972 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (holding that plea did not waive claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to seek suppression).

Because this ground was not legally insufficient on its face, the trial court was required to attach record documents conclusively refuting it. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(d) (2009). The court failed to do so as to Plowman’s arrest statements. Additionally, as to the notes and letters found in the truck, the trial court failed to attach documents to

1 Plowman also raised an issue regarding suppression of photographs within this ground, but we affirm as to that issue.

support its rationale that these items were found in a “company” truck in which Plowman lacked a privacy interest sufficient for standing to seek suppression. As noted above, Plowman alleged that they were found in his truck.

In ground 8, Plowman alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective because he filed a demand for speedy trial under rule 3.191(b), but thereafter failed to invoke the procedure for discharge. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(b)(4), (p)(2)-(3) (2008). The trial court summarily denied this ground, stating: “[T]he defendant . . . waived speedy trial at his first pre-trial on December 14, 2007. There was no basis in law to file a motion for speedy trial discharge.” However, the court failed to attach documents showing a waiver of speedy trial. In addition, Plowman alleged defense counsel subsequently filed a demand for speedy trial. After a waiver, speedy trial rights can be reactivated by filing a rule 3.191(b) demand for speedy trial. State v. Gibson, 783 So. 2d 1155, 1158 n.2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); see Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968, 970 (Fla. 1980) (holding same under predecessor of rule 3.191(b)).

Accordingly, as to these two grounds, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for the trial court to attach record documents conclusively refuting the grounds or to hold an evidentiary hearing. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(d).

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

ORFINGER, C.J., and GRIFFIN, J., concur.

ELVIS QUIMI, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

Friday, December 30th, 2011

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2011

ELVIS QUIMI,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

Case No. 5D10-4198

Opinion filed December 30, 2011

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County,

Tim Shea, Judge.

A. Mauricio Hued, of Hued & Valedon, P.A., Maitland, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We find no error, fundamental or otherwise, in the admission of Mr. Quimi’s statement to the police. The mid-trial, oral motion to suppress made after the statement had been admitted without objection, should have been denied by the trial court on the merits.

AFFIRMED.

ORFINGER, C.J., SAWAYA and EVANDER, JJ., concur.

ANN MARIE FARLEY, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

Friday, December 30th, 2011

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2011

ANN MARIE FARLEY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

Case No. 5D11-1206

Opinion filed December 30, 2011

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Osceola County,

Scott Polodna, Judge.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Steven N. Gosney, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Megan Saillant, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Based on a careful review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was simply insufficient to show that appellant, as opposed to some other individual, took the victim’s iPhone.

REVERSED and REMANDED for Entry of Judgment of Acquittal.

ORFINGER, C.J., SAWAYA and EVANDER, JJ., concur.

ANDRE FRISON, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

Friday, December 30th, 2011

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2011

ANDRE FRISON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

Case No. 5D11-2392

Opinion filed December 30, 2011

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Seminole County,

Jessica J. Recksiedler, Judge.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and David S. Morgan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison Leigh Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

GRIFFIN, J.

Andre Frison ["Frison"] appeals the sentence that he received upon resentencing. He contends it was error to resentence him without counsel. We agree and reverse.

Frison was sentenced in 1989 to life in prison for sexual battery with a deadly weapon pursuant to section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes (1987). He was originally

sentenced to 100 years in prison, but, after his appeal, he was resentenced to life in prison.

Frison then filed a pro se rule 3.800 motion to correct illegal sentence seeking resentencing on the basis of Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).1 The State conceded that because Frison was a juvenile at the time he committed the charged offense, Graham applied, making his life sentence without the possibility of parole an illegal sentence. At the hearing on the rule 3.800 motion, the court asked for the prosecutor’s position concerning sentencing. The prosecutor agreed that Frison could not be sentenced to life and asked for the maximum allowed of forty years. The trial court granted the motion and immediately resentenced Frison to forty years in prison followed by one year of community control and life probation. The transcript of the hearing makes clear that the purpose of the hearing was to consider Frison’s rule 3.800 motion to correct illegal sentence. There is no indication from the record that Frison was aware that a resentencing would occur, and he did not have counsel.

On appeal, Frison contends that he was denied due process because he did not receive notice of sentencing, he was not allowed to speak at the hearing, and, most notably, that he was not represented by an attorney.

In both capital and noncapital cases, our supreme court has held that resentencing is a new proceeding. State v. Collins, 985 So. 2d 985, 989 (Fla. 2008). A defendant has a due process right to notice of the sentencing hearing, the right to be heard and the right to legal representation. Stang v. State, 24 So. 3d 566, 570 (Fla. 2d

1 The United States Supreme Court held that “the Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.” 130 S. Ct. at 2034.

DCA 2009). “Resentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding in which the full panoply of due process considerations attach, including the appointment of counsel.” Payne v. State, 38 So. 3d 827, 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). An indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel at resentencing after prevailing on a rule 3.800 motion. Mahone v. State, 39 So. 3d 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

The State acknowledges that a defendant is entitled to counsel at a resentencing hearing, even when a rule 3.800(a) motion is granted. However, the State asserts that this is not required when the trial court is merely conducting a ministerial act. The State contends that Frison’s resentencing was merely “ministerial” because all of the parties agreed that, under Graham, Frison’s life sentence was illegal; therefore, the only option remaining upon resentencing was the imposition of a forty-year sentence. In other words, the State asserts that the imposition of the forty-year sentence was mandatory; thus, there was no need for appointed counsel.

Frison was originally convicted of sexual battery with a deadly weapon, a life felony under section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1987). The 1987 version of section 794.011 states:

A person who commits sexual battery upon a person 12 years of age or older, without that person’s consent, and in the process thereof uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon or uses actual physical force likely to cause serious personal injury is guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

Section 775.082(3), Florida Statutes (1987) states in pertinent part:

(3) A person who has been convicted of any other designated felony may be punished as follows:

(a) For a life felony committed prior to October 1, 1983, by a

term of imprisonment for life or for a term of years not less

than 30 and, for a life felony committed on or after October 1, 1983, by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 40 years.

(Emphasis added). The emphasized language of section 775.082(3)(a) gives the court the discretion to sentence Frison to less than forty years. Moreover, Frison was entitled to be heard on the community control and life probation. Frison is entitled to a new resentencing hearing and to counsel.

SENTENCE VACATED and REMANDED.

MONACO and SAWAYA, JJ., concur.

JON A. REGISTER, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.

Friday, December 30th, 2011

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2011

JON A. REGISTER,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

Case No. 5D11-3185

Opinion filed December 30, 2011

Petition for Belated Appeal,

A Case of Original Jurisdiction.

Jon A. Register, Milton, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Jon A. Register, Petitioner, seeks a belated appeal of his judgment and sentence in Osceola County case number 2004-CF-000152, asserting that immediately following sentencing, he requested his attorney, Jose Baez, to file an appeal, but counsel failed to do so. On October 27, 2011, this Court ordered the appointment of a commissioner to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make a finding of fact as to whether Petitioner timely communicated to the trial attorney his desire to appeal the judgment and sentence. The commissioner conducted a hearing; however, he made no findings as to

whether Petitioner made a timely request to his counsel to file an appeal. Because the sworn testimony of Petitioner was not refuted, we grant Petitioner’s request for a belated appeal. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence in case number 2004-CF-000152, in the Circuit Court in and for Osceola County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

SAWAYA, COHEN and JACOBUS, JJ., concur.

MICHAEL W. KLINE, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

Friday, December 30th, 2011

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2011

MICHAEL W. KLINE,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

Case No. 5D11-3537

Opinion filed December 30, 2011

3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Citrus County,

Richard A. Howard, Judge.

Michael W. Kline, Madison, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Michael Kline appeals the summary denial of his Rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. Because the written sentencing orders are inconsistent with the oral pronouncement at sentencing (as well as the terms of the plea agreement), we reverse.

On January 27, 2010, Kline entered into a plea agreement to resolve three felony charges—felony fleeing or attempting to elude (Case No. 2009-CF-1198), dealing in stolen property (Case No. 2009-CF-1195), and violation of probation on a grand theft

offense (Case No. 2009-CF-419). The plea agreement provided for Kline to receive a seven-year habitual felony offender (HFO) prison sentence in Case Number 2009-CF­1198 and concurrent five-year prison sentences on the other two charges. The trial court, consistent with the plea agreement, orally pronounced an HFO sentence only as to the felony charge in Case No. 2009-CF-1198. However, the written judgment(s) erroneously recited that Kline was sentenced as an HFO in all three cases.

A written sentence that conflicts with the oral pronouncement and sentence imposed in open court is an illegal sentence, cognizable in a motion to correct illegal sentence. See Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2007); Beard v. State, 27 So. 3d 186 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). On remand, the trial court shall correct the written judgment(s) to provide that Kline was sentenced as an HFO in Case No. 2009-CF-1198 only. The other issues raised by Kline are without merit.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED, in part; REMANDED.

ORFINGER, C.J., TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur.

YESSY GEORGE, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.

Friday, December 30th, 2011

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2011

YESSY GEORGE,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

Case No. 5D11-3969

Opinion filed December 30, 2011

Petition for Belated Appeal,

A Case of Original Jurisdiction.

Robert Wesley, Public Defender, and Alena Valeria Baker, Assistant Public Defender, Orlando, for Petitioner.

No Appearance for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence in case number CF11-5085-O, in the Circuit Court in and for Orange County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(5)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

TYRONE DONTE GLADDEN, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.

Friday, December 2nd, 2011

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2011

TYRONE DONTE GLADDEN,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

Case No. 5D11-3694

Opinion filed December 2, 2011

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, A Case of Original Jurisdiction.

Robert Wesley, Public Defender and Linna L. Gonzalez-Suarez, Assistant Public Defender, Orlando, for Petitioner.

No Appearance for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence in case no. CF11-2433-O, in the Circuit Court in and for Orange County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

ANQUON TRAVON NORFLEET, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.

Friday, December 2nd, 2011

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2011

ANQUON TRAVON NORFLEET,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

Case No. 5D11-3524

Opinion filed December 2, 2011

Petition for Belated Appeal

A Case of Original Jurisdiction.

Anquon Travon Norfleet, Blountstown, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General

Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal, filed October 17, 2011, is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence in case no. 10-CF-007123-C-O, in the Circuit Court in and for Orange County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

WALTER E. WHYNOT, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.

Friday, December 2nd, 2011

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2011

WALTER E. WHYNOT,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

Case No. 5D11-3255

Opinion filed December 2, 2011

Petition for Belated Appeal,

A Case of Original Jurisdiction.

Walter Whynot, Malone, pro se.

Pamela J. Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General,

Daytona Beach, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the order granting in part and denying in part, Defendant’s motion to correct sentence in Case No. 05-2004-CF­036389-A, in the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.